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Wright, Emily D.

Publications and source records attributed to Wright, Emily D..

8 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Electrical Shock During Phone Assisted Troubleshooting of Laboratory Equipment

We report researchers have the potential to be exposed to a wide variety of hazards inherent to the equipment they use and maintain. When equipment does not function as expected, researchers sometimes reach out to their vendors for assistance. Early diagnostic or troubleshooting interactions between researcher and vendor are often conducted over the telephone and can lead to researchers performing work outside of their area of expertise and exposure to unknown hazards. This type of interaction significantly contributed to an incident where during diagnostic activities a researcher accidentally contacted, and discharged, a capacitor in an X-ray diffraction instrument. While this incident did not produce a serious injury, if the capacitor discharge path had occurred hand-to-hand across the heart, a serious injury may have been possible.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2018

NA-SS-SN L-5000-2018-0005 858EL Arsenic Release Above Permit Level (Causal Analysis Report)

On November 28, 2018 at approximately 4:17pm the arsenic monitor in the Acid Waste Neutralization (AWN) room located in 858N was registering a concentration above the permit level of 51ppb as stated in ABCWUA Permit 2069G Daily Composite Limit. 100ml samples had been drawn from the waste stream at - 6pm November 28, 2018. The samples were analyzed, results received on November 29, 2018 confirmed an arsenic concentration above the permit level.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2018

Causal Analysis Report for Thunder Range Block VIII Test - Management Concern

From July 24th -27th, 2018, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) was conducting a series of explosive tests (referred to as Block VIII Tests) at Thunder Range. Thunder Range is an explosive testing range located on Kirtland Air Force Base and operated by SNL. The testing occurred on Range 7, a fragmentation range that is authorized for activities up to a maximum of 2,000 pounds net explosive weight (NEW). The maximum NEW for the Block VIII tests was 114 lbs. The specific management concern is that although the Thunder Range team identified controls to provide protection for essential personnel, those controls were not adequately evaluated before testing occurred. There were several controls in place at Thunder Range when the block VW test was executed. Engineered controls including Fire Control Point (FCP) placement, FCP structure design, and administrative controls involving communications. These controls were in place but not thoroughly evaluated for adequacy in meeting requirements related to sound pressure and fragments before the test was executed. Compliance with the remaining requirements was achieved. The lack of evaluation did not result in harm to personnel, equipment, or structures but was deemed as an opportunity to further understand how compliance with DOE-STD-1212-2012 could be better achieved with defensible evidence. The information provided in the remainder of this report discusses these controls and the deficiencies that contributed to this management concern.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2018

Causal Analysis Report for NA-SS-SNL-8000-2018-0002 Electrical shock: Wind Turbine Nacelle Lubbock TX

A Sandia National Laboratories Member of the Workforce (MOW) experienced contact with electrical energy while performing work on an oil filter pump electrical system in the al wind turbine nacelle at Sandia National Laboratories Scaled Wind Turbine Facility (SWiFT). The Department of Energy (DOE) Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Scaled Wind Farm Technology (SWiFT) facility does research and development (R&D) work in collaboration with Texas Tech University. The SWiFT facility includes three turbines for performing wind plant and turbine technology research in support of DOE's Wind Energy Technology Office. The current work ongoing at the site is primarily related to commissioning the three turbines to support ongoing DOE customer needs and requests. It was during the performance of commissioning tests of the hydraulic systems in the a1 turbine that a Sandia MOW experienced contact with electrical energy. There were multiple root and contributing causes that ultimately resulted in the electrical energy contact. These causes are summarized and aligned to their corrective actions in the corrective action plan table provided in Section 7(c). The purpose of this narrative section is to provide additional information and context

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2018

Causal Analysis Report for "Demolition of Historic and Yet-to-be-Determined Radar Towers at TTR Without Completing Required NEPA Process"

Two radar towers at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Contraves Towers 22-00 and 12-00, were torn down prior to completion of the required National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process. National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, (NTESS) submission of the NEPA checklist triggered a Sandia Field Office (SFO) review of the proposed work scope and was to include a required consultation between SFO and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) to assess any adverse effect(s) on historic properties or contributing element(s) to a historic district and, if so, determine a resolution. Following the consultation, SFO provides approval/denial of the proposed work detailed on the submitted NEPA checklist. Contraves Tower 22-00 is a historic structure, as formally determined by the SFO in consultation with the SHPO. The historical eligibility of Contraves Tower 12-00 is yet to be determined. On February 13, 2018, NTESS notified SFO that Contraves Tower 22-00 at TTR was torn down in May 2017 prior to completion of the required the NEPA process, including consultation with the SHPO. NTESS submitted two NEPA checklists to SFO in 2016 for the removal of several structures no longer required by NTESS. The first NEPA checklist listed three historic structures (one of which was Contraves Tower 22-00) and SFO determination on whether consultation with the SHPO is necessary as well as approval/denial of the NEPA checklist is pending. The second NEPA checklist listed five non-historic structures, one of which was Contraves Tower 12-00. SFO approved the NEPA checklist covering non historic structures except for the Contraves Tower 12-00, as the Contraves Tower 12-00 requires further consultation with the SHPO by SFO. Only after completion of the consultation would SFO determine approval/denial on the remaining property cited within the NEPA checklist. In late January 2018, NTESS personnel discovered that Contraves Tower 22-00 was no longer listed in the Facility Information Management System (FIMS). Upon further investigation, NTESS personnel verified that the Contraves Tower 22-00 had been removed in May 2017. During the initial extent of condition, it was discovered that Contraves Tower 12-00 had also been torn down in May 2017 as part of this same destruction and demolition (D&D) activity. Both Contraves Towers 22-00 and 12-00) had been torn down prior to completion of the NEPA process, including consultation with the SHPO.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2016

Measures and Metrics Report for Corporate Procedures (Q4 FY2016)

This quarterly summary report addresses measures and metrics as they pertain to risk, evaluation, and corrective action records in the Assurance Information System (AIS). This quarterly report is the product of a combined effort by the Risk, Assessments, and Take Action procedure subject matter experts (SMEs) to analyze the available data, primarily data from the AIS corporate application. The purpose of this report is to monitor implementation and identify improvement opportunities.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Security and Emergency Management: NMPEA Application

The Security and Emergency Management (S&EM) Center at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is responsible for ensuring overall security for people, information, and facilities at SNL. The center runs a broad Security and Emergency Management Program in close cooperation with other organizations throughout SNL. The mission of the Security program is to minimize current and future security threats so that Sandia can protect, sustain and enhance SNL’s ability to function as a multidisciplinary national security laboratory. The mission of the Emergency Management program is to provide SNL with dedicated professionals who deliver safe, prompt, courteous, efficient emergency planning and response to fire-related incidents, hazardous materials, confined space, emergency medical emergencies, and non-emergency events to protect the workers, the public and the environment. They embrace mission success in the National Interest, actively supporting all Divisions. The Emergency Management (EM) Program’s vision is to be recognized by SNL/NM and the entire DOE complex as the model for superior emergency management services. Emergency Management plans to accomplish this vision through a leadership philosophy that promotes respect and mutual trust among all members through open and honest communication.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗