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Tong, Lang

Publications and source records attributed to Tong, Lang.

6 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Network-Aware and Welfare-Maximizing Dynamic Pricing for Energy Sharing

The proliferation of behind-the-meter (BTM) distributed energy resources (DER) within the electrical distribution network presents significant supply and demand flexibilities, but also introduces operational challenges such as voltage spikes and reverse power flows. In response, this paper proposes a network-aware dynamic pricing framework tailored for energy-sharing coalitions that aggregate small, but ubiquitous, BTM DER downstream of a distribution system operator's (DSO) revenue meter that adopts a generic net energy metering (NEM) tariff. By formulating a Stackelberg game between the energy-sharing market leader and its prosumers, we show that the dynamic pricing policy induces the prosumers toward a network-safe operation and decentrally maximizes the energysharing social welfare. The dynamic pricing mechanism involves a combination of a locational ex-ante dynamic price and an ex-post allocation, both of which are functions of the energy sharing's BTM DER. The ex-post allocation is proportionate to the price differential between the DSO NEM price and the energy-sharing locational price. Simulation results using real DER data and the IEEE 13-bus test systems illustrate the dynamic nature of network-aware pricing at each bus, and its impact on voltage.

aggregates↗
DOE OSTI2024

Network-Aware and Welfare-Maximizing Dynamic Pricing for Energy Sharing: Preprint

The proliferation of behind-the-meter (BTM) distributed energy resources (DER) within the electrical distribution network presents significant supply and demand flexibilities, but also introduces operational challenges such as voltage spikes and reverse power flows. In response, this paper proposes a network-aware dynamic pricing framework tailored for energy-sharing coalitions that aggregate small, but ubiquitous, BTM DER downstream of a distribution system operator's (DSO) revenue meter that adopts a generic net energy metering (NEM) tariff. By formulating a Stackelberg game between the energy-sharing market leader and its prosumers, we show that the dynamic pricing policy induces the prosumers toward a network-safe operation and decentrally maximizes the energysharing social welfare. The dynamic pricing mechanism involves a combination of a locational ex-ante dynamic price and an ex-post allocation, both of which are functions of the energy sharing's BTM DER. The ex-post allocation is proportionate to the price differential between the DSO NEM price and the energy sharing locational price. Simulation results using real DER data and the IEEE 13-bus test systems illustrate the dynamic nature of network-aware pricing at each bus, and its impact on voltage.

energy communities↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Decentralized Market Mechanism for Energy Communities under Operating Envelopes

Here, we propose an operating envelopes (OEs) aware energy community market mechanism that dynamically charges/rewards its members based on two-part pricing. The OEs are imposed exogenously by a regulated distribution system operator (DSO) on the energy community's revenue meter and is subject to a generalized net energy metering (NEM) tariff design. By formulating the interaction of the community operator and its members as a Stackelberg game, we show that the proposed two-part pricing achieves a Nash equilibrium and maximizes the community's social welfare in a decentralized fashion while ensuring that the community's operation abides by the OEs. The market mechanism conforms with the cost-causation principle and guarantees community members a surplus level no less than their maximum surplus when they autonomously face the DSO. The dynamic and uniform community price is a monotonically decreasing function of the community's aggregate renewable generation. We also analyze the impact of exogenous parameters such as NEM rates and OEs on the value of joining the community. Lastly, through numerical studies, we showcase the community's welfare, and pricing, and compare its members' surplus to customers under the DSO's regime.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Operating-Envelopes-Aware Decentralized Welfare Maximization for Energy Communities

We propose an operating-envelope-aware, prosumer-centric, and efficient energy community that aggregates individual and shared community distributed energy resources and transacts with a regulated distribution system operator (DSO) under a generalized net energy metering tariff design. To ensure safe network operation, the DSO imposes dynamic export and import limits, known as dynamic operating envelopes, on end-users' revenue meters. Given the operating envelopes, we propose an incentive-aligned community pricing mechanism under which the decentralized optimization of community members' benefit implies the optimization of overall community welfare. The proposed pricing mechanism satisfies the cost-causation principle and ensures the stability of the energy community in a coalition game setting. Numerical examples provide insights into the characteristics of the proposed pricing mechanism and quantitative measures of its performance.

distributed energy resources aggregation↗
DOE OSTI2023

Operating-Envelopes-Aware Decentralized Welfare Maximization for Energy Communities: Preprint

We propose an operating-envelope-aware, prosumer-centric, and efficient energy community that aggregates individual and shared community distributed energy resources downstream of a regulated distribution system operator's (DSO) net energy metering revenue meter. Due to the elevated risk of grid constraint violations and to ensure safe network operation, the DSO imposes dynamic export and import limits, known as dynamic operating envelopes, on end-users' revenue meters. Given the operating envelopes, the proposed community market mechanism maximizes the community's social welfare in a decentralized fashion while every community member abides by its own operating envelopes. We show that the proposed market mechanism conforms with the cost-causation principle and guarantees community members a surplus level no less than their maximum surplus when they autonomously face the DSO. Lastly, a numerical study is implemented to showcase and compare the community's welfare under the proposed operating-envelopes-aware mechanisms to others, including the welfare of customers under the DSO's regime.

distributed energy resources aggregation↗