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Wetherholt, Jon

Publications and source records attributed to Wetherholt, Jon.

Hard and Soft Safety Verifications

The purpose of this paper is to examine the differences between and the effects of hard and soft safety verifications. Initially, the terminology should be defined and clarified. A hard safety verification is datum which demonstrates how a safety control is enacted. An example of this is relief valve testing. A soft safety verification is something which is usually described as nice to have but it is not necessary to prove safe operation. An example of a soft verification is the loss of the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) casings from Shuttle flight, STS-4. When the main parachutes failed, the casings impacted the water and sank. In the nose cap of the SRBs, video cameras recorded the release of the parachutes to determine safe operation and to provide information for potential anomaly resolution. Generally, examination of the casings and nozzles contributed to understanding of the newly developed boosters and their operation. Safety verification of SRB operation was demonstrated by examination for erosion or wear of the casings and nozzle. Loss of the SRBs and associated data did not delay the launch of the next Shuttle flight.

Wetherholt, Jon

Common Cause Failure Modes

High technology industries with high failure costs commonly use redundancy as a means to reduce risk. Redundant systems, whether similar or dissimilar, are susceptible to Common Cause Failures (CCF). CCF is not always considered in the design effort and, therefore, can be a major threat to success. There are several aspects to CCF which must be understood to perform an analysis which will find hidden issues that may negate redundancy. This paper will provide definition, types, a list of possible causes and some examples of CCF. Requirements and designs from NASA projects will be used in the paper as examples.

Wetherholt, Jon

Design for Minimum Risk

Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) is a term used by NASA programs as an expansion of the general hazard reduction process where if an identified hazard cannot be eliminated, the design is modified to reduce the associated mishap risk to an acceptable level. DFMR is a set of specific requirements to minimize risk. DFMR is not well understood and there are many misconceptions concerning the meaning and use. This paper will provide insight into the use of DFMR for space applications; it s comparison to other hazard mitigation strategies and examples of how the approach has been used in the past. It will also highlight documents used by NASA on various programs to determine DFMR.

Wetherholt, Jon

Integrated Safety Analysis Tiers

Commercial partnerships and organizational constraints, combined with complex systems, may lead to division of hazard analysis across organizations. This division could cause important hazards to be overlooked, causes to be missed, controls for a hazard to be incomplete, or verifications to be inefficient. Each organization s team must understand at least one level beyond the interface sufficiently enough to comprehend integrated hazards. This paper will discuss various ways to properly divide analysis among organizations. The Ares I launch vehicle integrated safety analyses effort will be utilized to illustrate an approach that addresses the key issues and concerns arising from multiple analysis responsibilities.

Shackelford, Carla

Ares I Integrated Vehicle System Safety Team

Complex systems require integrated analysis teams which sometimes are divided into subsystem teams. Proper division of the analysis in to subsystem teams is important. Safety analysis is one of the most difficult aspects of integration.

Wetherholt, Jon

Ares Integrated Vehicle System Safety Team

NASA is working on the Constellation Program to go to the Moon and beyond. The Program contains a number of projects: a) The Ares I Launch Vehicle for the Orion Crew Module; b) The Ares V Launch Vehicle to launch large payloads into orbit, including the Earth Departure Stage (EDS); d) The Orion vehicle to transport the crew to orbit and to other destinations; and d - The Altair Lunar Lander

Wetherholt, Jon