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NASA NTRS · 20140010764

Cabin Environment Physics Risk Model

Abstract

This paper presents a Cabin Environment Physics Risk (CEPR) model that predicts the time for an initial failure of Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) functionality to propagate into a hazardous environment and trigger a loss-of-crew (LOC) event. This physics-of failure model allows a probabilistic risk assessment of a crewed spacecraft to account for the cabin environment, which can serve as a buffer to protect the crew during an abort from orbit and ultimately enable a safe return. The results of the CEPR model replace the assumption that failure of the crew critical ECLSS functionality causes LOC instantly, and provide a more accurate representation of the spacecraft's risk posture. The instant-LOC assumption is shown to be excessively conservative and, moreover, can impact the relative risk drivers identified for the spacecraft. This, in turn, could lead the design team to allocate mass for equipment to reduce overly conservative risk estimates in a suboptimal configuration, which inherently increases the overall risk to the crew. For example, available mass could be poorly used to add redundant ECLSS components that have a negligible benefit but appear to make the vehicle safer due to poor assumptions about the propagation time of ECLSS failures.

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BibTeXRIS

Mattenberger, Christopher J., Mathias, Donovan Leigh. 2014-06-22. Cabin Environment Physics Risk Model. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20140010764

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