Interference Moral Hazard in Large Multihop Networks

Abstract

Cooperation between network nodes is critical for supporting services in ad hoc networks. Cooperation, however, is an idealized assumption that may not always be present. This assumption can fail because of moral hazard, a scenario in part caused by misaligned incentives between the requesting node and supporting node. In this paper, we characterize a moral hazard that perversely incentivizes nodes to increase their routing payments by transmitting interference into the multi-hop network. We refer to this as the interference moral hazard (IMH) problem which is inherent to strategyproof mechanisms with low overpayments. We investigate IMH as a non-cooperative game played by network nodes on a random graph. For large networks, we show that IMH can be solved in the network design space. Finally, we provide sufficient conditions on the network distribution that guarantee an equilibrium path with interference-free play. This is achieved by 1) lower-bounding the number of nodes and 2) bounding the network density slightly above the 2-connectedness threshold and below a proposed upper-bound. Simulations suggest that density plays a fundamental role in IMH.