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DOE OSTI · 3029209

FY26 Mid-Year Report

Schoenemann, Rico Uwe [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)] (ORCID:0000000227218777)·Carpenter, Matthew Hollis [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)] (ORCID:0000000292133614)·Weidenbenner, Sophie Lynn [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)] (ORCID:0009000118452705)·Kim, Geon-Bo [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)]·Hines, Nathan [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)]·Lee, Chang [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)]
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Abstract

The goal of this project is to develop specific aspects of ultra-high-resolution microcalorimeter technologies that support IAEA Nuclear Material Laboratory needs and the goals of SP-1 19/NML-003 "Microcalorimetry Analysis Technique for NML" but are outside the scope of the SP-1. The focus is on commissioning, assembly, and testing of the microcalorimeter decay energy spectrometer with superconducting transition-edge sensors (TESs) and magnetic microcalorimeters (MMCs) in preparation for transfer to the IAEA Nuclear Material Laboratory.

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98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION

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BibTeXRIS

Schoenemann, Rico Uwe [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)] (ORCID:0000000227218777), Carpenter, Matthew Hollis [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)] (ORCID:0000000292133614), Weidenbenner, Sophie Lynn [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)] (ORCID:0009000118452705), Kim, Geon-Bo [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)], Hines, Nathan [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)], Lee, Chang [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)]. 2026-04-10. FY26 Mid-Year Report. https://doi.org/10.2172/3029209

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