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NASA NTRS · 20205004525

Space Launch System Engine Out Capabilities

Abstract

NASA's SLS is being developed with the primary purpose of returning people to the Moon and eventually landing people on Mars. With these lofty goals, ensuring mission completion is paramount even in the event of an in-flight mishap. One possible mishap is the loss of an engine in flight. While SLS was not required to show full engine out capability, the program took an ``assess to'' approach to see when the launch vehicle could complete the mission after an engine failure versus when the launch vehicle targets required a down-mode to an alternate mission target to ensure at least some flight objectives were complete, or at a minimum ensure safe return of Orion and the Crew. While this paper will focus on Artemis I, an uncrewed mission, some comparisons will be made to how the engine out capability will change for the subsequent Crewed flights of SLS and Orion.

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BibTeXRIS

A. S. Craig, M. J. Hawkins, J. E. Hauglie, J. J. Hays. Space Launch System Engine Out Capabilities. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20205004525

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