Assessment of Aggregate Risk for JWST
This presentation communicates the aggregate assessment of risk performed for the James Webb Space Telescope prior to shipping the observatory to the launch site.
JWST↗
Engineering topics
Tupper Hyde
Publications and source records attributed to Tupper Hyde.
NOAA-17 Break-up Engineering Investigation Board Final Report
The NOAA-17 break-up was found to be a single, localized debris event producing about100 trackable pieces; there is likely no catastrophic damage to the whole spacecraft. NOAA-17 debris is very much in family with NOAA-16 debris, and DMSP F11 and F13 are very much in family with each other and share similarities with NOAA-16 and 17; it is likely all four (“The Big Four”) share the same debris source. DMSP F13 break-up occurred simultaneous with a known battery overcharge and therefore battery rupture is most likely intermediate cause of the Big Four break-ups; this is a low confidence assessment since other debris sources cannot be definitively ruled out. No root cause was found as the NOAA-17 batteries were all confirmed to have been disconnected from the charge path as intended. Possible conditions for reconnection are all unlikely including short circuits and commanding from a “bad actor.” All related spacecraft pose a risk of similar break-ups for decades to come and are a threat to the critical 800-850 km polar orbit regime; even appropriately decommissioned spacecraft appear to be at risk. Recommendations include an update to the decommissioning procedure and consideration of further investigations and active debris removal, consistent with national policy.
Maggie Atkinson↗
NOAA-17 Break-up Engineering Investigation
The NOAA-17 weather satellite operated in polar orbit near 800 km from 2002 until it was decommissioned in April 2013. The spacecraft broke up almost eight years later in March 2021 producing about 100 trackable objects. This follows the breakups of similar spacecraft NOAA-16, DMSP F11, and DMSP F13 which also produced between 80 and 500 trackable objects. An investigation was made into the cause of the breakup and recommend how to better operate or decommission spacecraft in the future. The NOAA-17 breakup was found to be a single, localized debris event; there is likely no catastrophic damage to the whole spacecraft. NOAA-17 debris is very much in family with NOAA-16 debris, and DMSP F11 and F13 are very much in family with each other and share similarities with NOAA-16 and 17; it is likely all four share the same breakup cause. DMSP F13 breakup occurred simultaneous with a known battery overcharge and therefore battery rupture is most likely intermediate cause of all four of the breakups. This is a low confidence assessment, however, since other debris sources cannot be definitively ruled out. No root cause was found as the NOAA-17 batteries were all confirmed to have been disconnected from the charge path as intended. Possible conditions for reconnection are all unlikely including short circuits and ground commanding. All 25 related spacecraft pose a risk of similar breakups for decades to come and are a threat to the critical 800-850 km polar orbit regime; even appropriately decommissioned spacecraft appear to be at risk. Recommendations include an update to the decommissioning procedure and consideration of further investigations and active debris removal, consistent with national policy.
Scott Hull↗
Phasing COTS Part Into Low-Risk-Tolerant Missions
A number of activities within NASA and the space community, as well as growing technology needs and supply chain changes have accelerated the need to expand the use of COTS parts within NASA. While the use of COTS has been formally institutionalized and deemed acceptable for Class D space missions and those with greater tolerance for risk, there is still a lack of understanding of how to most effectively use COTS in such high risk-tolerance missions, and no apparent path towards broad use in missions with much less tolerance for risk. However, the reality is that the fundamental limitations of technology associated with the military specification system combined with the need to fly newer technologies in upcoming flagship robotic missions and human space flight missions will ultimately demand a more expansive use of COTS. The infinite nature of COTS gives rise to numerous challenges in the selection, acceptance, testing, and usage of COTS when reliable operation is essential. This presentation will highlight some of the results of a NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) study on the use of COTS parts, as well as many of the historical through current facts about parts assurance within Agency to provide a path forward for reliable use of COTS for a range of space applications and risk postures. In addition this presentation will dispel the myth that expanded use of COTS parts causes a new set of radiation threats to missions.
COTS↗