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NASA NTRS · 20160005293

Model Based Mission Assurance: Emerging Opportunities for Robotic Systems

Abstract

The emergence of Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) in a Model Based Engineering framework has created new opportunities to improve effectiveness and efficiencies across the assurance functions. The MBSE environment supports not only system architecture development, but provides for support of Systems Safety, Reliability and Risk Analysis concurrently in the same framework. Linking to detailed design will further improve assurance capabilities to support failures avoidance and mitigation in flight systems. This also is leading new assurance functions including model assurance and management of uncertainty in the modeling environment. Further, the assurance cases, a structured hierarchal argument or model, are emerging as a basis for supporting a comprehensive viewpoint in which to support Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA).

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Evans, John W., DiVenti, Tony. 2016-02-17. Model Based Mission Assurance: Emerging Opportunities for Robotic Systems. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20160005293

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