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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2009

Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Threats to NASA's Docking Seals: Initial Assessment and Methodology

The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) will be exposed to the Micrometeoroid Orbital Debris (MMOD) environment in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) during missions to the International Space Station (ISS) and to the micrometeoroid environment during lunar missions. The CEV will be equipped with a docking system which enables it to connect to ISS and the lunar module known as Altair; this docking system includes a hatch that opens so crew and supplies can pass between the spacecrafts. This docking system is known as the Low Impact Docking System (LIDS) and uses a silicone rubber seal to seal in cabin air. The rubber seal on LIDS presses against a metal flange on ISS (or Altair). All of these mating surfaces are exposed to the space environment prior to docking. The effects of atomic oxygen, ultraviolet and ionizing radiation, and MMOD have been estimated using ground based facilities. This work presents an initial methodology to predict meteoroid and orbital debris threats to candidate docking seals being considered for LIDS. The methodology integrates the results of ground based hypervelocity impacts on silicone rubber seals and aluminum sheets, risk assessments of the MMOD environment for a variety of mission scenarios, and candidate failure criteria. The experimental effort that addressed the effects of projectile incidence angle, speed, mass, and density, relations between projectile size and resulting crater size, and relations between crater size and the leak rate of candidate seals has culminated in a definition of the seal/flange failure criteria. The risk assessment performed with the BUMPER code used the failure criteria to determine the probability of failure of the seal/flange system and compared the risk to the allotted risk dictated by NASA s program requirements.

deGroh, Henry C., III↗
NASA NTRS2005

Lightweight Radiator System for a Spacecraft

Three documents describe various aspects of a proposed lightweight, deployable radiator system for dissipating excess heat from the life-support system of a habitable spacecraft. The first document focuses on a radiator tube that would include a thin metal liner surrounded and supported by a thicker carbon-fiber-reinforced composite tubular structure that, in turn, would be formed as part of a unitary composite radiator-fin structure consisting mostly of a sheet of reticulated vitreous carbon laminated between carbon-fiber-reinforced face sheets. The thermal and mechanical properties, including the anisotropies, of the component materials are taken into account in the design. The second document describes thermo-structural bumpers, in the form of exterior multiple-ply carbon-fiber sheets enclosing hollows on opposite sides of a radiator fin, which would protect the radiator tube against impinging micrometeors and orbital debris. The third document describes a radiator system that would include multiple panels containing the aforementioned components, among others. The system would also include mechanisms for deploying the panels from compact stowage. Deployment would not involve breaking and remaking of fluid connections to the radiator panels.

Copeland, Robert J.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Shields for Enhanced Protection Against High-Speed Debris

A report describes improvements over the conventional Whipple shield (two thin, spaced aluminum walls) for protecting spacecraft against high-speed impacts of orbiting debris. The debris in question arises mainly from breakup of older spacecraft. The improved shields include exterior "bumper" layers composed of hybrid fabrics woven from combinations of ceramic fibers and high-density metallic wires or, alternatively, completely metallic outer layers composed of high-strength steel or copper wires. These shields are designed to be light in weight, yet capable of protecting against orbital debris with mass densities up to about 9 g/cubic cm, without generating damaging secondary debris particles. As yet another design option, improved shields can include sparsely distributed wires made of shape memory metals that can be thermally activated from compact storage containers to form shields of predetermined shape upon arrival in orbit. The improved shields could also be used to augment shields installed previously.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Shields for Enhanced Protection Against High-Speed Debris

A report describes improvements over the conventional Whipple shield (two thin, spaced aluminum walls) for protecting spacecraft against high-speed impacts of orbiting debris. The debris in question arise mainly from breakup of older spacecraft. The improved shields include exterior bumper layers composed of hybrid fabrics woven from combinations of ceramic fibers and high-density metallic wires or, alternatively, completely metallic outer layers composed of high-strength steel or copper wires. These shields are designed to be light in weight, yet capable of protecting against orbital debris with mass densities up to about 9 g/cm3, without generating damaging secondary debris particles. As yet another design option, improved shields can include sparsely distributed wires made of shape-memory metals that can be thermally activated from compact storage containers to form shields of predetermined shape upon arrival in orbit. The improved shields could also be used to augment shields installed previously.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Hypervelocity Impact Experiments on Epoxy/Ultra-High Molecular Weight Polyethylene Composite Panels Reinforced with Nanotubes

Advanced composites with multi-functional capabilities are of great interest to the designers of aerospace structures. Polymer matrix composites (PMCs) reinforced with high strength fibers provide a lightweight and high strength alternative to metals and metal alloys conventionally used in aerospace architectures. Novel reinforcements such as nanofillers offer potential to improve the mechanical properties and add multi-functionality such as radiation resistance and sensing capabilities to the PMCs. This paper reports the hypervelocity impact (HVI) test results on ultra-high molecular weight polyethylene (UHMWPE) fiber composites reinforced with single-walled carbon nanotubes (SWCNT) and boron nitride nanotubes (BNNT). Woven UHMWPE fabrics, in addition to providing excellent impact properties and high strength, also offer radiation resistance due to inherent high hydrogen content. SWCNT have exceptional mechanical and electrical properties. BNNT (figure 1) have high neutron cross section and good mechanical properties that add multi-functionality to this system. In this project, epoxy based UHMWPE composites containing SWCNT and BNNT are assessed for their use as bumper shields and as intermediate plates in a Whipple Shield for HVI resistance. Three composite systems are prepared to compare against one another: (I) Epoxy/UHMWPE, (II) Epoxy/UHMWPE/SWCNT and (III) Epoxy/UHMWPE/SWCNT/BNNT. Each composite is a 10.0 by 10.0 by 0.11 cm3 panel, consisting of 4 layers of fabrics arranged in cross-ply orientation. Both SWCNT and BNNT are 0.5 weight % of the fabric preform. Hypervelocity impact tests are performed using a two-stage light gas gun at Rice University

Khatiwada, Suman↗
NASA NTRS2015

Modular Robotic Vehicle

A modular robotic vehicle includes a chassis, driver input devices, an energy storage system (ESS), a power electronics module (PEM), modular electronic assemblies (eModules) connected to the ESS via the PEM, one or more master controllers, and various embedded controllers. Each eModule includes a drive wheel containing a propulsion-braking module, and a housing containing propulsion and braking control assemblies with respective embedded propulsion and brake controllers, and a mounting bracket covering a steering control assembly with embedded steering controllers. The master controller, which is in communication with each eModule and with the driver input devices, communicates with and independently controls each eModule, by-wire, via the embedded controllers to establish a desired operating mode. Modes may include a two-wheel, four-wheel, diamond, and omni-directional steering modes as well as a park mode. A bumper may enable docking with another vehicle, with shared control over the eModules of the vehicles.

Borroni-Bird, Christopher E.↗
NASA NTRS1959

Space: Past, Present, and Future: for Presentation to the American Ordnance Association, Washington Post

It is obvious that the last decade has produced dramatic changes in our national viewpoints on the question of the exploration of space. I would like to refer back, as a starting point, to a series of tests which were performed in 1949 under the sponsorship of the Army Ordnance Department under the code name, "Bumper." This project was carried out jointly by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the General Electric Company, and the Douglas Aircraft Company. The object of the project was to launch a Wac Corporal upper-stage vehicle from a V-2, and demonstrate a prototype high-performance, multi-stage rocket vehicle system. As you may recall, the project was entirely successful in demonstrating the feasibility of several unproved concepts: the staging of rocket vehicles at high altitudes, the utility of ablative materials for protection from aerodynamic heating, and a method of stabilizing rocket propelled vehicles operating in the vacuum of space. One of the most significant interpretations of this test to the engineers familiar with the work was the fact that the test showed that there were no longer any purely scientific barriers to the construction of vehicles capable of space flight. The barrier was engineering.

Stewart, Homer J.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Surveys of ISS Returned Hardware for MMOD Impacts

Since February 2001, the Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group at the Johnson Space Center in Houston has performed 26 post-flight inspections on space exposed hardware that have been returned from the International Space Station. Data on 1,024 observations of MMOD damage have been collected from these inspections. Survey documentation typically includes impact feature location and size measurements as well as microscopic photography (25-200x). Sampling of impacts sites for projectile residue was performed for the largest features. Results of Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) analysis to discern impactor source is included in the database. This paper will summarize the post-flight MMOD inspections, and focus on two inspections in particular: (1) Pressurized Mating Adapter-2 (PMA-2) cover returned in 2015 after 1.6 years exposure with 26 observed damages, and (2) Airlock shield panels returned in 2010 after 8.7 years exposure with 58 MMOD damages. Feature sizes from the observed data are compared to predictions using the Bumper risk assessment code.

Hyde, James↗
NASA NTRS2017

Estimating Consequences of MMOD Penetrations on ISS

The threat from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts on space vehicles is often quantified in terms of the probability of no penetration (PNP). However, for large spacecraft, especially those with multiple compartments, a penetration may have a number of possible outcomes. The extent of the damage (diameter of hole, crack length or penetration depth), the location of the damage relative to critical equipment or crew, crew response, and even the time of day of the penetration are among the many factors that can affect the outcome. For the International Space Station (ISS), a Monte-Carlo style software code called Manned Spacecraft Crew Survivability (MSCSurv) is used to predict the probability of several outcomes of an MMOD penetration-broadly classified as loss of crew (LOC), crew evacuation (Evac), loss of escape vehicle (LEV), and nominal end of mission (NEOM). By generating large numbers of MMOD impacts (typically in the billions) and tracking the consequences, MSCSurv allows for the inclusion of a large number of parameters and models as well as enabling the consideration of uncertainties in the models and parameters. MSCSurv builds upon the results from NASA's Bumper software (which provides the probability of penetration and critical input data to MSCSurv) to allow analysts to estimate the probability of LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM. This paper briefly describes the overall methodology used by NASA to quantify LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM with particular emphasis on describing in broad terms how MSCSurv works and its capabilities and most significant models.

Evans, H.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Surveys of Returned ISS Hardware for MMMOD Impacts

Since February 2001, the Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston has performed 35 post-flight inspections on space exposed hardware returned from the International Space Station (ISS). Data on 1,188 observations of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage have been collected from these inspections. Survey documentation typically includes impact feature location and size measurements as well as microscopic photography (25-200x). Sampling of impacts sites for projectile residue was performed for the largest features. Results of energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopic analysis to discern impactor source are included in the database when available. This paper will focus on two inspections, the Pressurized Mating Adapter 2 (PMA-2) cover returned in 2015 after 1.6 years exposure with 26 observed impact features, and two Airlock shield panels returned in 2010 after 8.75 years exposure with 58 MMOD impacts. Feature sizes from the observed data are compared to predictions using the Bumper 3 risk assessment code.

Hyde, J. L.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Predicting the Consequences of MMOD Penetrations on the International Space Station

The threat from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts on space vehicles is often quantified in terms of the probability of no penetration (PNP). However, for large spacecraft, especially those with multiple compartments, a penetration may have a number of possible outcomes. The extent of the damage (diameter of hole, crack length or penetration depth), the location of the damage relative to critical equipment or crew, crew response, and even the time of day of the penetration are among the many factors that can affect the outcome. For the International Space Station (ISS), a Monte-Carlo style software code called Manned Spacecraft Crew Survivability (MSCSurv) is used to predict the probability of several outcomes of an MMOD penetration-broadly classified as loss of crew (LOC), crew evacuation (Evac), loss of escape vehicle (LEV), and nominal end of mission (NEOM). By generating large numbers of MMOD impacts (typically in the billions) and tracking the consequences, MSCSurv allows for the inclusion of a large number of parameters and models as well as enabling the consideration of uncertainties in the models and parameters. MSCSurv builds upon the results from NASA's Bumper software (which provides the probability of penetration and critical input data to MSCSurv) to allow analysts to estimate the probability of LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM. This paper briefly describes the overall methodology used by NASA to quantify LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM with particular emphasis on describing in broad terms how MSCSurv works and its capabilities and most significant models.

Hyde, James↗
NASA NTRS2019

Consequences of MMOD Penetrations on the International Space Station

Risk from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts on space vehicles is often quantified in terms of the probability of no penetration (PNP). However, for large spacecraft, especially those with multiple compartments, a penetration may have a number of possible outcomes. The extent of the damage (diameter of hole, crack length or penetration depth), the location of the damage relative to critical equipment or crew, crew response, and even the time of day of the penetration are among the many factors that can affect the outcome. For the International Space Station (ISS), a Monte-Carlo style software code called Manned Spacecraft Crew Survivability (MSCSurv) is used to predict the probability of several outcomes of an MMOD penetration—broadly classified as loss of crew (LOC), crew evacuation (Evac), loss of escape vehicle (LEV), and nominal end of mission (NEOM). By generating large numbers of MMOD impacts (typically in the billions) and tracking the consequences, MSCSurv allows for the inclusion of a large number of parameters and models as well as enabling the consideration of uncertainties in the models and parameters. MSCSurv builds upon the results from NASA’s Bumper software (which provides the probability of penetration and critical input data to MSCSurv) to allow analysts to estimate the probability of LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM. This paper provides an overview of the methodology used by NASA to quantify LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM with particular emphasis on describing in broad terms how MSCSurv works and its capabilities and most significant models.

Evans, Hilary J.↗
NASA NTRS2019

An Astronaut's Risk of Experiencing a Critical Impact from Lunar Ejecta During Lunar EVA

The Moon is under constant bombardment by meteoroids. When the meteoroid is large, the impact craters the surface, launching crater ejecta far from the impact potentially threatening astronauts on the lunar surface. In the early 1960’s, the ejecta impact flux was thought no more than the sporadic meteoroid flux but with speeds one to two orders of magnitude smaller. However, the Lunar Module designers realized by 1965 that meteoroid bumpers do not perform well at the smaller ejecta impact speeds. Their estimates of the Lunar Module risk of penetration by ejecta were 25 to 50% of the total risk. This was in spite of the exposure time to ejecta being only a third of that to sporadic meteoroids. The standard committee based the 1969 NASA SP-8013 lunar ejecta environment on Zook’s 1967 flux analysis and Gault, Shoemaker and Moore’s 1963 test data for impacts into solid basalt targets. However, Zook noted in his 1967 analysis, that if the lunar surface was composed of soil, that the ejected soil particles would be smaller than ejected basalt fragments and that the ejection speeds would be smaller. Both effects contribute to reducing the risk of a critical failure due to lunar ejecta. The authors revised Zook’s analysis to incorporate soil particle size distributions developed from analysis of Apollo lunar soil samples and ejected mass as a function of ejecta speed developed from coupling parameter analyses of soil impact-test data. The authors estimated EVA risk by assuming failure occurs at a critical impact energy. At these impact speeds, this might be true for suit hard and soft goods. However, these speeds are small enough that there may be significant strength effects that require new test data to modify the hypervelocity critical energy failure criterion. With these caveats, Christiansen, Cour-Palais and Freisen list the critical energy of the ISS EMU hard upper torso as 44 J and the helmet and visor as 71 J at hypervelocity. The authors then assumed that the lunar EVA suit fails at 50 J critical energy. This results in a 1,700,000 years mean time to failure using the results of this analysis and a 3,800 years mean time to failure using NASA SP-8013.

Bjorkman, Michael D.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Optimization of Debris Shields on the NISAR Mission’s L-Band Radar Instrument

The NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) space mission is a collaboration between NASA and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), launching in the 2020s to a polar orbit of 747km altitude. The mission will provide spatial and temporal measurements of land surface changes (e.g. ice sheets, vegetation, earthquakes). Many of the SAR electronics boxes are mounted on the exterior of the structure. Their singlewall box lids efficiently radiate heat for thermal control, but are not very efficient debris shields. The initial design showed an unacceptably high impact risk as estimated with NASA’s ORDEM3 debris model and Bumper impact analysis tool. Each box has a different role in instrument functionality, and this was captured in a reliability model used to optimize the distribution of shield mass among the boxes: total added mass was minimized while maintaining a threshold of functionality and survival probability that was acceptable to the project.

Chinn, James Z.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Challenges of Debris-Impact Risk Assessment for Robotic Spacecraft

This paper describes an orbital debris impact risk assessment performed on the command and data subsystem electronics box of QuikSCAT, a functioning spacecraft with approximately 18 years on orbit. Several aspects of the analysis are paid particular attention. First is the modeling of a thermal blanket at a small stand-off distance from the box chassis. The properties of the blanket are such that under some assumptions, it may be treated as an effective bumper shield, and under other assumptions, it may not. The assumptions and their effects on the results of the analysis are explored. Similarly, the configuration of the electronic components inside the chassis are such that several definitions of failure criteria appear plausible. The results of each treatment are presented together and compared with the status of the actual electronics box. The failure predictions vary widely between treatments, and the more conservative assumption sets predict incredulously high probabilities of failure. This is problematic because the conservative assumptions are the ones typically used in analyses for flight projects.

Ratliff, Martin↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Dual Multilayer Insulation Blanket Concept to Radically Reduce Heat Loss From Thermally Controlled Spacecraft and Instruments

At large distances from the Sun (e.g. Jupiter/Saturn), the solar flux is less than 4% that at Earth. This requires very large solar arrays to meet the power demands of a typical new mission concept. Heat loss through Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI) blankets typically constitutes the vast majority of the total heat loss. Hence, improvements to MLI blankets that reduce heat loss are advantageous to the spacecraft design. The overall effective emittance (ε*) of MLI is usually a range dependent on the number of layers, size of blanket, seams, feedthroughs, layer density and operating temperatures of the heat source and heat sink. A concept has been developed at JPL to reduce the ε* by as much as a factor of two, which produces a corresponding reduction in heat losses. This concept utilizes two MLI blankets physically separated by traditional bumpers or spacers used for micrometeoroid protection. The outer surface of the inner blanket and the inner surface of the outer blanket are low emissivity surfaces to further minimize the total ε* of the overall dual MLI system. Analytical predictions of a dual MLI concept have been made using test data based ε* correlations. A development test has been conducted to validate the dual blanket design’s performance. This paper will describe the dual blanket design concept, schemes for its implementation, and the corresponding test results to validate its performance.

Duran, Mark↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

SpaceX Dragon 1 Post Flight MMOD Inspection Campaign

Introduction The SpaceX Dragon 1 spacecraft performed 20 resupply missions to the International Space Station (ISS) between 2012 and 2020. After each mission, a team from the NASA John-son Space Center Hypervelocity Impact Technology Group inspected each Dragon 1 capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. Data from these inspections are collected into a database that includes impact feature dimensions as well as the location on the vehicle. Additional details on the type and size of particle that produced the damage site are provided when sampling data and definitive spectroscopic analysis results are available. Observation data can be compared with impact estimates from risk assessment codes as a check on the micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment predictions. Scope A general description of the areas of the vehicle that were inspected are provided as well as mission details such as exposure duration and launch dates. The paper documents the general inspection procedure for collection of data and the post inspection data analysis process. It also provides details of the observation data collected as well as the results of analysis of intact samples collected for spectroscopic analysis to discern the source of the impacting particle. A comparison between observed impacts and the expected number of damage features calculated by Bumper 3 with the latest MMOD environments are also presented. Findings Statistics on the >300 impact features documented in the database will provide insight into the depth to diameter ratios and other relationships. The quality of the comparison between the observations and code predictions are dependent on several factors. The paper provides de-tails of each of these variables. (1) Damage equations (2) Impact condition assumptions a. Projectile density b. Impact speed c. Impact angle (3) Analysis results a. pre-flight vs. on-orbit damage b. MMOD vs. non-MMOD Conclusions and Recommendations The ISS visiting vehicle impact database is an ongoing project. SpaceX provides crew rotations as well as resupply and cargo return with the Dragon 2 spacecraft. Sierra Space is manifested for resupply and cargo return services starting in 2023. Boeing is expected to provide crew rotations as well. All of these spacecraft will provide additional opportunities for post flight MMOD inspections of space exposed hardware. Acknowledgements Over the course of the inspection campaign various personnel at the SpaceX Texas Test Site in McGregor and at the SpaceX headquarters in Hawthorne CA provided valuable support to this activity.

James L Hyde↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Prediction and Enhancement of Thermal Protection Systems from Meteoroid Damage using a Smooth Particle Hydrodynamic Code

Interplanetary spacecraft are exposed to meteoroid fluxes that range in speeds from 10 to 72 km/sec, far above the capability of today’s test facilities to provide predictions for the likelihood of spacecraft critical penetration. Of special interest are sample return missions, which (though protected by shielding) must often survive years of exposure to the meteoroid environment in order to re-enter Earth’s atmosphere with their scientific cargo. This paper describes the simulation of meteoric material damage to thermal protection systems (TPS) housed beneath protective “garage” (shielding) enclosures using the Smooth Particle Hydrodynamics Code (SPHC) operated by the Institute for Defense Analyses and Stellingwerf Consulting in support of ongoing NASA tasks. The study outlined in this paper considered the impact effect of both meteoric materials such as iron, ice, and chondrites (dunnite), and non-meteoric materials such as aluminum and nylon against both external shielding materials (single and dual aluminum bumpers) and Heat shield for Extreme Entry Environments Technology (HEEET) TPS materials, used alone and in conjunction with shielding. A general predictive damage equation to HEEET TPS is developed from these SPHC simulations for velocities up to 70 km/sec.

Hypervelocity Impact, hydrocode, meteoroid and orb↗