Search NASASearch

Engineering topics

Stewart, Christine E.

Publications and source records attributed to Stewart, Christine E..

Spacecraft Parachute Recovery System Testing from a Failure Rate Perspective

Spacecraft parachute recovery systems, especially those with a parachute cluster, require testing to identify and reduce failures. This is especially important when the spacecraft in question is human-rated. Due to the recent effort to make spaceflight affordable, the importance of determining a minimum requirement for testing has increased. The number of tests required to achieve a mature design, with a relatively constant failure rate, can be estimated from a review of previous complex spacecraft recovery systems. Examination of the Apollo parachute testing and the Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster recovery chute system operation will clarify at which point in those programs the system reached maturity. This examination will also clarify the risks inherent in not performing a sufficient number of tests prior to operation with humans on-board. When looking at complex parachute systems used in spaceflight landing systems, a pattern begins to emerge regarding the need for a minimum amount of testing required to wring out the failure modes and reduce the failure rate of the parachute system to an acceptable level for human spaceflight. Not only a sufficient number of system level testing, but also the ability to update the design as failure modes are found is required to drive the failure rate of the system down to an acceptable level. In addition, sufficient data and images are necessary to identify incipient failure modes or to identify failure causes when a system failure occurs. In order to demonstrate the need for sufficient system level testing prior to an acceptable failure rate, the Apollo Earth Landing System (ELS) test program and the Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Recovery System failure history will be examined, as well as some experiences in the Orion Capsule Parachute Assembly System will be noted.

Stewart, Christine E.

Human Rating the Orion Parachute System

Human rating begins with design. Converging on the requirements and identifying the risks as early as possible in the design process is essential. Understanding of the interaction between the recovery system and the spacecraft will in large part dictate the achievable reliability of the final design. Component and complete system full-scale flight testing is critical to assure a realistic evaluation of the performance and reliability of the parachute system. However, because testing is so often difficult and expensive, comprehensive analysis of test results and correlation to accurate modeling completes the human rating process. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Orion program uses parachutes to stabilize and decelerate the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) spacecraft during subsonic flight in order to deliver a safe water landing. This paper describes the approach that CEV Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) will take to human rate the parachute recovery system for the CEV.

Machin, Ricardo A.

Safety Panel Resources

The goal of this paper is to explore what resources are potentially available to safety panels and to provide some guidance on how to utilize those resources. While the examples used in this paper will concentrate on the Flight Equipment and Reliability Review Panel (FESRRP) and Extravehicular Activity (EVA) hardware that have come through that panel, as well as resources at Johnson Space Center, the paper will address how this applies to safety panels in general, and where possible cite examples for other safety panels.

Stewart, Christine E.

EVA Hazards due to TPS Inspection and Repair

Tile inspection and repair activities have implicit hazards associated with them. When an Extra Vehicular Activities (EVA) crewmember and associated hardware are added into the equation, additional hazards are introduced. Potential hazards to the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), the Orbiter or the crew member themselves are created. In order to accurately assess the risk of performing a TPS inspection or repair, an accurate evaluation of potential hazards and how adequately these hazards are controlled is essential. The EMU could become damaged due to sharp edges, protrusions, thermal extremes, molten metal or impact with the Orbiter. Tools, tethers and the presence of a crew member in the vicinity of the Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) pose hazards to the Orbiter. Hazards such as additional tile or Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) damage from a loose tool, safety tethers, crewmember or arm impact are introduced. Additionally, there are hazards to the crew which should be addressed. Crew hazards include laser injury, electrical shock, inability to return to the airlock for EMU failures or Orbiter rapid safing scenarios, as well as the potential inadvertent release of a crew member from the arm/boom. The aforementioned hazards are controlled in various ways. Generally, these controls are addressed operationally versus by design, as the majority of the interfaces are to the Orbiter and the Orbiter design did not originally account for tile repair. The Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS), for instance, was originally designed to deploy experiments, and therefore has insufficient design controls for retention of the Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS). Although multiple methods to repair the Orbiter TPS exist, the majority of the hazards are applicable no matter which specific repair method is being performed. TPS Inspection performed via EVA also presents some of the same hazards. Therefore, the hazards common to all TPS inspection or repair methods will be addressed.

Stewart, Christine E.