Cyber-Attack Methods, Why They Work on Us, and What to Do

Byrne, DJ

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NASA NTRS · 20170008244

Cyber-Attack Methods, Why They Work on Us, and What to Do

Byrne, DJ

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Abstract

Basic cyber-attack methods are well documented, and even automated with user-friendly GUIs (Graphical User Interfaces). Entire suites of attack tools are legal, conveniently packaged, and freely downloadable to anyone; more polished versions are sold with vendor support. Our team ran some of these against a selected set of projects within our organization to understand what the attacks do so that we can design and validate defenses against them. Some existing defenses were effective against the attacks, some less so. On average, every machine had twelve easily identifiable vulnerabilities, two of them "critical". Roughly 5% of passwords in use were easily crack-able. We identified a clear set of recommendations for each project, and some common patterns that emerged among them all.

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Byrne, DJ. 2015-08-31. Cyber-Attack Methods, Why They Work on Us, and What to Do. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20170008244

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