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Stevens, Rebecca S

Publications and source records attributed to Stevens, Rebecca S.

NNSA's next generation safeguards initiative to define an effective state system of accounting and control

The International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), the international outreach component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), is a collaborative program that endeavors to strengthen international safeguards at all stages of nuclear development. One of the critical ways the program achieves this objective is through working with partners to increase the effectiveness of the State System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) - the essential elements of national, regulatory and facility safeguards competencies that work as a system to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the world the full assurance of the state's adherence to its safeguards agreements. INSEP provides assistance in developing a state's SSAC in a number of areas, from developing national legislation governing the possession and use of nuclear material to working with nuclear facility operators to developing good practices in waste management. INSEP has collaborated with foreign partners in peaceful nuclear applications for over two decades, but recently, it has focused its efforts on strengthening SSACs due to the growth of nuclear power worldwide, particularly in countries with limited nuclear infrastructures. This new area of focus has prompted INSEP to develop a model of SSAC competencies that will serve not only as a structure for its engagement with partner states, but also as a means to facilitate coordination with other states that provide training and assistance, and as a mechanism for evaluating the effectiveness of its work in reaching its intended objectives. While this model uses as its starting point the requirements on a State that are presented in the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol, it is not, in itself, a requirements document or guidance for implementing requirements. It is rather an analysis of what capabilities will be needed in a State to be able to meet requirements and to build confidence in the State System. Viewed from this perspective, the model can be thought of as a quality assurance tool that assists states in ensuring that the outputs of their State System (the tangible 'goods' that are provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency under the State's agreements) are of high quality. As such, this tool is for the internal use of a State System that wishes to assess and improve its capacity. It is not intended for comparison or outside evaluation. In addition to providing a self-assessment tool, INSEP expects this model to be useful in several other ways: it will inform the approach that INSEP uses in bilateral consultations to identify areas where INSEP outreach and training may be of value, and it will provide a structure for its training curriculum. It will help INSEP to evaluate the effectiveness of its outreach - where there are gaps in the training provided, and whether the training that is provided meets its stated objectives. Finally, it will provide a framework for coordinating with the IAEA and other member states in the 'harmonization' efforts currently underway to align the outreach efforts of states that provide safeguards training. This paper describes the process of evaluation that INSEP is developing. It looks at the expected usefulness of the metrics for conducting self-assessments and joint assessments and enabling partners to identify training needs. The paper begins with a description of various performance requirements that define what must be done at the state and facility level to implement effective and efficient international safeguards. Next, technical performance measures are discussed, that define how well a state and its facilities are fulfilling these requirements. Then a functional analysis is conducted to align the technical requirements with competencies and determine who should carry out the various activities necessary to fulfill the performance requirements. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion about SEP's approach in applying the metrics to its outreach activities intended to help countries to implement high-functioning SSACs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Building safeguards infrastructure

Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NGSI student activities in open source information analysis in support of the training program of the U.S. DOE laboratories for the entry into force of the additional protocol

In 2008 a joint team from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) consisting of specialists in training of IAEA inspectors in the use of complementary access activities formulated a training program to prepare the U.S. Doe laboratories for the entry into force of the Additional Protocol. As a major part of the support of the activity, LANL summer interns provided open source information analysis to the LANL-BNL mock inspection team. They were a part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's (NGSI) summer intern program aimed at producing the next generation of safeguards specialists. This paper describes how they used open source information to 'backstop' the LANL-BNL team's effort to construct meaningful Additional Protocol Complementary Access training scenarios for each of the three DOE laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Future challenges and DOE/NNSA-JAEA cooperation for the development of advanced safeguards

The United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) has been cooperating with Japan on nuclear safeguards for over thirty years. DOE/NNSA has collaborated with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and its predecessors in addressing the need for innovative solutions to nuclear transparency and verification issues in one of the world's most advanced nuclear fuel cycle states. This collaboration includes over ninety activities that have involved nearly every facility in the JAEA complex and many national laboratories in the U.S. complex. The partnership has yielded new technologies and approaches that have benefited international safeguards not only in Japan, but around the world. The International Atomic Energy Agency uses a number of safeguards solutions developed under this collaboration to improve its inspection efforts in Japan and elsewhere. Japanese facilities serve as test beds for emerging safeguards technologies and are setting the trend for new nuclear energy and fuel cycle development worldwide. The collaboration continues to be an essential component of U.S. safeguards outreach and is integral to the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. In addition to fostering international safeguards development, the cooperation is an opportunity for U.S. scientists to work in facilities that have no analog in the United States, thus providing crucial real-life experience for and aiding development of the next generation of U.S. safeguards specialists. It is also an important element of promoting regional transparency thereby building confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear programs in the region. The successes engendered by this partnership provide a strong basis for addressing future safeguards challenges, in Japan and elsewhere. This paper summarizes these challenges and the associated cooperative efforts that are either underway or anticipated.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗