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Worl, Laura Ann

Publications and source records attributed to Worl, Laura Ann.

Potential safety impacts associated with production of gaseous PuF 6 due to reactions between 3013-compliant PuO 2 with Novec TM 1230 at temperature

A part of the NNSA/SRNS Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project is a planned expansion of an existing facility with capabilities to handle, process, package, and characterize large amounts of plutonium oxide materials for permanent disposition at WIPP. The facility design for this future processing capability will include glovebox operations, HEPA filters, and exhaust/ventilation systems. An NNSA review of the facility support systems included comments on the potential residual reactivity of previously-stabilized PuO 2 , and on the possibility of chemical interactions between stabilized PuO 2 and a new fire suppressant (Novec TM 1230), a replacement for chlorinated/brominated compounds such as HALON TM , to be employed in the event of a room/glovebox fire where PuO 2 will be processed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

MIS Shelf-Life Final Report for Plutonium Oxide Item CAN92 (SSR147) from Rocky Flats Analytical Laboratory Operations

A plutonium/uranium oxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied to determine the gas generation and corrosion behavior in a storage environment. Sample CAN92 represents plutonium/uranium oxides stored in 3013 containers. The material originated in the analytical laboratory at Rocky Flats. This study followed over time the gas pressure and composition of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/400th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions had been measured periodically over 5 ½ years. The maximum observed gas pressure from gas generation was 117 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 77.5 kPa was largely due to the generation of nitrogen and carbon dioxide with minor amounts of hydrogen and nitrous oxide. The internal components of SSR147 were inspected 6.5 years after it was removed from the array. The inside surfaces of the inner bucket exposed to the original sample for 1,937 days had an etched appearance and general corrosion. No pitting was observed on the inner bucket that held the sample.

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Experimental Steps toward a Density Law for Chlorine-Crediting Criticality Models of Aqueous Plutonium solutions

Criticality accident prevention is an essential safety consideration for all operations involving fissionable and fissile materials. Predictive criticality calculations using advanced neutron transport codes, such as Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport (MCNP), are invaluable tools for designing and implementing operational limits. While indispensable, these tools are limited by the quality and accuracy of the inputs that the user provides to define the modeled system. Parameters such as atomic composition, shape, and material density must be accurately defined to obtain a meaningful result. In the case of material property details for a plutonium model, accurate material characterization data is sometimes sparse. Thus limitations in calculation accuracy can be reduced by improving our knowledge of material properties in the targeted fissile systems. One of the biggest remaining challenges to accurately defining fissile systems is the description of aqueous fissile solutions. Even simple properties, such as density, are not well-known for fissile solutions relevant to nuclear energy and security. Described here are initial efforts undertaken to improve criticality calculation inputs for fissile plutonium chloride solutions in water. This effort is focused on experimentally determining accurate solution characteristics for ternary plutonium chloride/hydrochloric acid/water systems, by measurement of water activity and solution density. The effect of inputting experimental densities for these solutions into MCNP criticality calculations is compared to the traditional approach of modeling an idealized (and fictitious) plutonium-water mixture. Expansion of these efforts to a working density law for aqueous plutonium chloride solutions is also discussed.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

MIS Shelf-Life Final Report for Plutonium Oxide Item 1000089 (SSR136 and SSR136A) from Rocky Flats Peroxide Precipitation and Calcination Process

A plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied to determine the gas generation and corrosion behavior in a storage environment. Sample 1000089 represents product-quality plutonium oxides produced in the Rocky Flats peroxide precipitation process currently stored in 3013 containers. This study followed over time the gas pressure and composition of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions had been measured periodically over almost 13 years. The maximum observed gas pressure was 204 kPa and was related to a temperature excursion. The maximum observed gas pressure from gas generation was 126 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 86.7 kPa was due to the generation of hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. Carbon dioxide, methane and carbon monoxide were minor components of the headspace gas. The material exhibited unusual behavior in that the atmosphere reached flammable levels of hydrogen and oxygen within the first 30 days and remained flammable for the duration of the experiment. It has been determined that the sample inside the reactor was a mixture of the AR material, material calcined at 800 °C, and material calcined at 950 °C. The experiment was terminated in 2012 and unloaded in 2016. A new reactor, SSR136A, was loaded with the original sample freshly calcined at 950 °C. The total pressure inside SSR136A remained close to the initial value of 93 kPa. The total pressure is composed of He (steady levels after the reloading) and hydrogen which is 10% of the reactor’s total pressure. Nitrogen and oxygen compose trace amounts of the reactor headspace. The internal components of SSR136 were inspected in 2021, five years after it was removed from the array. The inside surfaces of the inner bucket exposed to the original sample for 4,576 days had an etched appearance, and pit-like features were observed in the microscopic analysis. No corrosion was observed on the SSR136A inner bucket that held the freshly calcined sample that was exposed for 1,303 days.

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Your Role as a Program Manager in Pit Production Mission Integration (PPMI-DO)

PPMI is responsible for integrating the planning, execution, and reporting for LANL’s Pit Manufacturing efforts, surplus plutonium disposition activities, the Material Recycle and Recovery (MR&R) program, and other programs of national significance. Our programmatic sponsors rely on PPMI to capitalize on the unique capabilities and expertise in PF-4 (the only Security Cat I/Haz Cat II Pu processing facility in the Nation) and other vital facilities across the laboratory to deliver on mission critical products in support of National Security.

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