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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 181 records · Page 10
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2001

Examination of Automation-Induced Complacency and Individual Difference Variates

Automation-induced complacency has been documented as a cause or contributing factor in many airplane accidents throughout the last two decades. It is surmised that the condition results when a crew is working in highly reliable automated environments in which they serve as supervisory controllers monitoring system states for occasional automation failures. Although many reports have discussed the dangers of complacency, little empirical research has been produced to substantiate its harmful effects on performance as well as what factors produce complacency. There have been some suggestions, however, that individual characteristics could serve as possible predictors of performance in automated systems. The present study examined relationship between the individual differences of complacency potential, boredom proneness, and cognitive failure, automation-induced complacency. Workload and boredom scores were also collected and analyzed in relation to the three individual differences. The results of the study demonstrated that there are personality individual differences that are related to whether an individual will succumb to automation-induced complacency. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Prinzel, Lawrence J., III↗
NASA NTRS2006

An Overview of Spray-On Foam Insulation Applications on the Space Shuttle's External Tank: Foam Applications and Foam Shedding Mechanisms

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded that the cause of the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its crew was a breach in the thermal protection system on the leading edge of the left wing. The breach was initiated by a piece of insulating foam that separated from the left bipod ramp of the External Tank and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panel No. 8 at 81.9 seconds after launch. The CAIB conclusion has spawned numerous studies to identify the cause of and factors influencing foam shedding and foam debris liberation from the External Tank during ascent. The symposium on the Thermo-mechanics and Fracture of Space Shuttle External Tank Spray-On Foam Insulation is a collection of presentations that discuss the physics and mechanics of the ET SOFI with the objective of improving analytical and numerical methods for predicting foam thermo-mechanical and fracture behavior. This keynote presentation sets the stage for the presentations contained in this symposium by introducing the audience to the various types of SOFI applications on the Shuttle s External Tank and by discussing the various mechanisms that are believed to be the cause of foam shedding during the Shuttle s ascent to space

Sullivan, Roy M.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report

NASA commissioned the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct a thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003. The accident investigation that followed determined that a large piece of insulating foam from Columbia s external tank (ET) had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The damage was undetected during the mission. The CAIB's findings and recommendations were published in 2003 and are available on the web at http://caib.nasa.gov/. NASA responded to the CAIB findings and recommendations with the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Implementation Plan. Significant enhancements were made to NASA's organizational structure, technical rigor, and understanding of the flight environment. The ET was redesigned to reduce foam shedding and eliminate critical debris. In 2005, NASA succeeded in returning the space shuttle to flight. In 2010, the space shuttle will complete its mission of assembling the International Space Station and will be retired to make way for the next generation of human space flight vehicles: the Constellation Program. The Space Shuttle Program recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew to benefit future human exploration, particularly future vehicle design. The program commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT). The SCSIIT was asked to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight vehicles. To do this, the SCSIIT investigated all elements of crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training, and procedures intended to protect the crew. This report documents the SCSIIT findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Source record↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Identifying Outside Influences as Latent Factors to Risk in Human Performance

During the Acquisition Life Cycle for a program, there are several opportunities for the system in design to be adjusted in accordance with its changing landscape as it is being shaped by evolving policy and organizational culture. Human Systems Integration is integral to identifying these opportunities of change as there are a set number of activities that may account for altered operational states, human performance deviations, and overall component engagement if HSI is enacted early enough in the life cycle. Some changes that occur in the operational environment may not be accounted for since the organizational culture and practices are not currently a part of the HSI focus. Likewise, policy changes themselves from a top-to-bottom analysis may not have the appearance of effecting human performance until having gone through a trail-and-error period. Workarounds to adjust for unforeseen policy affects become the system's solution that usually includes changes in the training and education of the operators, maintainers, and support personnel. A system full of workarounds and off-normal practices, that cause operators to disregard the purpose of the design, coupled with the false notion that these activities are proven for successful system operation, is the very definition of “an accident waiting to happen”. Unforeseen changes in policies and practices that cause new and unusual activities to successfully and keep the system running, should be considered latent factors that may cause a potential mishap, and not part of the resilience that humans provide to the successful operation of the system. This presentation will explore how latent factors may find their way into system operations and how they can be identified and addressed.

Human Systems Integration↗
NASA NTRS1990

A parametric shell analysis of the shuttle 51-L SRB AFT field joint

Following the Shuttle 51-L accident, an investigation was conducted to determine the cause of the failure. Investigators at the Langley Research Center focused attention on the structural behavior of the field joints with O-ring seals in the steel solid rocket booster (SRB) cases. The shell-of-revolution computer program BOSOR4 was used to model the aft field joint of the solid rocket booster case. The shell model consisted of the SRB wall and joint geometry present during the Shuttle 51-L flight. A parametric study of the joint was performed on the geometry, including joint clearances, contact between the joint components, and on the loads, induced and applied. In addition combinations of geometry and loads were evaluated. The analytical results from the parametric study showed that contact between the joint components was a primary contributor to allowing hot gases to blow by the O-rings. Based upon understanding the original joint behavior, various proposed joint modifications are shown and analyzed in order to provide additional insight and information. Finally, experimental results from a hydro-static pressurization of a test rocket booster case to study joint motion are presented and verified analytically.

Davis, Randall C.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Cool Suit

Acurex developed a heat stress alleviating, liquid cooled helmet liner for military pilots after a series of accidents in Vietnam suggested heat exhaustion as the cause. System pumped a cooled liquid through channels in the helmet liner proved effective in eliminating 40-60% of stored body heat.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1971

Mishaps with Oxygen in NASA Operations

Data from a substantial number of oxygen mishaps obtained from NASA and contractor records are presented. Information from several Air Force records, concerning oxygen accidents involving aircraft operations, are also included. Descriptions of the mishaps and their causes, for both liquid and gaseous oxygen in ground test facilities and space vehicle systems, are given. A number of safety regulations aimed at reducing the accident probability is discussed. The problems related to material compatibility and materials testing are considered, and the limited information on factors affecting the ignition of materials in oxygen is presented. In addition, details are given of several of the accident/incidents listed in order to define the combination of conditions causing the mishap. In addition to propellant system mishaps, accident/incidents which occurred in space and ground system structures were included, as well as those in electrical systems, ground support facilities, ordnance, and related operations.

Ordin, Paul M.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Evaluating Failures and Near Misses in Human Spaceflight History for Lessons for Future Human Spaceflight

There have been a number of studies done in the past drawn on lessons learned with regard to human loss-of-life events. Generally, the systemic causes and proximate causes for fatal events have both been examined in considerable detail. However, an examination of near-fatal accidents and failures that narrowly missed being fatal could be equally useful, not only in detecting causes, both proximate and systemic, but also for determining what factors averted disaster, what design decisions and/or operator actions prevented catastrophe. Additionally, review of risk factors for upcoming or future programs will often look at trending statistics, generally focusing on failure/success statistics. Unfortunately, doing so can give a skewed or misleading view of past reliability or a reliability that cannot be presumed to apply to a new program. One reason for this might be that failure/success criteria aren't the same across programs, but also that apparent success can hide systemic faults that, under other circumstances, can be fatal to a program with different parameters. A program with a number of near misses can look more reliable than a consistently healthy program with a single out-of-family failure and provide very misleading data if it is not examined in detail. This is particularly true for a manned space program where failure/success includes more than making a particular orbit. Augmenting reliability evaluations with this near miss data can provide insight and expand on the limitations of a strictly pass/fail evaluation. Even more importantly, a thorough understanding of these near miss events can identify conditions that prevented fatalities. Those conditions may be key to a programs reliability, but, without insight to the repercussions if such conditions were not in place, their importance may not be readily clear. As programs mature and political and fiscal responsibilities come to the fore, often there is considerable incentive to eliminate unnecessary conservatism, design margin, redundancy, operational support, testing, training, or safety oversight. An evaluation that demonstrates how these features and capabilities averted disaster can ensure processes that saved lives or missions are not discarded without appropriate review and understanding. Close examination of accidents that almost were can also highlight differences in design from one program to another, either justifying reliability comparisons or negating them. It can also provide considerable insight into how those saving factors were developed and implemented so that similar methods can be used to ensure appropriate life-saving and mission saving factors can be developed, even for a dissimilar space program. The lessons are appropriate for seasoned manned space programs and agencies, but crucial for untried agencies and organizations that are interested in sending man into space. The large body of publicly available near miss and accident data available provide invaluable insight into programmatic, technical, and even political issues that can be addressed before they impact safety. In this paper, we examine a number of these near misses and accidents and steps a program, agency, or potential spacefaring company might take to improve their chances of success and avoid mission or safety disasters using this data.

Barr, Stephanie↗
NASA NTRS1989

Risk-Based Fire Safety Experiment Definition for Manned Spacecraft

Risk methodology is used to define experiments to be conducted in space which will help to construct and test the models required for accident sequence identification. The development of accident scenarios is based on the realization that whether damage occurs depends on the time competition of two processes: the ignition and creation of an adverse environment, and the detection and suppression activities. If the fire grows and causes damage faster than it is detected and suppressed, then an accident occurred. The proposed integrated experiments will provide information on individual models that apply to each of the above processes, as well as previously unidentified interactions and processes, if any. Initially, models that are used in terrestrial fire risk assessments are considered. These include heat and smoke release models, detection and suppression models, as well as damage models. In cases where the absence of gravity substantially invalidates a model, alternate models will be developed. Models that depend on buoyancy effects, such as the multizone compartment fire models, are included in these cases. The experiments will be performed in a variety of geometries simulating habitable areas, racks, and other spaces. These simulations will necessitate theoretical studies of scaling effects. Sensitivity studies will also be carried out including the effects of varying oxygen concentrations, pressures, fuel orientation and geometry, and air flow rates. The experimental apparatus described herein includes three major modules: the combustion, the fluids, and the command and power modules.

Apostolakis, G. E.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Human factors of flight-deck checklists: The normal checklist

Although the aircraft checklist has long been regarded as the foundation of pilot standardization and cockpit safety, it has escaped the scrutiny of the human factors profession. The improper use, or the non-use, of the normal checklist by flight crews is often cited as the probable cause or at least a contributing factor to aircraft accidents. An attempt is made to analyze the normal checklist, its functions, format, design, length, usage, and the limitations of the humans who must interact with it. The development of the checklist from the certification of a new model to its delivery and use by the customer are discussed. The influence of the government, particularly the FAA Principle Operations Inspector, the manufacturer's philosophy, the airline's culture, and the end user, the pilot, influence the ultimate design and usage of this device. The effects of airline mergers and acquisitions on checklist usage and design are noted. In addition, the interaction between production pressures and checklist usage and checklist management are addressed. Finally, a list of design guidelines for normal checklists is provided.

Degani, Asaf↗
NASA NTRS2010

Evaluating Failures and near Misses in Human Spaceflight History for Lessons for Future Human Spaceflight

Studies done in the past have drawn on lessons learned with regard to human loss-of-life events. However, an examination of near-fatal accidents can be equally useful, not only in detecting causes, both proximate and systemic, but also for determining what factors averted disaster, what design decisions and/or operator actions prevented catastrophe. Binary pass/fail launch history is often used for risk, but this also has limitations. A program with a number of near misses can look more reliable than a consistently healthy program with a single out-of-family failure. Augmenting reliability evaluations with this near miss data can provide insight and expand on the limitations of a strictly pass/fail evaluation. This paper intends to show how near-miss lessons learned can provide crucial data for any new human spaceflight programs that are interested in sending man into space

Barr, Stephanie↗
NASA NTRS1980

Advanced risk assessment of the effects of graphite fibers on electronic and electric equipment

An assessment of the risk associated with accidents involving aircraft with carbon fiber composite structural components is examined. The individual fiber segments cause electrical and electronic equipment to fail under certain operating conditions. A Monte Carlo simulation model was used to computer the risk. Aircraft accidents with fire, release of carbon fiber material, entrainment of carbon fibers in a smoke plume transport of fibers downwind, transfer of some fibers/into the the interior of buildings, failures of electrical and electronic equipment, and economic impact of failures are discussed. Risk profiles were prepared for individual airports and the Nation. The vulnerability of electrical transmission equipment to carbon fiber incursion and aircraft accident total costs is investigated.

Pocinki, L.↗
NASA NTRS1975

An analysis of aircraft accidents involving fires

All U. S. Air Carrier accidents between 1963 and 1974 were studied to assess the extent of total personnel and aircraft damage which occurred in accidents and in accidents involving fire. Published accident reports and NTSB investigators' factual backup files were the primary sources of data. Although it was frequently not possible to assess the relative extent of fire-caused damage versus impact damage using the available data, the study established upper and lower bounds for deaths and damage due specifically to fire. In 12 years there were 122 accidents which involved airframe fires. Eighty-seven percent of the fires occurred after impact, and fuel leakage from ruptured tanks or severed lines was the most frequently cited cause. A cost analysis was performed for 300 serious accidents, including 92 serious accidents which involved fire. Personal injury costs were outside the scope of the cost analysis, but data on personnel injury judgements as well as settlements received from the CAB are included for reference.

Lucha, G. V.↗
NASA NTRS1982

Single pilot IFR accident data analysis

The aircraft accident data recorded and maintained by the National Transportation Safety Board for 1964 to 1979 were analyzed to determine what problems exist in the general aviation single pilot instrument flight rules environment. A previous study conducted in 1978 for the years 1964 to 1975 provided a basis for comparison. The purpose was to determine what changes, if any, have occurred in trends and cause-effect relationships reported in the earlier study. The increasing numbers have been tied to measures of activity to produce accident rates which in turn were analyzed in terms of change. Where anomalies or unusually high accident rates were encountered, further analysis was conducted to isolate pertinent patterns of cause factors and/or experience levels of involved pilots. The bulk of the effort addresses accidents in the landing phase of operations. A detailed analysis was performed on controlled/uncontrolled collisions and their unique attributes delineated. Estimates of day vs. night general aviation activity and accident rates were obtained.

Harris, D. F.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Development and Execution of the RUNSAFE Runway Safety Bayesian Belief Network Model

One focus area of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is to improve aviation safety. Runway safety is one such thrust of investigation and research. The two primary components of this runway safety research are in runway incursion (RI) and runway excursion (RE) events. These are adverse ground-based aviation incidents that endanger crew, passengers, aircraft and perhaps other nearby people or property. A runway incursion is the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft; one class of RI events simultaneously involves two aircraft, such as one aircraft incorrectly landing on a runway while another aircraft is taking off from the same runway. A runway excursion is an incident involving only a single aircraft defined as a veer-off or overrun off the runway surface. Within the scope of this effort at NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC), generic RI, RE and combined (RI plus RE, or RUNSAFE) event models have each been developed and implemented as a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN). Descriptions of runway safety issues from the literature searches have been used to develop the BBN models. Numerous considerations surrounding the process of developing the event models have been documented in this report. The event models were then thoroughly reviewed by a Subject Matter Expert (SME) panel through multiple knowledge elicitation sessions. Numerous improvements to the model structure (definitions, node names, node states and the connecting link topology) were made by the SME panel. Sample executions of the final RUNSAFE model have been presented herein for baseline and worst-case scenarios. Finally, a parameter sensitivity analysis for a given scenario was performed to show the risk drivers. The NASA and LaRC research in runway safety event modeling through the use of BBN technology is important for several reasons. These include: 1) providing a means to clearly understand the cause and effect patterns leading to safety issues, incidents and accidents, 2) enabling the prioritization of specialty areas needing more attention to improve aviation safety, and 3) enabling the identification of gaps within NASA's Aviation Safety funding portfolio

Green, Lawrence L.↗
NASA NTRS2019

NASA's Journey to Safety Culture

One of the organizational causes of the Shuttle Columbia mishap found by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report was a "Broken Safety Culture". Since its release, NASA has strived to improve its Safety Culture In 2009, the Chief of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance asked a member of the Air Force Safety Center and of the CAIB for assistance to develop a NASA Safety Culture Program. This presentation describes the journey that NASA personnel has taken developing a NASA Safety Culture Program to "repair" its Safety Culture.

Dillinger, Tracy↗
NASA NTRS1983

Structural response of transport airplanes in crash situations

This report highlights the results of contractural studies of transport accident data undertaken in a joint research program sponsored by the FAA and NASA. From these accident data studies it was concluded that the greatest potential for improved transport crashworthiness is in the reduction of fire related fatalities. Accident data pertaining to fuselage integrity, main landing gear collapse, fuel tank rupture, wing breaks, tearing of tank lower surfaces, and engine pod scrubbing are discussed. In those accidents where the energy absorbing protective capability of the fuselage structure is expended and the airplane experiences major structural damage, trauma caused fatalities are also discussed. The dynamic performance of current seat/restraint systems are examined but it is concluded that the accident data does not adequately define the relationship between occupant response and the dynamic interaction with the seat, floor and fuselage structure.

Thomson, R. G.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Impaired driving performance in shiftworkers: the role of the circadian system in a multifactorial model

A substantial and growing percentage of the U.S. work force now works on a rotating shift schedule. The repeated changes in sleep-wake, meal and work times inherent in such schedules conflict with the dictates of the internal biological clock and have adverse consequences for the health of the shiftworker population. An important consequence of this conflict is impaired performance, both on and off the job, as indexed by the increased incidence of motor vehicle accidents in shift workers. In this paper we report the results of a survey administered to rotating shift and straight day workers at a manufacturing plant in the eastern U.S. This survey documents an increased incidence of motor vehicle accidents or "near misses" in which sleepiness was implicated as a cause by the respondent. Complaints of poor sleep and increased sleepiness were also significantly more common in shiftworkers than day workers. Last, shiftworkers reported higher caffeine and alcohol consumption, and were more likely to use alcohol as a sleep aid. Although causal links cannot be established using these associative observations alone, previously reported experience with alteration of shift schedules, improvement of levels of alertness, and reduction in adverse performance outcomes corroborate the possibility of a causal link and suggest potential interventions.

NASA Discipline Regulatory Physiology↗