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DOE OSTI · 1339034

Minimizing Expected Maximum Risk from Cyber-Attacks with Probabilistic Attack Success

Abstract

The goal of our work is to enhance network security by generating partial cut-sets, which are a subset of edges that remove paths from initially vulnerable nodes (initial security conditions) to goal nodes (critical assets), on an attack graph given costs for cutting an edge and a limited overall budget.

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BibTeXRIS

Bhuiyan, Tanveer H., Nandi, Apurba, Medal, Hugh, Halappanavar, Mahantesh. 2016-07-16. Minimizing Expected Maximum Risk from Cyber-Attacks with Probabilistic Attack Success. https://doi.org/10.1109/ths.2016.7568892. https://searchnasa.com/record/osti%3A1339034/minimizing-expected-maximum-risk-from-cyber-attacks-with-probabilistic-attack-success

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Identifying Vulnerabilities and Hardening Attack Graphs for Networked Systems

We investigate efficient security control methods for protecting against vulnerabilities in networked systems. A large number of interdependent vulnerabilities typically exist in the computing nodes of a cyber-system; as vulnerabilities get exploited, starting from low level ones, they open up the doors to more critical vulnerabilities. These cannot be understood just by a topological analysis of the network, and we use the attack graph abstraction of Dewri et al. to study these problems. In contrast to earlier approaches based on heuristics and evolutionary algorithms, we study rigorous methods for quantifying the inherent vulnerability and hardening cost for the system. We develop algorithms with provable approximation guarantees, and evaluate them for real and synthetic attack graphs.

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