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Yao, David K. Y.

Publications and source records attributed to Yao, David K. Y..

Defense strategies for infrastructures with multiple systems of components

In several critical infrastructures correlations between the constituent systems represent certain vulnerabilities: disruptions to one may propagate to others and possibly to the entire infrastructure. The correlations between the systems are characterized in two ways in this paper: (i) the aggregate failure correlation function specifies the conditional failure probability of the infrastructure given the failure of an individual system, and (ii) the pairwise correlation function between two systems specifies the failure probability of one system given the failure of the other. The survival probabilities of individual systems satisfy firstorder differential conditions that generalize the contest success functions and statistical independence conditions. We formulate a problem of ensuring the resilience of an infrastructure as a game between the provider and attacker; their utility functions are sums of infrastructure survival probability terms and cost terms, both expressed in terms of the numbers of system components attacked and reinforced. We derive Nash Equilibrium conditions and sensitivity functions that highlight the dependence of infrastructure resilience on the cost terms, correlation functions, and individual system survival probabilities. We apply these results to models of distributed cloud computing and energy grid infrastructures.

Rao, Nageswara S↗

Cyber-Physical Correlations for Infrastructure Resilience: A Game-Theoretic Approach

In several critical infrastructures, the cyber and physical parts are correlated so that disruptions to one affect the other and hence the whole system. These correlations may be exploited to strategically launch components attacks, and hence must be accounted for ensuring the infrastructure resilience, specified by its survival probability. We characterize the cyber-physical interactions at two levels: (i) the failure correlation function specifies the conditional survival probability of cyber sub-infrastructure given the physical sub-infrastructure as a function of their marginal probabilities, and (ii) the individual survival probabilities of both sub-infrastructures are characterized by first-order differential conditions. We formulate a resilience problem for infrastructures composed of discrete components as a game between the provider and attacker, wherein their utility functions consist of an infrastructure survival probability term and a cost term expressed in terms of the number of components attacked and reinforced. We derive Nash Equilibrium conditions and sensitivity functions that highlight the dependence of infrastructure resilience on the cost term, correlation function and sub-infrastructure survival probabilities. These results generalize earlier ones based on linear failure correlation functions and independent component failures. We apply the results to models of cloud computing infrastructures and energy grids.

cyber-physical infrastructures↗

Identification of Low-level Point Radioactive Sources using a sensor network

Identification of a low-level point radioactive source amidst background radiation is achieved by a network of radiation sensors using a two-step approach. Based on measurements from three or more sensors, a geometric difference triangulation method or an N-sensor localization method is used to estimate the location and strength of the source. Then a sequential probability ratio test based on current measurements and estimated parameters is employed to finally decide: (1) the presence of a source with the estimated parameters, or (2) the absence of the source, or (3) the insufficiency of measurements to make a decision. This method achieves specified levels of false alarm and missed detection probabilities, while ensuring a close-to-minimal number of measurements for reaching a decision. This method minimizes the ghost-source problem of current estimation methods, and achieves a lower false alarm rate compared with current detection methods. This method is tested and demonstrated using: (1) simulations, and (2) a test-bed that utilizes the scaling properties of point radioactive sources to emulate high intensity ones that cannot be easily and safely handled in laboratory experiments.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Localization Leads to Improved Distributed Detection Under Non-Smooth Distributions

We consider a detection network of sensors that measure intensity levels due to a source amidst background inside a two-dimensional monitoring area. The source intensity decays away from it possibly in discrete jumps, and the corresponding sensor measurements could be random due to the nature of source and background, or due to sensor errors, or both. The detection problem is to infer the presence of a source based on sensor measurements. In the conventional decision/detection fusion approach, detection decisions are made at the individual sensors using Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT), and are combined at the fusion center using a Boolean fusion rule. We show that better detection can be achieved by utilizing sensor measurements at the fusion center, by first localizing the source and then utilizing a more effective SPRT. This approach leads to the detection performance superior to any Boolean detection fuser, under fairly general conditions: (i) smooth and non-smooth source intensity functions and probability ratios, and (ii) a minimum packing number of the state-space. We apply this method to improve the detection of (a) low-level point radiation sources amidst background radiation under strong shielding conditions, and (b) the well-studied Gaussian source amidst Gaussian background.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Cyber-Physical Trade-Offs in Distributed Detection Networks

We consider a network of sensors that measure the scalar intensity due to the background or a source combined with background, inside a two-dimensional monitoring area. The sensor measurements may be random due to the underlying nature of the source and background or due to sensor errors or both. The detection problem is infer the presence of a source of unknown intensity and location based on sensor measurements. In the conventional approach, detection decisions are made at the individual sensors, which are then combined at the fusion center, for example using the majority rule. With increased communication and computation costs, we show that a more complex fusion algorithm based on measurements achieves better detection performance under smooth and non-smooth source intensity functions, Lipschitz conditions on probability ratios and a minimum packing number for the state-space. We show that these conditions for trade-offs between the cyber costs and physical detection performance are applicable for two detection problems: (i) point radiation sources amidst background radiation, and (ii) sources and background with Gaussian distributions.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗