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Woodring, Mitchell L

Publications and source records attributed to Woodring, Mitchell L.

12 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2012

Imaging for dismantlement verification: information management and analysis algorithms

The level of detail discernible in imaging techniques has generally excluded them from consideration as verification tools in inspection regimes. An image will almost certainly contain highly sensitive information, and storing a comparison image will almost certainly violate a cardinal principle of information barriers: that no sensitive information be stored in the system. To overcome this problem, some features of the image might be reduced to a few parameters suitable for definition as an attribute, which must be non-sensitive to be acceptable in an Information Barrier regime. However, this process must be performed with care. Features like the perimeter, area, and intensity of an object, for example, might reveal sensitive information. Any data-reduction technique must provide sufficient information to discriminate a real object from a spoofed or incorrect one, while avoiding disclosure (or storage) of any sensitive object qualities. Ultimately, algorithms are intended to provide only a yes/no response verifying the presence of features in the image. We discuss the utility of imaging for arms control applications and present three image-based verification algorithms in this context. The algorithms reduce full image information to non-sensitive feature information, in a process that is intended to enable verification while eliminating the possibility of image reconstruction. The underlying images can be highly detailed, since they are dynamically generated behind an information barrier. We consider the use of active (conventional) radiography alone and in tandem with passive (auto) radiography. We study these algorithms in terms of technical performance in image analysis and application to an information barrier scheme.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2011

Neutron Detection Gamma Ray Sensitivity Criteria

The shortage of 3He has triggered the search for effective alternative neutron detection technologies for national security and safeguards applications. Any new detection technology must satisfy two basic criteria: (1) it must meet a neutron detection efficiency requirement, and (2) it must be insensitive to gamma-ray interference at a prescribed level, while still meeting the neutron detection requirement. It is the purpose of this paper to define measureable gamma ray sensitivity criteria for neutron detectors. Quantitative requirements are specified for: intrinsic gamma ray detection efficiency and gamma ray absolute rejection. The ratio GARRn is defined, and it is proposed that the requirement for neutron detection be 0.9 < GARRn < 1.1 at a 10 mR/h exposure rate. An example of results from a 3He based neutron detector are provided showing that this technology can meet the stated requirements. Results from tests of some alternative technologies are also reported.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2011

3He and BF3 Neutron Detector Pressure Effect and Model Comparison

Paper for SORMA conference Radiation detection systems for homeland security applications must possess the capability of detecting both gamma rays and neutrons. The radiation portal monitor (RPM) systems that are currently deployed use a plastic scintillator for detecting gamma rays and 3He gas-filled proportional counters for detecting neutrons. Proportional counters filled with 3He are the preferred neutron detectors for use in RPMs because 3He has a large neutron cross section, is relatively insensitive to gamma-rays, is neither toxic nor corrosive, can withstand extreme environments, and can be operated at a lower voltage than some of the alternative proportional counters. The amount of 3He required for homeland security and science applications has depleted the world supply and there is no longer enough available to fill the demand. Thus, alternative neutron detectors are being explored. Two possible temporary solutions that could be utilized while a more permanent solution is being identified are reducing the 3He pressure in the proportional counters and using boron trifluoride (BF3) gas-filled proportional counters. Reducing the amount of 3He required in each of the proportional counters would decrease the rate at which 3He is being used, not enough to solve the shortage but perhaps enough to increase the amount of time available to find a working replacement. BF3 is not appropriate for all situations as these detectors are less sensitive than 3He, BF3 gas is corrosive, and a much higher voltage is required than what is used with 3He detectors. Measurements of the neutron detection efficiency of 3He and BF3 as a function of tube pressure were made. The experimental results were also used to validate models of the RPMs.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
DOE OSTI2011

Report on First Activations with the Lead Slowing Down Spectrometer

On Feb. 17 and 18 2011, six items were irradiated with neutrons using the Lead Slowing Down Spectrometer. After irradiation, dose measurements and gamma-spectrometry measurements were completed on all of the samples. No contamination was found on the samples, and all but one provided no dose. Gamma-spectroscopy measurements qualitatively agreed with expectations based on the materials, with the exception of silver. We observed activation in the room in general, mostly due to 56Mn and 24Na. Most of the activation was short lived, with half-lives on the scale of hours, except for 198Au which has a half-life of 2.7 d.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
DOE OSTI2010

Neutron Detection Alternatives to 3He for National Security Applications

One of the main uses for 3He is in gas proportional counters for neutron detection. Large radiation detection systems deployed for homeland security and proliferation detection applications use such systems. Due to the large increase in use of 3He for homeland security and basic research, the supply has dwindled, and can no longer meet the demand. This has led to the search for an alternative technology to replace the use of 3He-based neutron detectors. In this paper, we review the testing of currently commercially available alternative technologies for neutron detection in large systems used in various national security applications.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2010

Boron-Lined Multitube Neutron Proportional Counter Test

Radiation portal monitors used for interdiction of illicit materials at borders include highly sensitive neutron detection systems. The main reason for having neutron detection capability is to detect fission neutrons from plutonium. The currently deployed radiation portal monitors (RPMs) from Ludlum and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) use neutron detectors based upon 3He-filled gas proportional counters, which are the most common large neutron detector. There is a declining supply of 3He in the world, and thus, methods to reduce the use of this gas in RPMs with minimal changes to the current system designs and sensitivity to cargo-borne neutrons are being investigated. Four technologies have been identified as being currently commercially available, potential alternative neutron detectors to replace the use of 3He in RPMs. These technologies are: 1) Boron trifluoride (BF3)-filled proportional counters, 2) Boron-lined proportional counters, 3) Lithium-loaded glass fibers, and 4) Coated non-scintillating plastic fibers. In addition, a few other companies have detector technologies that might be competitive in the near term as an alternative technology. Reported here are the results of tests of a boron-lined, “multitube” proportional counter manufactured by Centronic Ltd. (Surry, U.K. and Houston, TX). This testing measured the required performance for neutron detection efficiency and gamma-ray rejection capabilities of the detector.

3He↗
DOE OSTI2010

Boron-Lined Multichamber and Conventional Neutron Proportional Counter Tests

Radiation portal monitors used for interdiction of illicit materials at borders include highly sensitive neutron detection systems. The main reason for having neutron detection capability is to detect fission neutrons from plutonium. The currently deployed radiation portal monitors (RPMs) from Ludlum and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) use neutron detectors based upon 3He-filled gas proportional counters, which are the most common large neutron detector. There is a declining supply of 3He in the world, and thus, methods to reduce the use of this gas in RPMs with minimal changes to the current system designs and sensitivity to cargo-borne neutrons are being investigated. Four technologies have been identified as being currently commercially available, potential alternative neutron detectors to replace the use of 3He in RPMs. These technologies are: 1) Boron trifluoride (BF3)-filled proportional counters, 2) Boron-lined proportional counters, 3) Lithium-loaded glass fibers, and 4) Coated non-scintillating plastic fibers. In addition, a few other companies have detector technologies that might be competitive in the near term as an alternative technology. Reported here are the results of tests of a boron-lined, multichamber proportional counter manufactured by LND, Inc. Also reported are results obtained with an earlier design of conventional, boron-lined, proportional counters from LND. This testing measured the required performance for neutron detection efficiency and gamma-ray rejection capabilities of the detectors.

3He↗
DOE OSTI2010

Imaging for dismantlement verification: information management and analysis algorithms

The level of detail discernible in imaging techniques has generally excluded them from consideration as verification tools in inspection regimes. An image will almost certainly contain highly sensitive information, and storing a comparison image will almost certainly violate a cardinal principle of information barriers: that no sensitive information be stored in the system. To overcome this problem, some features of the image might be reduced to a few parameters suitable for definition as an attribute. However, this process must be performed with care. Computing the perimeter, area, and intensity of an object, for example, might reveal sensitive information relating to shape, size, and material composition. This paper presents three analysis algorithms that reduce full image information to non-sensitive feature information. Ultimately, the algorithms are intended to provide only a yes/no response verifying the presence of features in the image. We evaluate the algorithms on both their technical performance in image analysis, and their application with and without an explicitly constructed information barrier. The underlying images can be highly detailed, since they are dynamically generated behind the information barrier. We consider the use of active (conventional) radiography alone and in tandem with passive (auto) radiography.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2010

Alternatives to 3He for Neutron Detection for Homeland Security

Neutron detection is an essential aspect of interdiction of radiological threats for national security purposes, since plutonium, a material used for nuclear weapons, is a significant source of fission neutrons. Radiation portal monitoring systems, of which there are thousands deployed for homeland security and non-proliferation purposes, currently use 3He gas-filled proportional counters for detecting neutrons. Because of the high usage of 3He for neutron scattering science and national security, the supply has dwindled, and can no longer meet the demand. Consequently, a replacement technology for neutron detection is required in the very near future.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2010

Ship Effect Measurements With Fiber Optic Neutron Detector

The main objectives of this research project was to assemble, operate, test and characterize an innovatively designed scintillating fiber optic neutron radiation detector manufactured by Innovative American Technology with possible application to the Department of Homeland Security screening for potential radiological and nuclear threats at US borders (Kouzes 2004). One goal of this project was to make measurements of the neutron ship effect for several materials. The Virginia State University DOE FaST/NSF summer student-faculty team made measurements with the fiber optic radiation detector at PNNL above ground to characterize the ship effect from cosmic neutrons, and underground to characterize the muon contribution.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2010

IMAGE ANALYSIS ALGORITHMS FOR DUAL MODE IMAGING SYSTEMS

The level of detail discernable in imaging techniques has generally excluded them from consideration as verification tools in inspection regimes where information barriers are mandatory. However, if a balance can be struck between sufficient information barriers and feature extraction to verify or identify objects of interest, imaging may significantly advance verification efforts. This paper describes the development of combined active (conventional) radiography and passive (auto) radiography techniques for imaging sensitive items assuming that comparison images cannot be furnished. Three image analysis algorithms are presented, each of which reduces full image information to non-sensitive feature information and ultimately is intended to provide only a yes/no response verifying features present in the image. These algorithms are evaluated on both their technical performance in image analysis and their application with or without an explicitly constructed information barrier. The first algorithm reduces images to non-invertible pixel intensity histograms, retaining only summary information about the image that can be used in template comparisons. This one-way transform is sufficient to discriminate between different image structures (in terms of area and density) without revealing unnecessary specificity. The second algorithm estimates the attenuation cross-section of objects of known shape based on transition characteristics around the edge of the object’s image. The third algorithm compares the radiography image with the passive image to discriminate dense, radioactive material from point sources or inactive dense material. By comparing two images and reporting only a single statistic from the combination thereof, this algorithm can operate entirely behind an information barrier stage. Together with knowledge of the radiography system, the use of these algorithms in combination can be used to improve verification capability to inspection regimes and improve and substantially increase the likelihood of detecting material diversion.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗