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Suh, Rainbow

Publications and source records attributed to Suh, Rainbow.

Safeguards Considerations for Salt Fuel Fabrication

Molten salt reactors (MSR) with liquid fuel present a unique safeguards challenge whereby the current verification techniques have not been evaluated for effectiveness and applicability. While MSR operations have been the subject of prior studies, the front-end liquid fuel preparation activities have not been extensively evaluated. Reviewing the existing resources on fuel fabrication and evaluating the range of fuel fabrication process options available will allow safeguards analysts to identify the applicability of existing safeguards practices, identify gaps in capability, and identify opportunities where safeguards may be applied. There is no existing supplier of fuel salt for MSRs. In an extensive review of MSR technology, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA's) Nuclear Power Technology Development Section acknowledges the gap in existing capabilities for fuel salt fabrication, noting, simply, “if demand exists, supply will appear.” Salt reactor fuel has not been previously produced on an industrial scale in a non-nuclear weapon state. These characteristics of MSR fuel fabrication present high levels of uncertainty, but they also represent an opportunity to mature safeguards techniques alongside liquid fuel preparation technologies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safeguarding Commercial Breed and Burn Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors

A new class of reactors is under development in the United States. These new reactor designs use fast neutron spectra and rely on fuel technology advancements to reach fleet-wide operating conditions where neither enrichment nor reprocessing fuel are required to sustain or grow the fleet. Achieving this level of operation requires nuclear fuel that can remain in the reactor environment for much longer than current limits. The transfer of irradiated fuel is also required as the initial fissile source for new and replacement reactors. This class of reactors is known as breed and burn reactors and can be deployed as a fleet whereby the transfer of fuel is used to power subsequent generations of reactors. The use of breed and burn reactors reduces, and potentially eliminates, the need for enrichment and reprocessing to sustain a reactor fleet. Currently, enrichment and reprocessing plants require extremely complicated safeguards implementation and offer States diversion pathways for indirect use material. By eliminating the need for these facilities, a nuclear power fleet based on the BREED AND BURN reactor concept has the potential to indirectly reduce the burden on IAEA safeguards. However, this complex dynamic system does pose new safeguards challenges that are explored further in this report.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Safeguards Considerations for Coated Particle Fuel Fabrication Facilities

This study aims to identify where existing fuel fabrication safeguards are limited in application to coated particle fuel fabrication facilities; perform a review of techniques that may be appropriate to address these limitations; and identify where further study is required. The purpose is to ensure the necessary technology and safeguards developments are established to facilitate safeguards-by-design for coated particle fuel fabrication facilities, analogous to the research and development (R&D) efforts in the advanced reactor space, including those requiring coated particle fuels and progress to higher technology readiness levels. Finally, this study will also help meet high priority objectives set forth by the IAEA in establishing safeguards R&D precedence and measurement/procedural standards at emerging fuel fabrication facilities. To achieve these objectives, the report is formatted to (1) distill relevant background information on fuel fabrication of oxide and coated particle fuels; (2) provide an overview of the fuel fabrication techniques for a reference oxide fuel fabrication facility and two selected TRISO fuel fabrication facilities; (3) develop facility models of safeguards approaches for the reference facility and the two TRISO facilities; and (4) identify any observed technology needs or gaps from this analysis.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗