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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 181 records · Page 10

Micro-Flying Robotics in Space Missions

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board issued a major recommendation to NASA. Prior to return to flight, NASA should develop and implement a comprehensive inspection plan to determine the structural integrity of all Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) system components. This inspection plan should take advantage of advanced non-destructive inspection technology. This paper describes a non-intrusive technology with a micro-flying robot to continuously monitor inside a space vehicle for any stress related fissures, cracks and foreign material embedded in walls, tubes etc.

Bardina, Jorge↗

Using Perilog to Explore "Decision Making at NASA"

Perilog, a context intensive text mining system, is used as a discovery tool to explore topics and concerns in "Decision Making at NASA," chapter 6 of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report, Volume I. Two examples illustrate how Perilog can be used to discover highly significant safety-related information in the text without prior knowledge of the contents of the document. A third example illustrates how "if-then" statements found by Perilog can be used in logical analysis of decision making. In addition, in order to serve as a guide for future work, the technical details of preparing a PDF document for input to Perilog are included in an appendix.

McGreevy, Michael W.↗

Genesis Reentry Observations and Data Analysis

The Genesis spacecraft reentry represented a unique opportunity to observe a "calibrated meteor" from northern Nevada. Knowing its speed, mass, composition, and precise trajectory made it a good subject to test some of the algorithms used to determine meteoroid mass from observed brightness. It was also a good test of an inexpensive set of cameras that could be deployed to observe future shuttle reentries. The utility of consumer-grade video cameras was evident during the STS-107 accident investigation, and the Genesis reentry gave us the opportunity to specify and test commercially available cameras that could be used during future reentries. This Technical Memorandum describes the video observations and their analysis, compares the results with a simple photometric model, describes the forward scatter radar experiment, and lists lessons learned from the expedition and implications for the Stardust reentry in January 2006 as well as future shuttle reentries.

Suggs, R. M.↗

Impact Testing of Orbiter Thermal Protection System Materials

This viewgraph presentation reviews the impact testing of the materials used in designing the shuttle orbiter thermal protection system (TPS). Pursuant to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations a testing program of the TPS system was instituted. This involved using various types of impactors in different sizes shot from various sizes and strengths guns to impact the TPS tiles and the Leading Edge Structural Subsystem (LESS). The observed damage is shown, and the resultant lessons learned are reviewed.

Kerr, Justin↗

NASA Engineering Excellence: A Case Study on Strengthening an Engineering Organization

NASA implemented a system of technical authority following the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAE) report calling for independent technical authority to be exercised on the Space Shuttle Program activities via a virtual organization of personnel exercising specific technical authority responsibilities. After the current NASA Administrator reported for duty, and following the first of two planned "Shuttle Return to Flight" missions, the NASA Chief Engineer and the Administrator redirected the Independent Technical Authority to a program of Technical Excellence and Technical Authority exercised within the existing engineering organizations. This paper discusses the original implementation of technical authority and the transition to the new implementation of technical excellence, including specific measures aimed at improving safety of future Shuttle and space exploration flights.

Shivers, C. Herbert↗

An Overview of Spray-On Foam Insulation Applications on the Space Shuttle's External Tank: Foam Applications and Foam Shedding Mechanisms

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded that the cause of the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its crew was a breach in the thermal protection system on the leading edge of the left wing. The breach was initiated by a piece of insulating foam that separated from the left bipod ramp of the External Tank and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panel No. 8 at 81.9 seconds after launch. The CAIB conclusion has spawned numerous studies to identify the cause of and factors influencing foam shedding and foam debris liberation from the External Tank during ascent. The symposium on the Thermo-mechanics and Fracture of Space Shuttle External Tank Spray-On Foam Insulation is a collection of presentations that discuss the physics and mechanics of the ET SOFI with the objective of improving analytical and numerical methods for predicting foam thermo-mechanical and fracture behavior. This keynote presentation sets the stage for the presentations contained in this symposium by introducing the audience to the various types of SOFI applications on the Shuttle s External Tank and by discussing the various mechanisms that are believed to be the cause of foam shedding during the Shuttle s ascent to space

Sullivan, Roy M.↗

Implementation of Programmatic Quality and the Impact on Safety

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implementation of a programmatic quality assurance discipline within the International Space Station Program and the resulting impact on safety. NASA culture has continued to stress safety at the expense of quality when both are extremely important and both can equally influence the success or failure of a Program or Mission. Although safety was heavily criticized in the media after Col~imbiaa, strong case can be made that it was the failure of quality processes and quality assurance in all processes that eventually led to the Columbia accident. Consequently, it is possible to have good quality processes without safety, but it is impossible to have good safety processes without quality. The ISS Program quality assurance function was analyzed as representative of the long-term manned missions that are consistent with the President s Vision for Space Exploration. Background topics are as follows: The quality assurance organizational structure within the ISS Program and the interrelationships between various internal and external organizations. ISS Program quality roles and responsibilities with respect to internal Program Offices and other external organizations such as the Shuttle Program, JSC Directorates, NASA Headquarters, NASA Contractors, other NASA Centers, and International Partner/participants will be addressed. A detailed analysis of implemented quality assurance responsibilities and functions with respect to NASA Headquarters, the JSC S&MA Directorate, and the ISS Program will be presented. Discussions topics are as follows: A comparison of quality and safety resources in terms of staffing, training, experience, and certifications. A benchmark assessment of the lessons learned from the Columbia Accident Investigation (CAB) Report (and follow-up reports and assessments), NASA Benchmarking, and traditional quality assurance activities against ISS quality procedures and practices. The lack of a coherent operational and sustaining quality assurance strategy for long-term manned space flight. An analysis of the ISS waiver processes and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) process implemented as quality functions. Impact of current ISS Program procedures and practices with regards to operational safety and risk A discussion regarding a "defense-in-depth" approach to quality functions will be provided to address the issue of "integration vs independence" with respect to the roles of Programs, NASA Centers, and NASA Headquarters. Generic recommendations are offered to address the inadequacies identified in the implementation of ISS quality assurance. A reassessment by the NASA community regarding the importance of a "quality culture" as a component within a larger "safety culture" will generate a more effective and value-added functionality that will ultimately enhance safety.

Huls, Dale Thomas↗

Comprehensive Shuttle Foam Debris Reduction Strategies

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was clear in its assessment of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 3, 2003. Foam liberated from the External Tank (ET) impacting the brittle wing leading edge (WLE) of the orbiter causing the vehicle to disintegrate upon re-entry. Naturally, the CAB pointed out numerous issues affecting this exact outcome in hopes of correcting systems of systems failures any one of which might have altered the outcome. However, Discovery s recent return to flight (RTF) illustrates the primacy of erosion of foam and the risk of future undesirable outcomes. It is obvious that the original RTF focused approach to this problem was not equal to a comprehensive foam debris reduction activity consistent with the high national value of the Space Shuttle assets. The root cause is really very simple when looking at the spray-on foam insulation for the entire ET as part of the structure (e.g., actual stresses > materials allowable) rather than as some sort of sizehime limited ablator. This step is paramount to accepting the CAB recommendation of eliminating debris or in meeting any level of requirements due to the fundamental processes ensuring structural materials maintain their integrity. Significant effort has been expended to identify root cause of the foam debris In-Flight Anomaly (FA) of STS-114. Absent verifiable location specific data pre-launch (T-0) and in-flight, only a most probable cause can be identified. Indeed, the literature researched corroborates NASNTM-2004-2 13238 disturbing description of ill defined materials characterization, variable supplier constituents and foam processing irregularities. Also, foam is sensitive to age and the exposed environment making baseline comparisons difficult without event driven data. Conventional engineering processes account for such naturally occurring variability by always maintaining positive margins. Success in a negative margin range is not consistently achieved. Looking at the ET S spray-on foam insulation as part of the structural system (e.g., glass half full mentality) will create an environment where ET debris levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) can be realized. ALARA is a NASA requirements philosophy deployed for the complex, mission altering radiation exposure requirements for life safety of astronauts. In the Shuttle s case, reasonableness is established by exhaustive engineering rigor, allowable debris size/quantity, technology maturity and programmatic constraints. A more robust urethane foam thermal protection system (TPS) will enhance the hctionality of the new Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) Upper Stage. This paper will outline the strategy for a comprehensive effort to reduce ET foam debris and outline steps leading to an improved foam TPS. The NASA must remain committed to such an approach no matter what becomes of the next flight s actual debris field lest we fall back into a false sense of security. This commitment along with full implementation of all the other CAB recommendations such as orbiter hardening will significantly improve the Shuttle system, the engineering workforce, future capabilities & alternate policy offramps, national human resource protection, high value national asset protection and increase the level of service to the overall NASA mission.

Semmes, Edmund B.↗

Recovery of Space Shuttle Columbia and Return to Flight of Space Shuttle Discovery

NASA has come a long way in our journey to reduce the risks of operating the Spse Shuttle system. The External Tank bipod Thermal Protection System has been redesigned to eliminate the proximate cause of the Columbia accident. In all areas, we have applied the collective knowledge and capabilities of our Nation to comply with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations and to raise the bar beyond that. We have taken prudent technical action on potential threats to review and verify the material condition of all critical areas where failure could result in catastrophic loss of the crew and vehicle. We are satisfied that critical systems and elements should operate as intended-safely and reliably. While we will never eliminate all the risks from our human space flight programs, we have eliminated those we can and reduced, controlled, and/or mitigated others. The remaining identified risks will be evaluated for acceptance. Our risk reduction approach has its roots in the system safety engineering hierarchy for hazard abatement long employed in aerospace systems engineering. The components of the hierarchy are, in order of precedence, to: design/redesign; eliminate the hazard/risk; reduce the hazard/risk; and control the hazard/risk and/or mitigate the consequence of the remaining hazard/risk through warning devices, special procedures/capabilities, and/or training. This proven approach to risk reduction has been applied to potential hazards and risks in all critical areas of the Space Shuttle and has guided us through the technical challenges, failures, and successes present in return to flight endeavors. This approach provides the structured deliberation process required to verify and form the foundation for accepting any residual risk across the entire Space Shuttle Program by NASA leadership.

Rudolphi, Michael U.↗

From ESAS to Ares: A Chronology

Throughout my career, I have observed many launch vehicle efforts come and go. Although it may appear on the surface that those were dead-end streets, the knowledge we gained through them actually informs the work in progress. Following the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia's crew, the administration took the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's findings to heart and united the Agency behind the Vision for Space Exploration, with clear goals and objectives, including fielding a new generation of safe, reliable, and affordable space transportation. The genesis of the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle activities now under way by a nationwide Government and industry team was the confirmation of the current NASA Administrator in April 2005. Shortly thereafter, he commissioned a team of aerospace experts to conduct the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS), which gave shape to launch vehicles that will empower America's resurgence in scientific discovery through human and robotic space exploration. In October 2005, I was asked to lead this effort, building the team and forming the partnerships that will, in turn, build America's next human-rated space transportation system. In November 2006, the Ares I team began conducting the System Requirements Review milestone, just 1 year after its formation. We are gaining momentum toward the first test flight of the integrated vehicle system in 2009, just a few short years away. The Agency is now poised to deliver on the commitment this nation has made to advance our interests in space. In its inaugural year, the Ares team has conducted the first human-rated launch vehicle major milestone in over 30 years. Using the Exploration Systems Architecture Study recommendations as a starting point, the vehicle designs have been evolved to best meet customer and stakeholder requirements to fulfill the strategic goals outlined in the Vision for Space Exploration.

Cook, Stephen A.↗

Assuring Crew Health Protection

Amongst the recommendation of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) were the establishment of an independent technical authorities, one of which is the Health and Medical Technical Authority. This viewgraph presentation reviews the work of this Technical Authority in maintaining standards that are aimed at implementing health and medical policy, responding to medical events and emergencies consistent with acceptable levels defined by standards and providing expertise for program milestones.

Robinson, Judith L.↗

Probabilistic Modeling of Space Shuttle Debris Impact

On Feb 1, 2003, the Shuttle Columbia was lost during its return to Earth. As a result of the conclusion that debris impact caused the damage to the left wing of the Columbia Space Shuttle Vehicle (SSV) during ascent, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended that an assessment be performed of the debris environment experienced by the SSV during ascent. A flight rationale based on probabilistic assessment is used for the SSV return-to-flight. The assessment entails identifying all potential debris sources, their probable geometric and aerodynamic characteristics, and their potential for impacting and damaging critical Shuttle components. A probabilistic analysis tool, based on the SwRI-developed NESSUS probabilistic analysis software, predicts the probability of impact and damage to the space shuttle wing leading edge and thermal protection system components. Among other parameters, the likelihood of unacceptable damage depends on the time of release (Mach number of the orbiter) and the divot mass as well as the impact velocity and impact angle. A typical result is visualized in the figures below. Probability of impact and damage, as well as the sensitivities thereof with respect to the distribution assumptions, can be computed and visualized at each point on the orbiter or summarized per wing panel or tile zone.

Huyse, Luc J.↗

Supersonic/Hypersonic Laminar Heating Correlations for Rectangular and Impact-Induced Open and Closed Cavities

Impact and debris damage to the Space Shuttle Orbiter Thermal Protection System tiles is a random phenomenon, occurring at random locations on the vehicle surface, resulting in random geometrical shapes that are exposed to a definable range of surface flow conditions. In response to the 2003 Final Report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, wind tunnel aeroheating experiments approximating a wide range of possible damage scenarios covering both open and closed cavity flow conditions were systematically tested in hypersonic ground based facilities. These data were analyzed and engineering assessment tools for damage-induced fully-laminar heating were developed and exercised on orbit. These tools provide bounding approximations for the damaged-surface heating environment. This paper presents a further analysis of the baseline, zero-pressure-gradient, idealized, rectangular-geometry cavity heating data, yielding new laminar correlations for the floor-averaged heating, peak cavity endwall heating, and the downstream decay rate. Correlation parameters are derived in terms of cavity geometry and local flow conditions. Prediction Limit Uncertainty values are provided at the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels of significance. Non-baseline conditions, including non-rectangular geometries and flows with known pressure gradients, are used to assess the range of applicability of the new correlations. All data variations fall within the 99% Prediction Limit Uncertainty bounds. Importantly, both open-flow and closed-flow cavity heating are combined into a single-curve parameterization of the heating predictions, and provide a concise mathematical model of the laminar cavity heating flow field with known uncertainty.

Everhart, Joel L.↗

NASA Standard for Models and Simulations: Philosophy and Requirements Overview

Following the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, the NASA Administrator chartered an executive team (known as the Diaz Team) to identify those CAIB report elements with NASA-wide applicability and to develop corrective measures to address each element. One such measure was the development of a standard for the development, documentation, and operation of models and simulations. This report describes the philosophy and requirements overview of the resulting NASA Standard for Models and Simulations.

Blattnig, St3eve R.↗

White Paper on Factors of Safety

Following the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report, the "Diaz Team" identified CAIB Report elements with Agency-wide applicability. The "Diaz Report", A Renewed Commitment To Excellence, generated an action to "Review current policies and waivers on safety factors". This document addresses this action.

Raju, Ivatury↗

Changing the Safety and Mission Assurance (S and MA) Paradigm

This slide presentation reviews the change in the work and impact of the Safety and Mission Assurance directorate at Marshall Space Flight Center. It reviews the background and the reasons given for a strong Safety & Mission Assurance presence in all planning for space flight. This was pointed out by the Rogers Commission Report after the Space Challenger accident, by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) and by a 2006 NASA Exploration Safety Study (NESS) Team. The overall objective of the work in this area was to improve and maintain S&MA expertise and skills. Training for this work was improved and the S&MA organization was reorganized. This has resulted in a paradigm shift for NASA's safety efforts, which is described. The presentation then reviews the impact of the new S&MA work in the Ares I design and development.

Malone, Roy W.↗

Failure Analysis at the Kennedy Space Center

History has shown that failures occur in every engineering endeavor, and what we learn from those failures contributes to the knowledge base to safely complete future missions. The necessity of failure analysis is at its apex at the end of one aged program and at the beginning of a new and untested program. The information that we gain through failure analysis corrects the deficiencies in the current vehicle to make the next generation of vehicles more efficient and safe. The Failure Analysis and Materials Evaluation Branch in the Materials Science Division at the Kennedy Space Center performs metallurgical, mechanical, electrical, and non-metallic materials failure analyses and accident investigations on both flight hardware and ground support equipment for the Space Shuttle, International Space Station, Constellation, and Launch Services Programs. This paper will explore a variety of failure case studies at the Kennedy Space Center and the lessons learned that can be applied in future programs.

Salazar, Victoria L.↗

Modeling and Simulation at NASA

This slide presentation is composed of two topics. The first reviews the use of modeling and simulation (M&S) particularly as it relates to the Constellation program and discrete event simulation (DES). DES is defined as a process and system analysis, through time-based and resource constrained probabilistic simulation models, that provide insight into operation system performance. The DES shows that the cycles for a launch from manufacturing and assembly to launch and recovery is about 45 days and that approximately 4 launches per year are practicable. The second topic reviews a NASA Standard for Modeling and Simulation. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board made some recommendations related to models and simulations. Some of the ideas inherent in the new standard are the documentation of M&S activities, an assessment of the credibility, and reporting to decision makers, which should include the analysis of the results, a statement as to the uncertainty in the results,and the credibility of the results. There is also discussion about verification and validation (V&V) of models. There is also discussion about the different types of models and simulation.

Steele, Martin J.↗