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Swinhoe, Martyn T.

Publications and source records attributed to Swinhoe, Martyn T..

11 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Polyethylene density uncertainty in the simulation of neutron detectors

Simulations with the Monte Carlo N-Particle® (MCNP®) code are frequently used to study neutron coincidence counters for international safeguards. Reducing sources of uncertainty enables more accurate simulations, which reduces the need for expensive or impossible measurements. Accurately specifying the density of polyethylene is crucial for accurate simulations. The density of polyethylene ranges from 0.88 to 0.97 g/cm 3 and high-density polyethylene (HDPE) ranges from about 0.944 to 0.965 g/cm 3 . The density of a specific detector should be measured exactly for the best simulations. Here, the density of the blue/white Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) bulk polyethylene was measured to be 0.9594 +- 0.0013 g/cm 3 at 1-sigma confidence. The density was calculated from repeated measurements of the various polyethylene dimensions for volume, and weighing the polyethylene for the mass. The AWCC neutron detection efficiency was simulated for each polyethylene density. The relative range of efficiencies (3σ) was 3.4% for unspecified polyethylene, 0.9% for HDPE, and 0.3% for the measured density. The impact of modeling small features such as screws was also studied and was found to be a negligible 0.2%. Measuring polyethylene density can reduce its role in uncertainty from one of the largest to one of the smallest contributors.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Heterogeneity effects on nondestructive assay measurements of enrichment in UF 6 cylinders

A set of measurements were performed using multiple mechanically cooled HPGe detectors at six positions around a cylinder uranium hexafluoride to assess if matrix inhomogeneity is detectible and effects the determined apparent uranium enrichment. These measurements were performed on nine 30B cylinders of uranium hexafluoride. Six of the cylinders appeared to be homogeneous and had similar apparent measured uranium enrichment, as calculated by the FRAM software, at all positions. However, three cylinders appeared to have local inhomogeneity based on the observed results. This was manifested as very low apparent enrichments, often <10% of the declared enrichment, on select positions. The side with a low apparent enrichment shows elevated daughter isotope activity (e.g., elevated 1001 keV and 766 keV peak count rate) and slightly reduced 235 U activity (lower 185.7 keV count rate). We hypothesize that these heterogenous cylinders may have experienced asymmetric solar heating, which caused volatile UF 6 to sublime preferentially away from the warmed side. A similar phenomenon was observed at a second facility where dose rate measurements confirm that the “low-enriched side” of cylinders show elevated gamma ray dose rates, likely from the removal of UF 6 attenuation and concentration of daughter-products. Care should be taken during uranium enrichment verification when applying methods that include gamma-rays associated with daughter nuclides to the determination of uranium enrichment on cylinders that are stored in sunlight and have asymmetric dose readings around the cylinder.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nondestructive measurements of residual 235 U mass of Israeli Research Reactor-1 fuel using the Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter

In 2018, a measurement campaign took place with participants from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the Nuclear Research Centre-Negev (NRCN) and Soreq Nuclear Research Center (SNRC) at the Israeli Research Reactor-1 (IRR-1) in which 14 of the reactor’s used fuel assemblies (FAs) with varied amount of depletion were measured with the nondestructive assay instrument Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter (AEFC). Designed for safeguards purposes, the AEFC measures both neutrons emitted from the FA (passive neutrons) and fission neutrons induced by an external neutron source (in this experiment, 252 Cf). Signals recorded with the AEFC include total neutron count rates (Singles), time-correlated neutron count rates (Doubles), and total gamma-ray count rates. The 235 U content of the FAs was previously assessed by two independent methods: (1) measurement of the transparency of the FA to low-energy gamma rays from an activated rhenium source (rhenium gamma transmission, or the RGT method) and (2) calculation of the 30-year burnup history of the core using detailed three-dimensional Monte-Carlo core depletion calculations. The results from the FAs that had been measured via the RGT method were used to construct the calibration curves, which translate the AEFC count rates to 235 U mass. Then, the calibration was evaluated using AEFC measurements of six additional FAs that were not measured via the RGT method. From the results, it was determined the Doubles calibration curve was more reliable than that of the Singles and follows a simple second-order polynomial fit for the whole range of residual 235 U mass content, albeit with larger statistical uncertainty. Detailed uncertainties quantification was conducted for both the AEFC Singles and Doubles. This includes the analysis of statistical uncertainties, calibration uncertainty, and random uncertainties due to the sensitivity of the AEFC to several sources of uncertainty, namely the FA position, FA orientation, interrogation source position, and ambient pool temperature. Finally, an overall total uncertainty of 6 g of 235 U is estimated for the Singles and Doubles, which is mainly due to calibration uncertainty (for the Singles) and statistical uncertainty (for the Doubles), and which constitutes 3%–6% of the 235 U total mass in the FAs, depending on their level of depletion.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2019

Nuclear Data – Benchmarking 19 F(α,n) Yield Data for Nuclear Safeguards

Fluorine compounds of U and Pu are ubiquitous in the nuclear fuel cycle, so F(α,n) neutrons are an important signature and quantitative source term that needs to be understood for physics-based interpretation of nondestructive assay measurements. Historically there have been large differences in the basic nuclear data for this reaction reported by various groups. UF 6 is the most prominent material in the nuclear fuel cycle, with the potential for short-term production into weaponizable form. Verification of bulk quantities, natural feed, depleted tails, and especially low enriched product in cylinders is particularly important. The principal physical measurement is neutron counting. For enriched material, the 19 F(α,n) reaction, driven by 234U, is the dominant source of neutrons. Basic nuclear data, cross sections, needed to calculate the yield, as well as information on the source spectrum for sensitivity studies are sparse and highly discrepant. This limits defensible physics-based performance evaluations. The same applies to holdup and criticality studies in which hydrated uranyl fluoride is the material of interest which accumulates in enrichment facilities. In the future we anticipate that the physics community will have made improved accelerator-based measurements and undertaken a more thorough evaluation and adjustment of all relevant available data. But in the short term, this does not help the safeguards community face the pressing real-world nondestructive assay requirements. To address this need, we have performed quality neutron measurements on UF6 materials using well-known material and high-capability neutron counters. A robust determination of the n/s/g of 234 U in UF 6 was generated along with a scientifically defensible uncertainty analysis. The weighted average value of the neutron yield is 509 n/s/g 234 U with a random uncertainty of approximately 1%. Dominant sources of systematic uncertainty are in the efficiency determination where we incur approximately 1.1% relative standard deviation associated with the 252 Cf reference source and about 0.9% uncertainty coming from the uncertainty in the F(α,n) spectrum. The stated uncertainties are an order of magnitude better than current data based on accelerator data reported in the literature. Aside from being of immediate and direct use by the safeguards community, this result will serve as an enduring integral benchmark for subsequent data evaluations that will need to match it in order to be credible. In addition to yield normalization, safeguards users of F(α,n) data also need guidance of the neutron emission spectrum. We have generated a neutron emission using a modified version of the well-known SOURCES 4C code, updated with new alpha stopping power coefficients, and a blended microscopic cross section data set. The yield and spectra are available in a form that MCNP users can readily use.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2018

The specific ( α ,n) production rate for 234 U in UF 6

Natural, depleted, and low enriched uranium hexafluoride is manufactured and transported on an industrial scale to support commercial nuclear power plant operation. One-way material production and flow is verified by nuclear safeguards inspectorates is by neutron counting. The dominant neutron source term is ( α ,n) production due to 234 U which gets enriched/depleted along with 235 U. We describe recent efforts to accurately determine the ( α ,n)/s/g of 234 U in UF 6 . This piece of nuclear data is of direct value to the nuclear safeguards community in the science-based verification and assay of bulk uranium hexafluoride. It also provides a benchmark on codes that calculate yield curves for various compounds from cross section data, and hence, provides a scale or normalization constraint on evaluated basic cross section data. Finally, in turn, evaluated basic data allows the yield from other materials to be calculated; for instance, moist uranyl fluoride, which is of interest in holdup measurements.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2017

Viability of an Unattended Verification Station for UF6 Cylinders: Phase I Findings

In recent years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has pursued innovative techniques and an integrated suite of safeguards measures to address the verification challenges posed by the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Among the unattended instruments currently being explored by the IAEA is an Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS), which could provide automated, independent verification of the declared relative enrichment, 235U mass, total uranium mass, and identification for all declared uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders in a facility (e.g., uranium enrichment plants and fuel fabrication plants). Under the auspices of the United States and European Commission Support Programs to the IAEA, a project was undertaken to assess the technical and practical viability of the UCVS concept. Phase I of the UCVS viability study was centered on a long-term field trial of a prototype UCVS system at the Westinghouse Fuel Fabrication Facility in South Carolina, USA. A key outcome of the study was a quantitative performance evaluation of two nondestructive assay (NDA) methods being considered for inclusion in a UCVS: Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA), and Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM). This paper will provide context for the UCVS and potential implementation concepts, a description of the UCVS prototype design, and an overview of the long-term field trial at a fuel fabrication facility. Selected field-trial results and interpretation are presented, including the performance of PNEM and HEVA for the verification of declared enrichment and 235U mass in over 200 “typical” Type 30B cylinders. Example results from a modeling study provide a preliminary assessment of sensitivity to material-substitution scenarios, for the as-fielded NDA methods.

Smith, Leon E.↗
DOE OSTI2017

Fresh Fuel Measurements With the Differential Die-Away Self-Interrogation Instrument

The purpose of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI)-Spent Fuel (SF) Project is to strengthen the technical toolkit of safeguards inspectors and/or other interested parties. Thus the NGSI-SF team is working to achieve the following technical goals more easily and efficiently than in the past using nondestructive assay measurements of spent fuel assemblies: 1) verify the initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of facility declaration; 2) detect the diversion or replacement of pins; 3) estimate the plutonium mass; 4) estimate decay heat; and 5) determine the reactivity of spent fuel assemblies. The differential die-away self-interrogation (DDSI) instrument is one instrument that was assessed for years regarding its feasibility for robust, timely verification of spent fuel assemblies. The instrument was recently built and was tested using fresh fuel assemblies in a variety of configurations, including varying enrichment, neutron absorber content, and symmetry. The early die-away method, a multiplication determination method developed in simulation space, was successfully tested on the fresh fuel assembly data and determined multiplication with a root-mean-square (RMS) error of 2.9%. The experimental results were compared with MCNP simulations of the instrument as well. Low multiplication assemblies had agreement with an average RMS error of 0.2% in the singles count rate (i.e., total neutrons detected per second) and 3.4% in the doubles count rates (i.e., neutrons detected in coincidence per second). High-multiplication assemblies had agreement with an average RMS error of 4.1% in the singles and 13.3% in the doubles count rates.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

The effect of deadtime and electronic transients on the predelay bias in neutron coincidence counting

In neutron coincidence counting using the shift register autocorrelation technique, a predelay is inserted before the opening of the (R+A)-gate. Operationally the purpose of the predelay is to ensure that the (R+A)- and A-gates have matched effectiveness, otherwise a bias will result when the difference between the gates is used to calculate the accidentals corrected net reals coincidence rate. The necessity for the predelay was established experimentally in the early practical development and deployment of the coincidence counting method. The choice of predelay for a given detection system is usually made experimentally, but even today long standing traditional values (e.g., 4.5 µs) are often used. This, at least in part, reflects the fact that a deep understanding of why a finite predelay setting is needed and how to control the underlying influences has not been fully worked out. We attempt, in this paper, to gain some insight into the problem. One aspect we consider is the slowing down, thermalization, and diffusion of neutrons in the detector moderator. The other is the influence of deadtime and electronic transients. These may be classified as non-ideal detector behaviors because they are not included in the conventional model used to interpret measurement data. From improved understanding of the effect of deadtime and electronic transients on the predelay bias in neutron coincidence counting, the performance of both future and current coincidence counters may be improved.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2015

A qualitative analysis of the neutron population in fresh and spent fuel assemblies during simulated interrogation using the differential die-away technique

In this study, Monte Carlo simulations were performed for the differential die-away (DDA) technique to analyse the time-dependent behaviour of the neutron population in fresh and spent nuclear fuel assemblies as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Spent Fuel (NGSI-SF) Project. Simulations were performed to investigate both a possibly portable as well as a permanent DDA instrument. Taking advantage of a custom made modification to the MCNPX code, the variation in the neutron population, simultaneously in time and space, was examined. The motivation for this research was to improve the design of the DDA instrument, as it is be ing considered for possible deployment at the Central Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Encapsulation Plant in Sweden (Clab), as well as to assist in the interpretation of the both simulated and measured signals.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗