Engineering topics

Swegle, John A.

Publications and source records attributed to Swegle, John A..

6 records

DOE OSTI2016

The Middle East. Domestic sufficiency of fossil fuel resources

In this paper, we’ve compared energy production and consumption across the broader Middle East, paying special attention to three different countries; Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s largest oil producers (second in the CIA World Factbook ranking of crude oil producing countries), with a growing population in the mid-range (47th in the world, according to the CIA World Factbook, and fifth among the nations in this region), a large GDP and GDP per capita (15th in the world, second in this region in GDP, and 21st in GDP per capita in the world, just behind the US at 19th); Qatar, the world’s fourth largest producer of natural gas, with a small native population (and a relatively large foreign labor contingent) that is very wealthy (with the world’s highest GDP per capita, more than twice that of the US); and Egypt, the most populous nation in the region (with the world’s 16th largest population), but relatively poor (with a GDP per capita of about a fifth that of the US and a twelfth that of Qatar); Egypt is a significant energy producer – 29th in the world in crude oil production and 17th in natural gas production – but production has stalled or declined in recent years, and domestic consumption has overtaken production.

02 PETROLEUM↗

DOE OSTI2013

Reductions without Regret: Avoiding Wrong Turns, Roach Motels, and Box Canyons

This is the third of three papers (in addition to an introductory summary) aimed at providing a framework for evaluating future reductions or modifications of the U.S. nuclear force, first by considering previous instances in which nuclear-force capabilities were eliminated; second by looking forward into at least the foreseeable future at the features of global and regional deterrence (recognizing that new weapon systems currently projected will have expected lifetimes stretching beyond our ability to predict the future); and third by providing examples of past or possible undesirable outcomes in the shaping of the future nuclear force, as well as some closing thoughts for the future. In this paper, we provide one example each of our judgments on what constitutes a box canyon, a roach motel, and a wrong turn: Wrong Turn: The Reliable Replacement Warhead: Roach Motel: SRAM T vs the B61: and A Possible Box Canyon: A Low-Yield Version of the W76 SLBM Warhead. Recognizing that new nuclear missions or weapons are not demanded by current circumstances ₋ a development path that yields future capabilities similar to those of today, which are adequate if not always ideal, and a broader national-security strategy that supports nonproliferation and arms control by reducing the role for, and numbers, of nuclear weapons ₋ we briefly consider alternate, less desirable futures, and their possible effect on the complex problem of regional deterrence. In this regard, we discuss the issues posed by, and possible responses to, three example regional deterrence challenges: in-country defensive use of nuclear weapons by an adversary; reassurance of U.S. allies with limited strategic depth threatened by an emergent nuclear power; and extraterritorial, non-strategic offensive use of nuclear weapons by an adversary in support of limited military objectives against a U.S. ally.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2013

Reductions without Regret: Defining the Needed Capabilities

This is the second of three papers (in addition to an introductory summary) aimed at providing a framework for evaluating future reductions or modifications of the U.S. nuclear force, first by considering previous instances in which nuclear-force capabilities were eliminated; second by looking forward into at least the foreseeable future at the features of global and regional deterrence (recognizing that new weapon systems currently projected will have expected lifetimes stretching beyond our ability to predict the future); and third by providing examples of past or possible undesirable outcomes in the shaping of the future nuclear force, as well as some closing thoughts for the future. This paper begins with a discussion of the current nuclear force and the plans and procurement programs for the modernization of that force. Current weapon systems and warheads were conceived and built decades ago, and procurement programs have begun for the modernization or replacement of major elements of the nuclear force: the heavy bomber, the air-launched cruise missile, the ICBMs, and the ballistic-missile submarines. In addition, the Nuclear Weapons Council has approved a new framework for nuclear-warhead life extension not fully fleshed out yet that aims to reduce the current number of nuclear explosives from seven to five, the so-called "3+2" vision. This vision includes three interoperable warheads for both ICBMs and SLBMs (thus eliminating one backup weapon) and two warheads for aircraft delivery (one gravity bomb and one cruise-missile, eliminating a second backup gravity bomb). This paper also includes a discussion of the current and near-term nuclear-deterrence mission, both global and regional, and offers some observations on future of the strategic deterrence mission and the challenges of regional and extended nuclear deterrence.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2013

Reductions Without Regret: Historical Perspectives

This is the first of three papers (in addition to an introductory summary) aimed at providing a framework for evaluating future reductions or modifications of the U.S. nuclear force, first by considering previous instances in which nuclear-force capabilities were eliminated; second by looking forward into at least the foreseeable future at the features of global and regional deterrence (recognizing that new weapon systems currently projected will have expected lifetimes stretching beyond our ability to predict the future); and third by providing examples of past or possible undesirable outcomes in the shaping of the future nuclear force, as well as some closing thoughts for the future. This paper examines the circumstances and consequences of the elimination of The INF-range Pershing II ballistic missile and Gryphon Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), deployed by NATO under a dual-track strategy to counter Soviet intermediate-range missiles while pursuing negotiations to limit or eliminate all of these missiles. The Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM), which was actually a family of missiles including SRAM A, SRAM B (never deployed), and SRAM II and SRAM T, these last two cancelled during an over-budget/behind-schedule development phase as part of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992. The nuclear-armed version of the Tomahawk Land-Attack Cruise Missile (TLAM/N), first limited to shore-based storage by the PNIs, and finally eliminated in deliberations surrounding the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report. The Missile-X (MX), or Peacekeeper, a heavy MIRVed ICBM, deployed in fixed silos, rather than in an originally proposed mobile mode. Peacekeeper was likely intended as a bargaining chip to facilitate elimination of Russian heavy missiles. The plan failed when START II did not enter into force, and the missiles were eliminated at the end of their intended service life. The Small ICBM (SICBM), or Midgetman, a road-mobile, single-warhead missile for which per-unit costs were climbing when it was eliminated under the PNIs. Although there were liabilities associated with each of these systems, there were also unique capabilities; this paper lays out the pros and cons for each. Further, we articulate the capabilities that were eliminated with these systems.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2013

Reductions without Regret: Summary

This paper briefly summarizes the series in which we consider the possibilities for losing, or compromising, key capabilities of the U.S. nuclear force in the face of modernization and reductions. The first of the three papers takes an historical perspective, considering capabilities that were eliminated in past force reductions. The second paper is our attempt to define the needed capabilities looking forward in the context of the current framework for force modernization and the current picture of the evolving challenges of deterrence and assurance. The third paper then provides an example for each of our undesirable outcomes: the creation of roach motels, box canyons, and wrong turns.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2013

Reductions without Regret: Details - Avoiding Box Canyons, Roach Motels, and Wrong Turns

The United States is concurrently pursuing the goals of reducing the size of its nuclear weapons force – strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed – and of modernizing the weapons it continues to possess. Many of the existing systems were deployed 30 to 50 years ago, and the modernization process can be expected to extend over the next decade or more. Given the impossibility of predicting the future over the lifetime of systems that could extend to the end of this century, it is essential that dead ends in force development be avoided, and the flexibility and availability of options be retained that allow for: • Scalability downward in the event that further reductions are agreed upon; • Reposturing to respond to changes in threat levels and to new nuclear actors; and • Breakout response in the event that a competitor significantly increases its force size or force capability, In this paper, we examine the current motivations for reductions and modernization; review a number of historical systems and the attendant capabilities that have been eliminated in recent decades; discuss the current path forward for the U.S. nuclear force; provide a view of the evolving deterrence situation and our assessment of the uncertainties involved; and present examples of possibly problematic directions in force development. We close with our thoughts on how to maintain flexibility and the availability of options for which a need might recur in the future.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗