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NASA NTRS2018

Assessing C2 Communications for UAS Traffic Management

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) project works to develop tools and technologies essential for safely enabling civilian low-altitude UAS operations. Currently there is no established infrastructure to enable and safely manage the widespread use of low-altitude airspace and UAS operations, regardless of the type of UAS. The UTM technical challenge will develop comprehensive and validated airspace operations and integration requirements to safely enable large-scale persistent access to visual line of sight and autonomous beyond visual line of sight small UAS in low-altitude airspace. Within the UTM project, a number of communications technologies to support UTM command and control (C2) are under investigation. In particular, commercial networked cellular systems are being tested and assessed for their ability to meet the reliability, scalability, cybersecurity and redundancy required. NASA Glenn Research Center is studying some of the aspects of employing such networks for UTM C2 communications. This includes the development of a test platform for sensing and characterizing the airborne C2 communications environment at various altitudes and in various terrains and topologies, measuring such aspects as received signal strength and interference. System performance aspects such as latency in the link, handover performance, packet error loss rate, drop outs, coverage gaps and other aspects impacting UTM operation will also be assessed. In this paper we explore some of the C2 approaches being proposed and demonstrated in the UTM project, the reliability, availability and other general C2 performance requirements, and approaches to evaluating and analyzing UTM C2 links based on commercial cellular networks.

air traffic control↗

NASA NTRS2018

ADS-B Mixed sUAS and NAS System Capacity Analysis and DAA Performance

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) technology was introduced more than twenty years ago to improve surveillance within the US National Airspace Space (NAS) as well as in many other countries. Via the NextGen initiative, implementation of ADS-B technology across the US is planned in stages between 2012 and 2025. ADS-B's automatic one second epoch packet transmission exploits on-board GPS-derived navigational information to provide position information, as well as other information including vehicle identification, ground speed, vertical rate and track angle. The purpose of this technology is to improve surveillance data accuracy and provide access to better situational awareness to enable operational benefits such as shorter routes, reduced flight time and fuel burn, and reduced traffic delays, and to allow air traffic controllers to manage aircraft with greater safety margins. Other than the limited amount of information bits per packet that can be sent, ADS-B's other hard-limit limitation is capacity. Small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) can utilize limited ADS-B transmission power, in general, thus allowing this technology to be considered for use within a combined NAS and sUAS environment, but the potential number and density of sUAS predicted for future deployment calls into question the ability of ADS-B systems to meet the resulting capacity requirement. Hence, studies to understand potential limitations of ADS-B to fulfill capacity requirements in various sUAS scenarios are of great interest. In this paper we, validate/improve on, previous work performed by the MITRE Corporation concerning sUAS power and capacity in a sUAS and General Aviation (GA) mixed environment. In addition, we implement its inherent media access control layer capacity limitations which was not shown in the MITRE paper. Finally, a simple detect and avoid (DAA) algorithm is implemented to display that ADS-B technology is a viable technology for a mixed NAS/sUAS environment even in proposed larger mixed density environments.

Matheou, Konstantin J.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Assessing C2 Communications

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) project works to develop tools and technologies essential for safely enabling civilian low-altitude UAS operations. Currently there is no established infrastructure to enable and safely manage the widespread use of low-altitude airspace and UAS operations, regardless of the type of UAS. The UTM technical challenge will develop comprehensive and validated airspace operations and integration requirements to safely enable large-scale persistent access to visual line of sight and autonomous beyond visual line of sight small UAS in low-altitude airspace. Within the UTM project, a number of communications technologies to support UTM command and control (C2) are under investigation. In particular, commercial networked cellular systems are being tested and assessed for their ability to meet the reliability, scalability, cybersecurity and redundancy required. NASA Glenn Research Center is studying some of the aspects of employing such networks for UTM C2 communications. This includes the development of a test platform for sensing and characterizing the airborne C2 communications environment at various altitudes and in various terrains and topologies, measuring such aspects as received signal strength and interference. System performance aspects such as latency in the link, handover performance, packet error loss rate, drop outs, coverage gaps and other aspects impacting UTM operation will also be assessed. In this paper we explore some of the C2 approaches being proposed and demonstrated in the UTM project, the reliability, availability and other general C2 performance requirements, and approaches to evaluating and analyzing UTM C2 links based on commercial cellular networks.

aircraft communications↗

NASA NTRS2018

ADS-B Mixed sUAS and NAS System Capacity Analysis and DAA Performance

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) technology was introduced more than twenty years ago to improve surveillance within the US National Airspace Space (NAS) as well as in many other countries. Via the NextGen initiative, implementation of ADS-B technology across the US is planned in stages between 2012 and 2025. ADS-B's automatic one second epoch packet transmission exploits on-board GPS-derived navigational information to provide position information, as well as other information including vehicle identification, ground speed, vertical rate and track angle. The purpose of this technology is to improve surveillance data accuracy and provide access to better situational awareness to enable operational benefits such as shorter routes, reduced flight time and fuel burn, and reduced traffic delays, and to allow air traffic controllers to manage aircraft with greater safety margins. Other than the limited amount of information bits per packet that can be sent, ADS-B's other hard-limit limitation is capacity. Small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) can utilize limited ADS-B transmission power, in general, thus allowing this technology to be considered for use within a combined NAS and sUAS environment, but the potential number and density of sUAS predicted for future deployment calls into question the ability of ADS-B systems to meet the resulting capacity requirement. Hence, studies to understand potential limitations of ADS-B to fulfill capacity requirements in various sUAS scenarios are of great interest. In this paper we, validate/improve on, previous work performed by the MITRE Corporation concerning sUAS power and capacity in a sUAS and General Aviation (GA) mixed environment. In addition, we implement its inherent media access control layer capacity limitations which was not shown in the MITRE paper. Finally, a simple detect and avoid (DAA) algorithm is implemented to display that ADS-B technology is a viable technology for a mixed NAS/sUAS environment even in proposed larger mixed density environments.

Matheou, Konstantin↗

NASA NTRS2014

Integration and Testing of LCS Software

Kennedy Space Center is in the midst of developing a command and control system for the launch of the next generation manned space vehicle. The Space Launch System (SLS) will launch using the new Spaceport Command and Control System (SCCS). As a member of the Software Integration and Test (SWIT) Team, command scripts, and bash scripts were written to assist in integration and testing of the Launch Control System (LCS), which is a component of SCCS. The short term and midterm tasks are for the most part completed. The long term tasks if time permits will require a presentation and demonstration.

Command Script↗

NASA NTRS2014

A Numerical and Experimental Study of Damage Growth in a Composite Laminate

The present study has three goals: (1) perform an experiment where a simple laminate damage process can be characterized in high detail; (2) evaluate the performance of existing commercially available laminate damage simulation tools by modeling the experiment; (3) observe and understand the underlying physics of damage in a composite honeycomb sandwich structure subjected to low-velocity impact. A quasi-static indentation experiment has been devised to provide detailed information about a simple mixed-mode damage growth process. The test specimens consist of an aluminum honeycomb core with a cross-ply laminate facesheet supported on a stiff uniform surface. When the sample is subjected to an indentation load, the honeycomb core provides support to the facesheet resulting in a gradual and stable damage growth process in the skin. This enables real time observation as a matrix crack forms, propagates through a ply, and then causes a delamination. Finite element analyses were conducted in ABAQUS/Explicit(TradeMark) 6.13 that used continuum and cohesive modeling techniques to simulate facesheet damage and a geometric and material nonlinear model to simulate core crushing. The high fidelity of the experimental data allows a detailed investigation and discussion of the accuracy of each numerical modeling approach.

McElroy, Mark↗

NASA NTRS2012

Analysis of CSIRT/SOC Incidents and Continuous Monitoring of Threats

Security Operations Centers (SOC) contain a wealth of data which, if properly classified and tagged upfront, can yield a wealth of real-time information about your organizations IT Security posture, risks, and threats. These include answers to relevant and actionable questions such as: What are our biggest threats? Who is attacking us and what do they want? What controls are working or not working? How effective was the new technology we just implemented? What is our ROI?

Wang, John↗

NASA NTRS2010

Anatomy of a Security Operations Center

Many agencies and corporations are either contemplating or in the process of building a cyber Security Operations Center (SOC). Those Agencies that have established SOCs are most likely working on major revisions or enhancements to existing capabilities. As principle developers of the NASA SOC; this Presenters' goals are to provide the GFIRST community with examples of some of the key building blocks of an Agency scale cyber Security Operations Center. This presentation viII include the inputs and outputs, the facilities or shell, as well as the internal components and the processes necessary to maintain the SOC's subsistence - in other words, the anatomy of a SOC. Details to be presented include the SOC architecture and its key components: Tier 1 Call Center, data entry, and incident triage; Tier 2 monitoring, incident handling and tracking; Tier 3 computer forensics, malware analysis, and reverse engineering; Incident Management System; Threat Management System; SOC Portal; Log Aggregation and Security Incident Management (SIM) systems; flow monitoring; IDS; etc. Specific processes and methodologies discussed include Incident States and associated Work Elements; the Incident Management Workflow Process; Cyber Threat Risk Assessment methodology; and Incident Taxonomy. The Evolution of the Cyber Security Operations Center viII be discussed; starting from reactive, to proactive, and finally to proactive. Finally, the resources necessary to establish an Agency scale SOC as well as the lessons learned in the process of standing up a SOC viII be presented.

Wang, John↗