Interactions Between the Space Station and the Environment: A Preliminary Assessment of EMI

G B Murphy; H B Garrett

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NASA NTRS · 19900016241

Interactions Between the Space Station and the Environment: A Preliminary Assessment of EMI

G B Murphy·H B Garrett

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Abstract

A review of the interactions between proposed Space Station systems/payloads and the environment that contribute to electromagnetic interference was performed. Seven prime sources of interference have been identified. These are: The Space Station power system; active experiments such as beam injection; ASTROMAG; ram and wake density gradients; pick up ions produced by vented or offgassed clouds; waves produced by current loops that include the plasma and structure; arcing from high voltage solar arrays (or possible ESD in polar orbit). This review indicates that: minimizing leakage current from the 20 kHz power system to the structure; keeping the surfaces of the Space Station structure, arrays, and radiators nonconducting; minimizing venting of payloads or systems to non-operational periods; careful placement of payloads sensitive to magnetic field perturbations or wake noise; and designing an operational timeline compatible with experiment requirement are the most effective means of minimizing the effects of this interference. High degrees of uncertainty exist in the estimates of magnitudes of gas emission induced EMI, radiation of 20 kHz and harmonics, ASTROMAG induced interference, and arc threshold/frequency of the solar array. These processes demand further attention so that mitigation efforts are properly calibrated.

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G B Murphy, H B Garrett. 1990-03-01. Interactions Between the Space Station and the Environment: A Preliminary Assessment of EMI. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19900016241

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