Goal Structuring Notation in a Radiation Hardening Assurance Case for COTS-Based Spacecraft

Witulski, A.; Austin, R.; Evans, J.; Mahadevan, N.; Karsai, G.; Sierawski, B.; LaBel, K.; Reed, R.

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NASA NTRS · 20160005295

Goal Structuring Notation in a Radiation Hardening Assurance Case for COTS-Based Spacecraft

Witulski, A.·Austin, R.·Evans, J.·Mahadevan, N.·Karsai, G.·Sierawski, B.·LaBel, K.·Reed, R.

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Abstract

The attached presentation is a summary of how mission assurance is supported by model-based representations of spacecraft systems that can define sub-system functionality and interfacing, reliability parameters, as well as detailing a new paradigm for assurance, a model-centric and not document-centric process.

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Witulski, A., Austin, R., Evans, J., Mahadevan, N., Karsai, G., Sierawski, B., LaBel, K., Reed, R.. 2016-03-14. Goal Structuring Notation in a Radiation Hardening Assurance Case for COTS-Based Spacecraft. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20160005295

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