Diagnostics Algorithms in Nuclear Plant Cyber Attack Analysis Toolkit
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Engineering topics
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When considering potential energy production technologies for the future, a critical consideration centers on the question of “how green” the technology is. Here, the word “green” implies that the technology has a zero or minimal impact on the public and environment while still providing benefits by way of electricity, heat, and other products such as hydrogen and water. And, these potential impacts must be considered over the lifecycle of the technology deployment, from design, construction, operation, and disposition. Ideally, a green energy technology would be net-zero (i.e., having no to almost negligible contribution) on five key elements: 1. Greenhouse gas emissions, including carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases such as ozone-depleting gases 2. Water consumption 3. Material resource consumption 4. Disposition of wastes 5. Public, flora, and fauna safety including deaths, health, and environmental impacts. Society would benefit from net-zero impacts of the five elements above while having low-cost energy. As society starts to replace fossil fuels in the energy mix, we need to consider the possible impacts of adopted technologies. We need a production approach that provides large quantities of energy while being safe, reliable, economical, and sustainable. In this report, we describe a variety of characteristics related to the five elements above to provide a fact-supported, science-based depiction of nuclear fission as an energy providing technology. By better understanding how fission power is nearly net-zero in the five elements above, we can position our thinking to align with the overarching goal to provide society with a low-impact energy source.
Sabotage of nuclear plants and theft of special nuclear material are different from many other issues potentially affecting public health and safety, and some of those differences drive the content of the present report. A high-level indication of these differences is provided in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety Goal Policy. Promulgated in the mid-1980’s, when it had become reasonably clear that risk analysis had improved to the point where it was possible to understand the risks associated with plant operation, the Safety Goal Policy articulates qualitative safety goals and quantitative health objectives that are meant to guide regulatory and risk management activities, with the following key exceptions noted in the original policy statement: The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently included in the safety goals. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission’s intention that everything that is needed will be done to keep these types of risks at their present very low level; and it is the Commission’s expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions, it is the Commission’s intent that the risks from all the various initiating mechanisms be considered to the best of the capability of current evaluation techniques. The present report discusses extensions of classical risk management to address some of the special issues that arise in the context of security. Although the present emphasis is on physical security, some attention will be paid to cyber security. A particular focus of the report is on quantitative framework to manage and address uncertainties. This framework is demonstrated via a couple of hypothetical examples.