System-Theoretic Analysis of Unsafe Collaborative Control in Teaming Systems

Abstract

The interactions that occur in human-teaming are inspiring novel aerospace designs aimed at improving how humans and machines, or multiple machines, work together. Unfortunately, current Systems Engineering processes are ill-equipped to handle these complex relationships and are unable to design and assure the safety for these systems. To close part of this gap, this paper introduces a novel system-theoretic analytical process to identify unsafe collaborative control actions. It is part of a broader set of techniques that extend the state-of-the-art in hazard analysis, System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), to systematically address collaboration. The method rigorously expresses the different ways multiple commands may be unsafe together. Using Systems Theory, it employs abstraction to manage the combinatorial complexity in enumerating control contributions from multiple collaborating components. An algorithm integrates these concepts into an end-to-end process and is supported by automation to enumerate, refine, prune, and prioritize unsafe combinations of control actions. The output of the method feeds the specification of system requirements to implement safety-guided design starting early in concept development. The process is demonstrated on a manned-unmanned aircraft teaming case study and finds new causal factors that were not previously found in a past hazard analysis of the same system.