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NASA NTRS · 20230013383

Considerations for Software Fault Prevention and Tolerance

Lorraine Prokop
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Abstract

Mission or safety-critical spaceflight systems should be developed to both reduce the likelihood of software faults pre-flight and to detect/mitigate the effects of software errors should they occur in-flight. New data is available that categorizes software errors from significant historic spaceflight software incidents with implications and considerations to better develop and design software to both minimize and tolerate these most likely software failures.

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Avionicsfault tolerancesoftware fault preventionsafety critical software

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Lorraine Prokop. 2023-09-19. Considerations for Software Fault Prevention and Tolerance. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20230013383

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