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DOE OSTI · 3685240

Validating a Dynamic PWR Safety and Security Model?

Abstract

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are assessed for safety and security using separate models that cannot capture how an attacker's decisions and a plant's response unfold together in real time, leaving regulators and operators without a complete picture of true plant vulnerability. Traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods treat adversarial events as fixed initiators with predetermined outcomes, and are structurally incapable of representing the time-dependent interplay between physical security events, safety system response, and operator mitigative actions. At Idaho National Laboratory (INL), I contributed to the development and validation of Modeling and Analysis for Safety and Security using the Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). Where static PRA relies on event-tree logic that cannot evolve mid-scenario, MASS-DEF couples a time-dependent dynamic PRA tool EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams) with attack simulation software, allowing attacker behavior, plant system states, and operator actions to interact across time. My work focused on validating a general Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) model. I traced model logic against PWR plant to identified errors in logic and confirm accuracy. I then built and tested attack scenarios against a general PWR model to verify that the model produced expected outcomes across all logical pathways. I also contributed a section to a related technical paper applying the same EMRALD platform to radiation dose modeling. Results show that MASS-DEF can quantitatively demonstrate that many plants exceed their regulatory security thresholds. This demonstrated margin provides a technically defensible basis for reducing the number of guards without compromising regulatory compliance. Physical security costs represent roughly 10% of annual operating budgets, making such reductions directly meaningful to INL's mission of sustaining existing commercial NPPs. This internship strengthened my understanding of nuclear systems, probabilistic modeling, and technical writing, and has solidified my pursuit of a career at a national laboratory.

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BibTeXRIS

Brott, Zoey Ann [Idaho National Laboratory] (ORCID:0009000538487576). 2026-08-13. Validating a Dynamic PWR Safety and Security Model?. https://www.osti.gov/biblio/3685240

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