Search NASA⌕ Search

Engineering topics

Whitaker, J Michael

Publications and source records attributed to Whitaker, J Michael.

14 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

A Field Evaluation of a Prototype Global Identifier for UF6 Cylinders

The U.S. Department of Energy s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), members of the U.S. national laboratories, UF6 industry stakeholders, and international inspectorates have been working on developing a global identifier (ID) for UF6 cylinders. This industry-driven project has identified efficiency gains for facility operations, state and/or regional regulation, and inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The global ID features standardized alphanumeric characters, a large font, a barcode (for automated reading), and it is affixed to the cylinder. Four years of active engagement with all of the stakeholders has resulted in on the development of user requirements, implementation guidelines, and a preferred design for the ID. Although this project was conceived and has been largely managed from the DOE/NNSA side to address international non-proliferation concerns, it remains an industry-driven initiative. When designing the field evaluation, the NNSA team worked closely with a World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI) Working Group on UF6 Cylinder Identification to determine features that would provide the most benefit. The WNTI Working Group consists predominately of industry members associated with cylinder fabrication, UF6 conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, and cylinder transport. Despite its industry-laden focus, the DOE/NNSA team realized that a vote of confidence from the IAEA could serve as a catalyst for the overall project, and its eventual implementation. In April of 2016, a field evaluation was conducted to demonstrate how the key features of the identifier would work in an operational setting. A selected team travelled to Vienna to evaluate the benefits of a global identifier in performing a PIV in a cylinder storage area containing ~50-100 cylinders. The mock tag-checking exercise was conducted three separate times, with varying scenarios with three different teams. The first group performed the exercise according to current inspection methods. The second group focused on the addition of a new global identifier to the cylinders, and the third group used the new global identifier with an automated reader. This paper will discuss the preparation and execution of the field evaluation, its results, and the next steps for the Global Cylinder Identifier Project.

White-Horton, Jessica L↗
DOE OSTI2015

A Monte Carlo Analysis of Weight Data from UF 6 Cylinder Feed and Withdrawal Stations

As the number of nuclear facilities handling uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) cylinders (e.g., UF 6 production, enrichment, and fuel fabrication) increase in number and throughput, more automated safeguards measures will likely be needed to enable the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to achieve its safeguards objectives in a fiscally constrained environment. Monitoring the process data from the load cells built into the cylinder feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations (i.e., cylinder weight data) can significantly increase the IAEA’s ability to efficiently achieve the fundamental safeguards task of confirming operations as declared (i.e., no undeclared activities). Researchers at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Joint Research Center (in Ispra, Italy), and University of Glasgow are investigating how this weight data can be used for IAEA safeguards purposes while fully protecting the operator’s proprietary and sensitive information related to operations. A key question that must be resolved is, what is the necessary frequency of recording data from the process F/W stations to achieve safeguards objectives? This paper summarizes Monte Carlo simulations of typical feed, product, and tails withdrawal cycles and evaluates longer sampling frequencies to determine the expected errors caused by low-frequency sampling and its impact on material balance calculations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2015

Opportunities to more fully utilize safeguards information reported to the IAEA at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

In an effort to increase transparency and to strengthen IAEA safeguards, more countries are adopting practices that provide the IAEA with more timely, safeguards-relevant information to confirm nuclear operations are as declared. At Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) potential examples include installing unattended IAEA instruments that transmit selected information back to Vienna, instruments that collect and store measurement information on-site, and daily facility operator submissions of material receipts, shipments, or utilization of key operational systems (e.g., UF6 feed stations) to on-site mail boxes. Recently the IAEA has implemented the use of on-site mailbox systems supplemented with short notice or unannounced inspections to maintain effectiveness without significantly increasing the number of inspection days. While these measures significantly improves the IAEA’s effectiveness, we have identified several opportunities for how the use of this information could be improved and how some additional information would further improve safeguards. This paper presents concepts for how the safeguards information currently collected at GCEPs could be more effectively utilized through enhancing the way that raw data is displayed visually so that it is more intuitive to the inspector and provides for more effective inspection planning and execution, comparing information with previous IAEA inspection activities (lists of previous verified inventory), through comparing data with operator supplied data when inspectors arrive (notional inventory change reports), and through evaluating the data over time to provide even greater confidence in the data and operations as declared in between inspections. This paper will also discuss several potential improvements to the submissions themselves, such as including occupancy information about product and tails stations and including weight information for each station.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2013

A Monte Carlo Analysis of Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Process Load Cell Data

As uranium enrichment plants increase in number, capacity, and types of separative technology deployed (e.g., gas centrifuge, laser, etc.), more automated safeguards measures are needed to enable the IAEA to maintain safeguards effectiveness in a fiscally constrained environment. Monitoring load cell data can significantly increase the IAEA s ability to efficiently achieve the fundamental safeguards objective of confirming operations as declared (i.e., no undeclared activities), but care must be taken to fully protect the operator s proprietary and classified information related to operations. Staff at ORNL, LANL, JRC/ISPRA, and University of Glasgow are investigating monitoring the process load cells at feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations to improve international safeguards at enrichment plants. A key question that must be resolved is what is the necessary frequency of recording data from the process F/W stations? Several studies have analyzed data collected at a fixed frequency. This paper contributes to load cell process monitoring research by presenting an analysis of Monte Carlo simulations to determine the expected errors caused by low frequency sampling and its impact on material balance calculations.

Garner, James R↗
DOE OSTI2013

Feedback following the Industry Engagement of the NNSA Unique Identifier and Global Monitoring 5 year plan

The National Nuclear Security Administration s project for developing a unique identifier and a concept for a global monitoring system for UF6 cylinders made significant progress on developing functional requirements and a concept of operation for such a system. The multi-laboratory team is working to define the functional requirements for both the unique identifier and the global monitoring system and to develop a preliminary concept of operations to discuss with key industry stakeholders. Team members began meeting with industry representatives in January 2013 to discuss the preliminary concept and solicit feedback and suggestions. The team has met with representatives from United States Enrichment Corporation, Cameco, URENCO, Honeywell/ConverDyn, and others. This paper presents an overview of the preliminary concept of operations and shares the feedback obtained from the industry engagement meetings.

IAEA↗