DOE OSTI · 982587
Solving multi-leader-common-follower games.
Abstract
Multi-leader-common-follower games arise when modelling two or more competitive firms, the leaders, that commit to their decisions prior to another group of competitive firms, the followers, that react to the decisions made by the leaders. These problems lead in a natural way to equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPECs). We develop a characterization of the solution sets for these problems and examine a variety of nonlinear optimization and nonlinear complementarity formulations of EPECs. We distinguish two broad cases: problems where the leaders can cost-differentiate and problems with price-consistent followers. We demonstrate the practical viability of our approach by solving a range of medium-sized test problems.
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Leyffer, S, Munson, T. 2010-01-01. Solving multi-leader-common-follower games.. https://doi.org/10.1080/10556780903448052
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