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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach for Identifying IASMS Services, Functions, and Capabilities From Data Sources

Assuring safety in the NAS with the inclusion of new entrants that are part of Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) will require overcoming unique safety challenges that result from combining innovative technologies with novel airspace concepts for moving people and cargo using semi-autonomous/autonomous vehicles. Overcoming these AAM safety assurance challenges is the focus of the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). The IASMS Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes an interconnected set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs)designed to manage operational risks, identify unknown risks, and inform system design to mitigate risk. This paper describes a broad approach for identifying SFCs involving technology trends in research, assessment of known and unknown risks in safety reports, and causal and contributing factors in aviation accidents and incidents. This approach leverages these sources to identify potential SFCs that enable the Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate (M-A-M)functionality that represents the enabling framework of the IASMS.

Kyle Ellis↗
NASA NTRS2003

Proceedings of the Second NASA Aviation Safety Program Weather Accident Prevention Review

The Second NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) Weather Accident Prevention (WxAP) Annual Project Review held June 5-7, 2001, in Cleveland, Ohio, presented the NASA technical plans and accomplishments to the aviation community. NASA-developed technologies presented included an Aviation Weather Information System with associated digital communications links, electronic atmospheric reporting technologies, forward-looking turbulence warning systems, and turbulence mitigation procedures. The meeting provided feedback and insight from the aviation community of diverse backgrounds and assisted NASA in steering its plans in the direction needed to meet the national safety goal of 80-percent reduction of aircraft accidents by 2007. The proceedings of the review are enclosed.

Martzaklis, K. Gus↗
NASA NTRS2002

NASA Aviation Safety Program Weather Accident Prevention/weather Information Communications (WINCOMM)

Weather is a contributing factor in approximately 25-30 percent of general aviation accidents. The lack of timely, accurate and usable weather information to the general aviation pilot in the cockpit to enhance pilot situational awareness and improve pilot judgment remains a major impediment to improving aviation safety. NASA Glenn Research Center commissioned this 120 day weather datalink market survey to assess the technologies, infrastructure, products, and services of commercial avionics systems being marketed to the general aviation community to address these longstanding safety concerns. A market survey of companies providing or proposing to provide graphical weather information to the general aviation cockpit was conducted. Fifteen commercial companies were surveyed. These systems are characterized and evaluated in this report by availability, end-user pricing/cost, system constraints/limits and technical specifications. An analysis of market survey results and an evaluation of product offerings were made. In addition, recommendations to NASA for additional research and technology development investment have been made as a result of this survey to accelerate deployment of cockpit weather information systems for enhancing aviation safety.

Feinberg, Arthur↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Identifying Human Errors and Error Mechanisms From Accident Reports Using Large Language Models

Emerging operational concepts for aviation hinge on novel paradigms for human machine interaction. Critical to their safe operation is early consideration of human error into the design process. Existing methods for consideration of human error require significant expert input, which is challenging both in early design and in novel systems for which there is little existing safety expertise. In this research, we propose a methodology for identifying human error, error producing factors, and mechanisms in early design from historical incident reports. Additionally, we hypothesize that cross-domain sharing of lessons learned can aid with early design human considerations in circumstances where data is not relevant or incomplete. This is addressed by identifying causes of human error in aviation and railway domains through applying state-of-the art natural language processing techniques to historical incident reports. Using this method, it is possible to extract extensive reports on human error from past incidents. Using the proposed approach, we identify nine human errors from railway reports and fourteen from aviation reports, with three errors common to both domains. There is at least one error producing conditions for each human error while a majority of the errors have more than one error mechanism. We also found that a majority of the human errors, error producing factors, and error mechanisms (even if they are not common between the domains) can be used to inform safe operations across domains as long as the errors are not domain specific and are interpreted and contextualized using engineering judgement.

Human Errors↗
NASA NTRS2002

CATS-based Agents That Err

This report describes preliminary research on intelligent agents that make errors. Such agents are crucial to the development of novel agent-based techniques for assessing system safety. The agents extend an agent architecture derived from the Crew Activity Tracking System that has been used as the basis for air traffic controller agents. The report first reviews several error taxonomies. Next, it presents an overview of the air traffic controller agents, then details several mechanisms for causing the agents to err in realistic ways. The report presents a performance assessment of the error-generating agents, and identifies directions for further research. The research was supported by the System-Wide Accident Prevention element of the FAA/NASA Aviation Safety Program.

Callantine, Todd J.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Honeywell Enhancing Airplane State Awareness (EASA) Project: Final Report on Refinement and Evaluation of Candidate Solutions for Airplane System State Awareness

The loss of pilot airplane state awareness (ASA) has been implicated as a factor in several aviation accidents identified by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST). These accidents were investigated to identify precursors to the loss of ASA and develop technologies to address the loss of ASA. Based on a gap analysis, two technologies were prototyped and assessed with a formative pilot-in-the-loop evaluation in NASA Langley’s full-motion Research Flight Deck. The technologies address: 1) data source anomaly detection in real-time, and 2) intelligent monitoring aids to provide nominal and predictive awareness of situations to be monitored and a mission timeline to visualize events of interest. The evaluation results indicated favorable impressions of both technologies for mitigating the loss of ASA in terms of operational utility, workload, acceptability, complexity, and usability. The team concludes that there is a feasible retrofit solution for improving ASA that would minimize certification risk, integration costs, and training impact.

Whitlow, Stephen D.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Developing a Methodology for Eliciting Subjective Probability Estimates During Expert Evaluations of Safety Interventions: Application for Bayesian Belief Networks

The NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) has defined several products that will potentially modify airline and/or ATC operations, enhance aircraft systems, and improve the identification of potential hazardous situations within the National Airspace System (NAS). Consequently, there is a need to develop methods for evaluating the potential safety benefit of each of these intervention products so that resources can be effectively invested to produce the judgments to develop Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN's) that model the potential impact that specific interventions may have. Specifically, the present report summarizes methodologies for improving the elicitation of probability estimates during expert evaluations of AvSP products for use in BBN's. The work involved joint efforts between Professor James Luxhoj from Rutgers University and researchers at the University of Illinois. The Rutgers' project to develop BBN's received funding by NASA entitled "Probabilistic Decision Support for Evaluating Technology Insertion and Assessing Aviation Safety System Risk." The proposed project was funded separately but supported the existing Rutgers' program.

Wiegmann, Douglas A.a↗
NASA NTRS2007

Preliminary Considerations for Classifying Hazards of Unmanned Aircraft Systems

The use of unmanned aircraft in national airspace has been characterized as the next great step forward in the evolution of civil aviation. To make routine and safe operation of these aircraft a reality, a number of technological and regulatory challenges must be overcome. This report discusses some of the regulatory challenges with respect to deriving safety and reliability requirements for unmanned aircraft. In particular, definitions of hazards and their classification are discussed and applied to a preliminary functional hazard assessment of a generic unmanned system.

Kelly J. Hayhurst↗
NASA NTRS2017

Safeguard: Progress and Test Results for a Reliable Independent On-Board Safety Net for UAS

As demands increase to use unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for a broad spectrum of commercial applications, regulatory authorities are examining how to safely integrate them without compromising safety or disrupting traditional airspace operations. For small UAS, several operational rules have been established; e.g., do not operate beyond visual line-of-sight, do not fly within five miles of a commercial airport, do not fly above 400 feet above ground level. Enforcing these rules is challenging for UAS, as evidenced by the number of incident reports received by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). This paper reviews the development of an onboard system - Safeguard - designed to monitor and enforce conformance to a set of operational rules defined prior to flight (e.g., geospatial stay-out or stay-in regions, speed limits, and altitude constraints). Unlike typical geofencing or geo-limitation functions, Safeguard operates independently of the off-the-shelf UAS autopilot and is designed in a way that can be realized by a small set of verifiable functions to simplify compliance with existing standards for safety-critical systems (e.g. for spacecraft and manned commercial transportation aircraft systems). A framework is described that decouples the system from any other devices on the UAS as well as introduces complementary positioning source(s) for applications that require integrity and availability beyond what can be provided by the Global Positioning System (GPS). This paper summarizes the progress and test results for Safeguard research and development since presentation of the design concept at the 35th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC '16). Significant accomplishments include completion of software verification and validation in accordance with NASA standards for spacecraft systems (to Class B), development of improved hardware prototypes, development of a simulation platform that allows for hardware-in-the-loop testing and fast-time Monte Carlo evaluations, and flight testing on multiple air vehicles. Integration testing with NASA's UAS Traffic Management (UTM) service-oriented architecture was also demonstrated.

Young, Steven D.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Radiated Emissions from a Remote-Controlled Airplane-Measured in a Reverberation Chamber

A full-vehicle, subscale all-electric model airplane was tested for radiated emissions, using a reverberation chamber. The mission of the NASA model airplane is to test in-flight airframe damage diagnosis and battery prognosis algorithms, and provide experimental data for other aviation safety research. Subscale model airplanes are economical experimental tools, but assembling their systems from hobbyist and low-cost components may lead to unforseen electromagnetic compatibility problems. This report provides a guide for accommodating the on-board radio systems, so that all model airplane systems may be operated during radiated emission testing. Radiated emission data are provided for on-board systems being operated separately and together, so that potential interferors can be isolated and mitigated. The report concludes with recommendations for EMI/EMC best practices for subscale model airplanes and airships used for research.

Ely, Jay J.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Resilient Propulsion Control Research for the NASA Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) Project

Gas turbine engines are designed to provide sufficient safety margins to guarantee robust operation with an exceptionally long life. However, engine performance requirements may be drastically altered during abnormal flight conditions or emergency maneuvers. In some situations, the conservative design of the engine control system may not be in the best interest of overall aircraft safety; it may be advantageous to "sacrifice" the engine to "save" the aircraft. Motivated by this opportunity, the NASA Aviation Safety Program is conducting resilient propulsion research aimed at developing adaptive engine control methodologies to operate the engine beyond the normal domain for emergency operations to maximize the possibility of safely landing the damaged aircraft. Previous research studies and field incident reports show that the propulsion system can be an effective tool to help control and eventually land a damaged aircraft. Building upon the flight-proven Propulsion Controlled Aircraft (PCA) experience, this area of research will focus on how engine control systems can improve aircraft safe-landing probabilities under adverse conditions. This paper describes the proposed research topics in Engine System Requirements, Engine Modeling and Simulation, Engine Enhancement Research, Operational Risk Analysis and Modeling, and Integrated Flight and Propulsion Controller Designs that support the overall goal.

Guo, Ten-Huei↗
NASA NTRS2012

Automating the Generation of Heterogeneous Aviation Safety Cases

A safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, which provides a convincing and valid justification that a system is acceptably safe for a given application in a given operating environment. This report describes the development of a fragment of a preliminary safety case for the Swift Unmanned Aircraft System. The construction of the safety case fragment consists of two parts: a manually constructed system-level case, and an automatically constructed lower-level case, generated from formal proof of safety-relevant correctness properties. We provide a detailed discussion of the safety considerations for the target system, emphasizing the heterogeneity of sources of safety-relevant information, and use a hazard analysis to derive safety requirements, including formal requirements. We evaluate the safety case using three classes of metrics for measuring degrees of coverage, automation, and understandability. We then present our preliminary conclusions and make suggestions for future work.

Denney, Ewen W.↗
NASA NTRS2024

Assessment of Some IASMS-relevant Data Sources for Aviation Safety

An In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) [1,2] is a set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) necessary for monitoring known hazards and emergent risks, assessing safety data for anomalies, precursors, and trends, mitigating hazards that reach safety thresholds, and assuring efficacy of controls in mitigating hazards. An IASMS will continually monitor the NAS to collect data on the status of aircraft, air traffic management systems, weather, and airports. Within the NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) System-Wide Safety (SWS) project’s technical challenge called In-time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS) for Commercial Aviation Operations, which we often refer to as Technical Challenge 6 (TC-6), we have performed an assessment of several aviation data sources we have found that are relevant to assessing the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS) in the context of an IASMS. This assessment includes understanding the nature of the data themselves and using some data analytics tools on these data to show how they can be used to identify potential safety issues. We also describe how the data and analytics are part of a system that can allow for other data and analytics to be performed and for the results to be visualized for use by appropriate operators to identify potential safety issues and develop mitigations. This report is a step toward the ultimate goal of TC-6, which is to develop a prototype IASMS system that demonstrates the potential of an IASMS and inspire operators to build analogous systems to make the best possible use of the significant investments that they make in collecting, storing, and managingdata related to their operations.

aviation safety↗
NASA NTRS2017

Qualitative Future Safety Risk Identification an Update

The purpose of this report is to document the results of a high-level qualitative study that was conducted to identify future aviation safety risks and to assess the potential impacts to the National Airspace System (NAS) of NASA Aviation Safety research on these risks. Multiple external sources (for example, the National Transportation Safety Board, the Flight Safety Foundation, the National Research Council, and the Joint Planning and Development Office) were used to develop a compilation of future safety issues risks, also referred to as future tall poles. The primary criterion used to identify the most critical future safety risk issues was that the issue must be cited in several of these sources as a safety area of concern. The tall poles in future safety risk, in no particular order of importance, are as follows: Runway Safety, Loss of Control In Flight, Icing Ice Detection, Loss of Separation, Near Midair Collision Human Fatigue, Increasing Complexity and Reliance on Automation, Vulnerability Discovery, Data Sharing and Dissemination, and Enhanced Survivability in the Event of an Accident.

future aviation safety risk↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Strategies for Identifying Resilient Behavior In Aviation

When we imagine a situation where people fly aircraft and nothing scary happens, we assume it is the system that affords this phenomenon. That is, the overall design is the cause of the success. However, this is not always true. There are many examples of how the presence of a human in the system is the reason for a successful outcome, despite flaws in the system’s design. This resilient behavior is often overlooked and challenging to characterize. In an attempt to identify this phenomenon in a generalizable way, we named and investigated two strategies, as well as identification methods, that exemplify resilient performance: 1) controls; and 2) modifications. First, controls are resilient actions in situations known to be problematic. To capture this, instead of looking at the examples of how the problem became a reality, we look at the examples of how the problem was successfully avoided or controlled. For example, a country road may have a hairpin turn where a higher-than-normal rate of accidents occur. Given that there is a likely system flaw identified, we would look at how the successful drivers navigated the turn. This can be accomplished using current safety reporting systems. Second, modifications are augmentations or changes that people create to fill in the gap between work-as-imagined and work-as-done. This type of resilient performance is directly related to poor design. In aviation, work-as-imagined is often scripted explicitly, so it can be compared to work-as-done through the use of examining system-generated data as well as narrative reports written by the system operators. These two approaches aim to identify resilient human actions to better understand how current systems function, as well as how people contribute to successes that were otherwise unknown.

human factors↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Expertise and the Perils of Novelty

Emerging aviation markets such as urban air mobility are giving rise to new technologies and means of operation. However, novelty may hide ‘unknown unknowns,’ raising new hazards. This paper examines how expertise and safety techniques enable transformative technologies such as reduced crew operations, hybrid wing-borne and rotor-born flight, federated air traffic services, and urban operations. We explore how analysts use expertise to address common-cause failures, collect and interpret safety data, and perform exacting tradeoffs between dissimilarity, redundancy, independence, and diversity (human, process lifecycle, or otherwise) to ensure safety. When novelty is present, analysts might not possess the expertise needed to fully understand the implications of design decisions and tradeoffs being made, especially in early lifecycle phases, on emergent properties such as safety. Safety expertise must be carefully cultivated. The conflicting views of safety experts must be unpacked to identify the divergence in fundamental assumptions, models, means, and methods that may be causing them. Once systems venture beyond the basis of what safety expertise can reliably guarantee, projects take on risk that must be managed. The paper contains key takeaways and actionable recommendations for novel OEMs and regulators touching on topics such as robust monitoring; clear and transparent reporting; incremental approaches to fielding novel systems in hazard-rich, risk-tolerant environments; the cultivation of safety culture and expertise in an organization; and the use of scientific study to reduce epistemic uncertainty in novel operations with new technologies. Since excessive novelty in aviation can undermine the current foundation of safety, humility and incrementalism are necessary to enable emerging aviation markets safely.

safety expertise↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Expertise and the Perils of Novelty

Emerging aviation markets such as urban air mobility are giving rise to new technologies and means of operation. However, novelty may hide ‘unknown unknowns,’ raising new hazards. This paper examines how expertise and safety techniques enable transformative technologies such as reduced crew operations, hybrid wing-borne and rotor-born flight, federated air traffic services, and urban operations. We explore how analysts use expertise to address common-cause failures, collect and interpret safety data, and perform exacting tradeoffs between dissimilarity, redundancy, independence, and diversity (human, process lifecycle, or otherwise) to ensure safety. When novelty is present, analysts might not possess the expertise needed to fully understand the implications of design decisions and tradeoffs being made, especially in early lifecycle phases, on emergent properties such as safety. Safety expertise must be carefully cultivated. The conflicting views of safety experts must be unpacked to identify the divergence in fundamental assumptions, models, means, and methods that may be causing them. Once systems venture beyond the basis of what safety expertise can reliably guarantee, projects take on risk that must be managed. The paper contains key takeaways and actionable recommendations for novel OEMs and regulators touching on topics such as robust monitoring; clear and transparent reporting; incremental approaches to fielding novel systems in hazard-rich, risk-tolerant environments; the cultivation of safety culture and expertise in an organization; and the use of scientific study to reduce epistemic uncertainty in novel operations with new technologies. Since excessive novelty in aviation can undermine the current foundation of safety, humility and incrementalism are necessary to enable emerging aviation markets safely.

safety expertise↗
NASA NTRS2013

Prospective Safety Analysis and the Complex Aviation System

Fatal accident rates in commercial passenger aviation are at historic lows yet have plateaued and are not showing evidence of further safety advances. Modern aircraft accidents reflect both historic causal factors and new unexpected "Black Swan" events. The ever-increasing complexity of the aviation system, along with its associated technology and organizational relationships, provides fertile ground for fresh problems. It is important to take a proactive approach to aviation safety by working to identify novel causation mechanisms for future aviation accidents before they happen. Progress has been made in using of historic data to identify the telltale signals preceding aviation accidents and incidents, using the large repositories of discrete and continuous data on aircraft and air traffic control performance and information reported by front-line personnel. Nevertheless, the aviation community is increasingly embracing predictive approaches to aviation safety. The "prospective workshop" early assessment tool described in this paper represents an approach toward this prospective mindset-one that attempts to identify the future vectors of aviation and asks the question: "What haven't we considered in our current safety assessments?" New causation mechanisms threatening aviation safety will arise in the future because new (or revised) systems and procedures will have to be used under future contextual conditions that have not been properly anticipated. Many simulation models exist for demonstrating the safety cases of new operational concepts and technologies. However the results from such models can only be as valid as the accuracy and completeness of assumptions made about the future context in which the new operational concepts and/or technologies will be immersed. Of course that future has not happened yet. What is needed is a reasonably high-confidence description of the future operational context, capturing critical contextual characteristics that modulate both the likelihood of occurrence of hazards, and the likelihood that those hazards will lead to negative safety events. Heuristics extracted from scenarios, questionnaires, and observed trends from scanning the aviation horizon may be helpful in capturing those future changes in a way conducive to safety assessment. What is also needed is a checklist of potential sources of emerging risk that arise from organizational features that are frequently overlooked. The ultimate goal is to develop a pragmatic, workable method for using descriptions of the future aviation context, to generate valid predictions of safety risks.

prospection↗