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von Hippel, Frank

Publications and source records attributed to von Hippel, Frank.

Mitigating the Threat of Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation via Nuclear-Submarine Programs

Brazil is building a nuclear-powered attack submarine, South Korea has in the past asserted its need for nuclear-powered attack submarines to deal with the threat of North Korean nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and Iran has asserted more vaguely its need for naval nuclear propulsion. All three countries are non-weapon-state parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Their interest in naval reactors brings with it two challenges to the NPT: 1) The safeguards “loophole” under which a country can withdraw nuclear materials from IAEA safeguards indefinitely for allowed “non-peaceful activities;” and 2) A justification for the acquisition of national uranium-enrichment facilities because the international suppliers of enrichment services have peaceful-use requirements. In fact, Brazil’s acquisition of enrichment was driven by its navy. It is argued, however, that nuclear-powered attack submarines have advantages over modern conventional attack submarines primarily in their ability to transit great distances at high speed whereas only a few countries have foreign military commitments requiring such capabilities. For defense of nearby waters against foreign navies, attack submarines are merely one component of a complex system of anti-submarine aircraft and surface vessels and underwater sensor networks. Conventional attack submarines are no less effective and much less costly than nuclear-powered attack submarines in this role.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear safety regulation in the post-Fukushima era

The March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident prompted regulators around the world to take a hard look at their requirements for protecting nuclear plants against severe accidents. In the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) ordered a “top-to-bottom” review of its regulations, and ultimately approved a number of safety upgrades. It rejected other risk-reduction measures, however, using a screening process that did not adequately account for impacts of large-scale land contamination events. Among rejected options was a measure to end dense packing of 90 spent fuel pools, which we consider critical for avoiding a potential catastrophe much greater than Fukushima. Unless the NRC improves its approach to assessing risks and benefits of safety improvements—by using more realistic parameters in its quantitative assessments and also taking into account societal impacts—the United States will remain needlessly vulnerable to such disasters.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Feasibility of Ending HEU Fuel Use in the U.S. Navy

We report that since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has sought to remove weapons-useable highly enriched uranium (HEU) containing 20 percent or more uranium-235 from as many locations as possible because of concerns about the possibility of nuclear terrorism.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

After the Iran deal: Multinational enrichment

Iran and the E3+3 nations (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, plus China, Russia, and the United States) negotiated a framework, in April 2015, for a “comprehensive solution that will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program” (1, 2). The final settlement, expected by July 2015 or soon after, would constrain Iran's activities for various extended periods in return for the lifting of sanctions and affirm Iran's right to pursue its nuclear program free of the limits on its uranium enrichment capacity a decade or more from now. What happens when these restrictions begin to phase out? Here, we outline one approach to limit the long-term risk by using the next 10 years to convert Iran's national enrichment plant into a multinational one, possibly including as partners some of Iran's neighbors and one or more of the E3+3 countries.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Policy and Technical Issues Facing a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty. Chapter 14

We report the largest obstacle to creating nuclear weapons, starting with the ones that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has been to make sufficient quantities of fissile materials – highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium – to sustain an explosive fission chain reaction.1 Recognition of this fact has, for more than fifty years, underpinned both the support for and the opposition to adoption of an international treaty banning at a minimum the production of more fissile materials for nuclear weapons, commonly referred to as a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation

Achieving nuclear disarmament, stopping nuclear proliferation, and preventing nuclear terrorism are among the most critical challenges facing the world today. Unmaking the Bomb proposes a new approach to reaching these long-held goals. Rather than considering them as separate issues, the authors—physicists and experts on nuclear security—argue that all three of these goals can be understood and realized together if we focus on the production, stockpiling, and disposal of plutonium and highly enriched uranium—the fissile materials that are the key ingredients used to make nuclear weapons. The authors describe the history, production, national stockpiles, and current military and civilian uses of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and propose policies aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating these fissile materials worldwide. These include an end to the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons, an end to their use as reactor fuels, and the verified elimination of all national stockpiles.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy

Iran is negotiating with a group of six states over the future of its nuclear program. In November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) agreed to a Joint Plan of Action that seeks to reach a “comprehensive solution” by July 20, 2014.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A Win-Win Solution For Iran’s Arak Reactor

In November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 group of countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) agreed on a six-month Joint Plan of Action to enable negotiations on a final settlement to contain the proliferation risks from Iran’s nuclear program.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗