Engineering topics

Younkin, Jim

Publications and source records attributed to Younkin, Jim.

2 records

DOE OSTI2022

Recommendations for Secure Transport: Material Conveyance Physical Protection Technology

Nuclear material is at higher risk of theft and sabotage during transport than during any other phase of the nuclear fuel lifecycle. Nuclear materials are transported in the public domain where adversaries have an upper hand by taking advantage of the time and location of the theft or sabotage attempt. As such, even modest threat profiles for transport of nuclear and radioactive material can require substantial detection and delay measures to support timely response. Conveyance tracking augmented with technology that improves on-the-scene situational awareness at a remote monitoring center has been adopted as a de-facto standard approach for transportation security. At present, the extended tracking and situational awareness capabilities needed for a nuclear material shipment, as is provided by the purpose designed, Transportation – Security, Tracking and Reporting (T-STAR) System, do not exist in a single commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solution. Typically, the COTS systems that excel in one area are deficient in other areas, presenting challenges to designing well-rounded, robust systems. Still, COTS solutions can offer the basic set of tracking and situational awareness capabilities by indicating last update time, current location, and route taken. By incorporating vehicle and driver performance measures via the vehicle’s controller area network (CAN bus) and video alongside other data streams allows telemetry and other shipment information to be assessed in novel ways.This paper describes the operation, capabilities and features of various conveyance protection systems and approaches, assesses emerging technologies and how they could be used through a unified interface, and enumerates additional ways to provide early detection using vehicle, onboard technologies, effective delay technologies and approaches and simple equipment to improve protection during transport.

Shannon, Michael↗

DOE OSTI2021

A Novel Fiber-Bragg-Grating-Based Unique Identifier for Use in Tags and Seals

Tags and seals are important tools used in safeguards regimes for the control of nuclear materials. Vital to a successful tag or seal is the ability to securely, uniquely, and positively distinguish it from others of the same kind. This allows one to validate that items entered into an inspection regime to which the tag or seal is affixed are as claimed. We are developing a new type of unique identifier (UID) for such applications that is based on fiber-Bragg grating (FBG) technology. The index of refraction of the core glass of a fiber optic can be locally and permanently altered if sensitized fibers are exposed to intense ultraviolet light. This can be used to create index modulations with a regular periodicity comparable to the wavelengths of light with which the fiber is used. If broadband illumination is sent down the fiber, any light that is in resonance with the modulations will be reflected back to the input end of the fiber where it can be detected. The shape of the returned spectrum can be set by the modulation pattern written into the fiber’s core. We take advantage of these properties to create a compact UID that contains several FBGs potted into a monolithic body. By connecting the UID to an optical interrogator, the complex spectral return can be uniquely identified with a short measurement, providing a robust identification. As a device based on narrowband spectral returns, FBGs are inherently radiation tolerant, making them ideal for use with nuclear materials. Further, they can be read out remotely via a long fiber optic or locally via brief connection to a portable optical interrogator. Because the spectral signature of FBGs is sensitive to external mechanical perturbations, we are exploring the ability to reversibly alter the signature obtained from the UID by applying controlled mechanical forces with a simple device. Such a “key” will allow different stakeholders to obtain their own unique signature from the device, providing a new level of surety to safeguards inspections.

Ziock, Klaus-Peter↗