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Youngblood, Robert W.

Publications and source records attributed to Youngblood, Robert W..

3 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Model-Based Diagnostics and Mitigation of Cyber Threats

The report summarizes key tasks performed to develop a toolkit for detecting cyber-attack events in instrumentation and control (I&C) systems of nuclear power plants. The toolkit connects the state-of-the-art GPWR Simulator with the RELAP5 code providing best-estimate nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) analyses, via the application programming interface (API), and allows users to introduce potential cyber-attack scenarios into power plant operational simulation. This summary for the project reflects topical reports submitted during the project as well as a journal paper published in 2022. The focus areas of the summary include: (1) modeling I&C systems for the AP1000 Generation III+ nuclear plant and GPWR simulator, (2) simulation and monitoring of plant response to cyber-attack events, (3) API structure for the toolkit interfacing the GPWR simulator and RELAP5 code, and (4) restructuring of the three-loop NSSS software of GPWR to model the two-loop AP1000 structure. Discussed in some details are (a) the attack tree analysis assessing the susceptibility of the AP1000 I&C system, resulting in reactor trips, in terms of the attack possibility and component sensitivity and (b) realistic estimation of the time to steam generator trip due to cyber-intrusions in the GPWR Simulator. Finally, sample demonstrations of the cyber-security tool kit, in the form of the GPWR-RELAP5 API, are summarized.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Estimation of the time for steam generator trip due to cyber intrusions

The time required to trip a pressurized water reactor (PWR) by inserting malicious signals into its steam generator (SG) control system has been studied using the Generic PWR (GPWR) Simulator. A semi-analytical model is developed to approximately reproduce the simulator response and understand the dynamics of the control unit. A series of two proportional-integral controllers determines control action according to preset constants, the readings from the feedwater level sensor, and those from feedwater and steam flowrate transmitters. It is observed that the most important factor that determines whether a trip will occur is how much additional water is added to or withheld from the SG over time compared to normal operating conditions. In order to determine the effects of control action on the SG, changes in mass inventory are considered. This approach models the SG water level as a function of mass inventory and has a backward temporal memory. A Python interface is developed for the GPWR framework to automatically simulate different spoofing scenarios and post-process the related data. We observe that the trip times predominantly depend on flow mismatch and/or level errors. Controller parameters, including the integral time and gain constants, either speed up or slow down the rate of progression to a trip setpoint but do not cause a trip by themselves. The reactor can trip on a high-level signal when the reading crosses above 78%, increased from its reference level of 57%, or a low-level reading when it is below 25%. The present results show roughly how long the operators would have to respond to an attack, given a specific set of spoofing signals within the issue space analyzed. Furthermore, we have generated a simple surface by fitting a combination of exponential functions to the data obtained from the GPWR Simulator. In general, trips on a low level have been observed to occur faster than those on a high level.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗