Resilient information and inference networks under mixed-trust sensing

Abstract

With ubiquitous digitization, sensing, and computational intelligence deployed in increasingly more and broader domains, including critical infrastructure, potentially misleading and destabilizing effects of multimodal anomalies and adversarial behavior are growing in importance. Here, we develop randomized and reinforcement learning-based strategies for strategically recruiting and utilizing deployed (and, thus, vulnerable and potentially faulty and/or compromised) nodes from information and inference networks, while defending against adversaries that attempt to misguide assessments of inferred variables. Recognizing that, besides communication and other costs, sampling from any observable node can either provide true data or dangerously expose our inference to misinformation (without being easily distinguishable what actually happens), the proposed strategies proceed by progressively recruiting nodes and cautiously scaling their information contribution based on assumed, or, in our reinforcement learning approach, intelligently weighed trustworthiness, with the learning approach also considering network-wide, threat-inclusive risk/value tradeoffs. While avoiding the hardware, communication, analytical and computational burden of explicit redundancy, the proposed defensive schemes enable on-the-fly assessments of underlying processes, and system-wide situational awareness with demonstrable resilience against adversarial activities.