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Vesely, William

Publications and source records attributed to Vesely, William.

Synthesizing a New Launch Vehicle Failure Probability Based on Historical Flight Data

New launch vehicles have historically had significantly higher failure probabilities in early flights than what has been predicted using Probabilistic Risk Assessment. Work on a new methodology originally started with ARES I-X and the Common Standards Working Group (CSWG) for range safety applications. CSWG consists of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Air Force, and NASA. Historical launch vehicle data was viewed as the best predictor of success/failure for launches of new vehicles. A launch vehicle database was developed that includes all launches from 1980-2017 (both US and foreign). Entries to the database include: Vehicle by model type; Launch dates; Failure description; Failure Result (Loss Of Vehicle (LOV)/Loss Of Mission (LOM); Failure cause (when available); Vehicle designs (stages/engines/etc.)

Early flight risk↗

Methods for Probabilistic Uncertainty Analysis and Bayesian Analysis with Examples of Statistically Analyzing Data to Revise MMOD Risk Estimates and Compare Models

Probabilistic methods are presented for characterizing and quantifying uncertainties in models and model predictions. Techniques are given for constructing specific uncertainty distributions based on available information. Alternative techniques are given for propagating uncertainties in model inputs to obtain the uncertainty in the model result or prediction. Bayesian techniques are also described for utilizing data and information to update and revise model results and predictions. The focus is on applications with numerous specific examples given. The use of data to revise Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) risk prediction models are among the examples given.

Risk↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners (Second Edition)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance. NASA's objective is to better understand and effectively manage risk, and thus more effectively ensure mission and programmatic success, and to achieve and maintain high safety standards at NASA. NASA intends to use risk assessment in its programs and projects to support optimal management decision making for the improvement of safety and program performance. In addition to using quantitative/probabilistic risk assessment to improve safety and enhance the safety decision process, NASA has incorporated quantitative risk assessment into its system safety assessment process, which until now has relied primarily on a qualitative representation of risk. Also, NASA has recently adopted the Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process [1-1] as a valuable addition to supplement existing deterministic and experience-based engineering methods and tools. Over the years, NASA has been a leader in most of the technologies it has employed in its programs. One would think that PRA should be no exception. In fact, it would be natural for NASA to be a leader in PRA because, as a technology pioneer, NASA uses risk assessment and management implicitly or explicitly on a daily basis. NASA has probabilistic safety requirements (thresholds and goals) for crew transportation system missions to the International Space Station (ISS) [1-2]. NASA intends to have probabilistic requirements for any new human spaceflight transportation system acquisition. Methods to perform risk and reliability assessment in the early 1960s originated in U.S. aerospace and missile programs. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an example. It would have been a reasonable extrapolation to expect that NASA would also become the world leader in the application of PRA. That was, however, not to happen. Early in the Apollo program, estimates of the probability for a successful roundtrip human mission to the moon yielded disappointingly low (and suspect) values and NASA became discouraged from further performing quantitative risk analyses until some two decades later when the methods were more refined, rigorous, and repeatable. Instead, NASA decided to rely primarily on the Hazard Analysis (HA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methods for system safety assessment.

Stamatelatos,Michael↗