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NASA NTRS · 19950020933

CAE for Thermal Management of Aerospace Electronic Boards Using the BETAsoft Program

Abstract

Aerospace electronic boards require special attention to thermal management due to constraints such as their need to be light, small, and maintain high power densities. Also, cooling is mainly through conductive and radiative modes with minor or negligible convective cooling. Due to these particular requirements, thermal design has become an integrated part of the electronic design process in order to avoid expensive repeat prototyping and to ensure high reliability. To achieve high speed simulations, the BETAsoft code uses semi-empirical formulations and an advanced finite difference scheme that incorporates local adaptive grids. Detailed conduction, convection and radiation heat transfer is considered. Various benchmark verifications of the software simulation compared to infrared images typically prove to be within 10% of each other. The thermal analysis of a sample avionic card in a natural convection environment is shown. Then, the individual effects of attaching metal screws to the casing, increasing radiative emissivities of the casing, increasing the conductance of the wedge lock, adding an aluminum core to the board, adding metal strips in board layers, inserting conduction pads under components, and adding heat sinks to components are demonstrated.

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Kimberly Bobish. 1995-01-01. CAE for Thermal Management of Aerospace Electronic Boards Using the BETAsoft Program. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19950020933

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