DOE OSTI · 2997795
UAV Resilience Against Stealthy Attacks
Abstract
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) depend on software components to automate dangerous or critical missions; these components are then a desirable target for adversaries seeking to sabotage the UAV. Some work has been done to prevent an attacker who has either compromised a ground control station or parts of a UAV’s software from sabotaging the vehicle, but not both. We present an architecture running a UAV software stack with runtime monitoring and seL4-based software isolation that prevents attackers from both exploiting software bugs and utilizing stealthy attacks. Our architecture retrofits legacy UAVs and secures the popular MAVLink protocol, making it widely applicable for UAVs to adopt.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Explore connections, maps & timelines
Amorim, Arthur [Idaho National Laboratory], Taylor, Max [Idaho National Laboratory], Kann, Trevor Grant [Idaho National Laboratory], Leavens, Gary [The University of Central Florida], Harrison, Bill [Idaho National Laboratory], Joneckis, Lance Gregory [Idaho National Laboratory]. 2025-05-21. UAV Resilience Against Stealthy Attacks. https://www.osti.gov/biblio/2997795
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.