Projection-Based Inter-Agent Collision Avoidance in Dual Agent Systems
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Bayard, David S.↗
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Collision Avoidance “Short Course” Part III: CA Challenges and Opportunities
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conjunction assessment↗
Differential Drag Efficacy for Close Approach Remediation
Differential drag has become a viable alternative to propulsion for satellites to avoid collisions, but there is little guidance in the literature to aid mission designers in developing a differential drag capability that verifiably meets collision avoidance efficacy standards or requirements, if such requirements were to exist. This paper proposes a differential drag efficacy determination approach based on empirical conjunctions from the NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis historical database, focusing on energy dissipation rate and change in ballistic coefficient as the key satellite parameters correlated to efficacy. The data analysis informs the discussion toward adoption of recommended differential drag requirements. A case study is presented to walk through the process to determine efficacy of a proposed mission assuming several potential requirements.
conjunction remediation↗
USA Space Debris Environment, Operations, and Research Updates
Space Missions in 2017 Earth Satellite Population Collision Avoidance Maneuvers Post mission Disposal of U.S.A. Spacecraft Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and the Space Debris Sensor (SDS) A total of 86 space launches placed more than 400 spacecraft into Earth orbits during 2017, following the trend of increase over the past decade NASA has established conjunction assessment processes for its human spaceflight and uncrewed spacecraft to avoid accidental collisions with objects tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network - NASA also assists other U.S. government spacecraft owners with conjunction assessments and subsequent maneuvers The ISS has conducted 25 debris collision avoidance maneuvers since 1999 - None in 2016-2017, but an ISS visiting vehicle had one collision avoidance maneuver in 2017 During 2017 NASA executed or assisted in the execution of 21 collision avoidance maneuvers by uncrewed spacecraft - Four maneuvers were conducted to avoid debris from Fengyun-1C - Two maneuvers were conducted to avoid debris from the collision of Cosmos 2251 and Iridium 33 - One maneuver was conducted to avoid the ISS NASA has established conjunction assessment processes for its human spaceflight and uncrewed spacecraft to avoid accidental collisions with objects tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network - NASA also assists other U.S. government spacecraft owners with conjunction assessments and subsequent maneuvers The ISS has conducted 25 debris collision avoidance maneuvers since 1999 - None in 2016-2017, but an ISS visiting vehicle had one collision avoidance maneuver in 2017 During 2017 NASA executed or assisted in the execution of 21 collision avoidance maneuvers by uncrewed spacecraft - Four maneuvers were conducted to avoid debris from Fengyun-1C - Two maneuvers were conducted to avoid debris from the collision of Cosmos 2251 and Iridium 33 The 2014-15 NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) study on the micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) assessment for the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) provided the following findings - Millimeter-sized orbital debris pose the highest penetration risk to most operational spacecraft in LEO - The most effective means to collect direct measurement data on millimetersized debris above 600 km altitude is to conduct in situ measurements - There is currently no in situ data on such small debris above 600 km altitude Since the orbital debris population follows a power-law size distribution, there are many more millimeter-sized debris than the large tracked objects - Current conjunction assessments and collision avoidance maneuvers against the tracked objects (which are typically 10 cm and larger) only address a small fraction (<1%) of the mission-ending risk from orbital debris To address the millimeter-sized debris data gap above 600 km, NASA has recently developed an innovative in situ measurement instrument - the Space Debris Sensor (SDS) - One maneuver was conducted to avoid the ISS
Liou, J.-C.↗
Characterizing the Effects of a Vertical Time Threshold for a Class of Well-Clear Definitions
A fundamental requirement for the integration of unmanned aircraft into civil airspace is the capability of aircraft to remain well clear of each other and avoid collisions. This requirement has led to a broad recognition of the need for an unambiguous, formal definition of well clear. It is further recognized that any such definition must be interoperable with existing airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS). A particular class of well-clear definitions uses logic checks of independent distance thresholds as well as independent time thresholds in the vertical and horizontal dimensions to determine if a well-clear violation is predicted to occur within a given time interval. Existing ACAS systems also use independent distance thresholds, however a common time threshold is used for the vertical and horizontal logic checks. The main contribution of this paper is the characterization of the effects of the decoupled vertical time threshold on a well-clear definition in terms of (1) time to well-clear violation, and (2) interoperability with existing ACAS. The paper provides governing equations for both metrics and includes simulation results to illustrate the relationships. In this paper, interoperability implies that the time of well-clear violation is strictly less than the time a resolution advisory is issued by ACAS. The encounter geometries under consideration in this paper are initially well clear and consist of constant-velocity trajectories resulting in near-mid-air collisions.
Upchurch, Jason M.↗
Automated Spacecraft Conjunction Assessment at Mars and the Moon
Conjunction assessment and collision avoidance are areas of current high interest in space operations. Most current conjunction assessment activity focuses on the Earth orbital environment. Several of the world's space agencies have satellites in orbit at Mars and the Moon, and avoiding collisions there is important too. Smaller number of assets than Earth, and smaller number of organizations involved, but consequences similar to Earth scenarios.This presentation will examine conjunction assessment processes implemented at JPL for spacecraft in orbit at Mars and the Moon.
assessment processes↗
A Human-in-the-Loop Evaluation of ACAS Xu
As part of the Phase 2 UAS DAA MOPS, a Class 3 DAA system has been under development with the potential to resolve many of the limitations of Class 1 and 2 systems. A Class 3 system would combine the DAA and CA functions into a single, unified system, and would also extend the CA capabilities relative to TCAS II. Class 3 is enabled by the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) XU, a next generation CA system developed specifically for UAS operations. Unlike Class 2 systems, ACAS XU provides CA protection against both cooperative and non-cooperative traffic. Class 3 systems also expand the CA logic to allow horizontal RAs in addition to vertical RAs. The purpose of the current study was to evaluate ACAS XU in a real-time, HITL simulation. The latest version of ACAS XU was implemented and pilots were tasked with responding to scripted traffic conflicts over the course of four experimental trials. Variables included the location of the ACAS XU guidance information (standalone vs. integrated) and traffic conflict type (DAA or CA threat). Sixteen active UAS pilots participated in the study, with ATC and ‘pseudo’ pilots acting as airspace confederates. Results showed that pilots were able to maintain DWC with ACAS XU at a rate comparable to previous research (~5%). Compliance rates to initial RAs were high (~90%) but dropped significantly when the target heading value issued during horizontal RAs were updated over the course of an encounter (30-70%). The implications of these findings on the display, alerting, and guidance requirements for Class 3 systems will be discussed.
unmanned aircraft systems↗
A Human-in-the-Loop Evaluation of ACAS Xu
As part of the Phase 2 UAS DAA MOPS, a Class 3 DAA system has been under development with the potential to resolve many of the limitations of Class 1 and 2 systems. A Class 3 system would combine the DAA and CA functions into a single, unified system, and would also extend the CA capabilities relative to TCAS II. Class 3 is enabled by the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) XU, a next generation CA system developed specifically for UAS operations. Unlike Class 2 systems, ACAS XU provides CA protection against both cooperative and non-cooperative traffic. Class 3 systems also expand the CA logic to allow horizontal RAs in addition to vertical RAs. The purpose of the current study was to evaluate ACAS XU in a real-time, HITL simulation. The latest version of ACAS XU was implemented and pilots were tasked with responding to scripted traffic conflicts over the course of four experimental trials. Variables included the location of the ACAS XU guidance information (standalone vs. integrated) and traffic conflict type (DAA or CA threat). Sixteen active UAS pilots participated in the study, with ATC and ‘pseudo’ pilots acting as airspace confederates. Results showed that pilots were able to maintain DWC with ACAS XU at a rate comparable to previous research (~5%). Compliance rates to initial RAs were high (~90%) but dropped significantly when the target heading value issued during horizontal RAs were updated over the course of an encounter (30-70%). The implications of these findings on the display, alerting, and guidance requirements for Class 3 systems will be discussed.
unmanned aircraft systems↗
A Human-in-theLoop Evaluation of ACAS Xu
As part of the Phase 2 UAS DAA MOPS, a Class 3 DAA system has been under development with the potential to resolve many of the limitations of Class 1 and 2 systems. A Class 3 system would combine the DAA and CA functions into a single, unified system, and would also extend the CA capabilities relative to TCAS II. Class 3 is enabled by the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) XU, a next generation CA system developed specifically for UAS operations. Unlike Class 2 systems, ACAS XU provides CA protection against both cooperative and non-cooperative traffic. Class 3 systems also expand the CA logic to allow horizontal RAs in addition to vertical RAs. The purpose of the current study was to evaluate ACAS XU in a real-time, HITL simulation. The latest version of ACAS XU was implemented and pilots were tasked with responding to scripted traffic conflicts over the course of four experimental trials. Variables included the location of the ACAS XU guidance information (standalone vs. integrated) and traffic conflict type (DAA or CA threat). Sixteen active UAS pilots participated in the study, with ATC and ‘pseudo’ pilots acting as airspace confederates. Results showed that pilots were able to maintain DWC with ACAS XU at a rate comparable to previous research (~5%). Compliance rates to initial RAs were high (~90%) but dropped significantly when the target heading value issued during horizontal RAs were updated over the course of an encounter (30-70%). The implications of these findings on the display, alerting, and guidance requirements for Class 3 systems will be discussed.
unmanned aircraft systems↗
Statistical Orbit Determination using the Particle Filter for Incorporating Non-Gaussian Uncertainties
The tracking of space objects requires frequent and accurate monitoring for collision avoidance. As even collision events with very low probability are important, accurate prediction of collisions require the representation of the full probability density function (PDF) of the random orbit state. Through representing the full PDF of the orbit state for orbit maintenance and collision avoidance, we can take advantage of the statistical information present in the heavy tailed distributions, more accurately representing the orbit states with low probability. The classical methods of orbit determination (i.e. Kalman Filter and its derivatives) provide state estimates based on only the second moments of the state and measurement errors that are captured by assuming a Gaussian distribution. Although the measurement errors can be accurately assumed to have a Gaussian distribution, errors with a non-Gaussian distribution could arise during propagation between observations. Moreover, unmodeled dynamics in the orbit model could introduce non-Gaussian errors into the process noise. A Particle Filter (PF) is proposed as a nonlinear filtering technique that is capable of propagating and estimating a more complete representation of the state distribution as an accurate approximation of a full PDF. The PF uses Monte Carlo runs to generate particles that approximate the full PDF representation. The PF is applied in the estimation and propagation of a highly eccentric orbit and the results are compared to the Extended Kalman Filter and Splitting Gaussian Mixture algorithms to demonstrate its proficiency.
Mashiku, Alinda↗
[Micron]ADS-B Detect and Avoid Flight Tests on Phantom 4 Unmanned Aircraft System
Researchers at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Armstrong Flight Research Center in Edwards, California and Vigilant Aerospace Systems collaborated for the flight-test demonstration of an Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast based collision avoidance technology on a small unmanned aircraft system equipped with the uAvionix Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast transponder. The purpose of the testing was to demonstrate that National Aeronautics and Space Administration / Vigilant software and algorithms, commercialized as the FlightHorizon UAS"TM", are compatible with uAvionix hardware systems and the DJI Phantom 4 small unmanned aircraft system. The testing and demonstrations were necessary for both parties to further develop and certify the technology in three key areas: flights beyond visual line of sight, collision avoidance, and autonomous operations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Vigilant Aerospace Systems have developed and successfully flight-tested an Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Detect and Avoid system on the Phantom 4 small unmanned aircraft system. The Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Detect and Avoid system architecture is especially suited for small unmanned aircraft systems because it integrates: 1) miniaturized Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast hardware; 2) radio data-link communications; 3) software algorithms for real-time Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast data integration, conflict detection, and alerting; and 4) a synthetic vision display using a fully-integrated National Aeronautics and Space Administration geobrowser for three dimensional graphical representations for ownship and air traffic situational awareness. The flight-test objectives were to evaluate the performance of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Detect and Avoid collision avoidance technology as installed on two small unmanned aircraft systems. In December 2016, four flight tests were conducted at Edwards Air Force Base. Researchers in the ground control station looking at displays were able to verify the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast target detection and collision avoidance resolutions.
avoidance↗
Integration of Automated Systems (IAS) Flight Test - Hazard Perception & Avoidance (HPA) Results
The Integration of Automated Systems (IAS) flight test series concluded in October 2023 in support of NASA's Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) project. These flights include crewed, test (i.e., ownship) and traffic (i.e., intruder) aircraft that flew with unique technologies onboard. The presentation includes overviews of the flight tet itself and the specific results that pertain to the Hazard Perception and Avoidance (HPA) technical areas. HPA tested the FAA's Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X), a next-generation collision avoidance tool developed to support different aircraft types and operations. The rotorcraft variant, ACAS Xr, is designed to accommodate existing helicopter platforms and in-development, vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) concepts, which are critical to the emerging AAM concept of operations. Two configurations of ACAS Xr were examined: Collision Avoidance System (CAS, similar to the Traffic Collision Avoidance System [TCAS] II) and Detect and Avoid (DAA, previously developed to provide added situational awareness for remote pilots). Additionally, this system was flown in cruise and low-speed flight regimes as well as within en-route and (emulated), structured (i.e., dense/urban), and terminal airspaces. Results include the types of alerts generated by ACAS Xr across the different configurations, the distances at which the alerts were generated, response times, manuever sizes, miss distances, and general comments from pilots. Key takeaways and next steps are also provided.
detect and avoid↗
Advanced Air Mobility Operations & Automation Part II Technical Lecture
The Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X) is a next-generation collision avoidance tool developed to support different aircraft types and operations. The rotorcraft variant – referred to as ACAS XR – is designed to accommodate existing helicopter platforms as well as in-development, electric vertical takeoff and landing concepts, which are critical to the emerging concept of operations referred to as Advanced Air Mobility. The fundamental role of ACAS XR is to provide Detect and Avoid (DAA) and/or Collision Avoidance (CA) protection against airborne traffic. DAA alerting and guidance in the context of ACAS XR is caution-level and “suggestive,” and is to be used by the pilot if, and when, they decide to maneuver against an identified threat to DAA “well clear.” The CA alerting, by contrast, is warning-level and “directive,” with the pilot required to comply with the associated guidance to prevent a predicted Near Midair Collision (NMAC). The CA alerts generated by ACAS XR are referred to as Resolution Advisories (RAs) consistent with previous CA systems. Unlike earlier CA systems, ACAS XR issues RAs in the horizontal and vertical dimensions as well as multi-axis RAs (referred to as “Blended” RAs). According to the Minimal Operational Performance Standards of DAA systems for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, maneuvers to comply with RAs may be automated, whereas maneuvers based on DAA alerting assume a manual response. The current presentation discusses two human-in-the-loop simulations that presented rotorcraft pilots with ACAS XR alerts and guidance in eVTOL simulators with varying levels of automation. It also presents overviews of these studies as well as how they assisted live flight tests, which will occur throughout 2023.
air taxis↗
Safe Space Conduct: NASA Best Practices Overview
While prevention of launch and on-orbit collisions has been an institutional concern of NASA for several decades (beginning with the Shuttle program), historically the paucity of spaceactors and deployed payloads made the conduct of such protection activities relatively straightforward. With the substantial increases in launched payloads over the last several years, collision avoidance operations have become substantially more complicated. At the same time, many operators are uncertain regarding what collision avoidance activities are appropriate to their missions. The lack of a space traffic management authority to articulate standards and guidelines for such conduct has only increased the confusion.In response to this situation, NASA has published a Spacecraft Conjunction Assessment and Collision Avoidance Handbook, which articulates and explains the launch and on-orbit collision avoidance best practices that the Agency has developed and is requiring of present and future NASA missions. Because the CA2 Handbook is a living document regularly updated to reflect best practices changes as the industry develops, feedback from both NASA missions and other users is continuously collected in order to issue CA2 Handbook updates.This talk will summarize and explain the collision avoidance best practices from the CA2Handbook, along with the key issues that drove the selection of those practices.
Conjunction Assessment↗
NASA Best Practices Overview
While prevention of launch and on-orbit collisions has been an institutional concern of NASA for several decades (beginning with the Shuttle program), historically the paucity of space actors and deployed payloads made the conduct of such protection activities relatively straightforward. With the substantial increases in launched payloads over the last several years, collision avoidance operations have become substantially more complicated. At the same time, many operators are uncertain regarding what collision avoidance activities are appropriate to their missions. The lack of a space traffic management authority to articulate standards and guidelines for such conduct has only increased the confusion. In response to this situation, NASA has published a Spacecraft Conjunction Assessment and Collision Avoidance Handbook, which articulates and explains the launch and on-orbit collision avoidance best practices that the Agency has developed and is requiring of present and future NASA missions. Because the CA2 Handbook is a living document regularly updated to reflect best practices changes as the industry develops, feedback from both NASA missions and other users is continuously collected in order to issue CA2 Handbook updates. This talk will summarize and explain the collision avoidance best practices from the CA2 Handbook, along with the key issues that drove the selection of those practices.
Conjunction Assessment↗
Integration of Automated Systems (IAS) Flight Test Overview
The Integration of Automated Systems (IAS) Project is conducting a series of 2023 flight tests supporting NASA's Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) and National Campaign efforts. These flights include crewed, test (i.e., ownship) and traffic (i.e., intruder) aircraft that will fly with unique technologies onboard. The presentation will include overviews of the Hazard Perception and Avoidance (HPA) and Flight Path Management (FPM) technical areas but will focus primarily on HPA. HPA will test the FAA's Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X), a next-generation collision avoidance tool developed to support different aircraft types and operations. The rotorcraft variant, ACAS Xr, is designed to accommodate existing helicopter platforms and in-development, vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) concepts, which are critical to the emerging AAM concept of operations. Two configurations of ACAS Xr will be examined: Collision Avoidance System (CAS, similar to the Traffic Collision Avoidance System [TCAS] II) and Detect and Avoid (DAA, previously developed to provide added situational awareness for uncrewed aircraft). Additionally, this system will be explored during cruise and low-speed flight as well as flights within en-route, structured (i.e., dense/urban), and terminal airspaces. Scripted flight conflicts will be conducted, and these conflicts will be mitigated through maneuvers that are manual (i.e., performed by the pilots) or automated (i.e., achieved by the cooperation of the program middleware and onboard ownship systems). Objective data will be collected involving system and pilot performance as well as pilot decisions; subjective data will include pilot opinions of ACAS Xr's alerting and guidance as well as the automated maneuvers.
detect and avoid↗
FT-01: Autonomous Helicopter Flight Testing Over Long Island Sound Special Session - Hazard Perception and Avoidance Tech Area
This presentation is included as part of a panel reporting on the Integration of Automated Systems (IAS) flight test series. The IAS series concluded in October 2023 and was conducted under NASA’s Advanced Air Mobility project and in partnership with Sikorsky and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The flight test effort included two crewed rotorcraft platforms. The first, a modified S-76B helicopter, served as the “ownship” for the duration of the flight test. The second vehicle, a modified S-70, served as the intruder aircraft. One Sikorsky pilot and one NASA test pilot was onboard each aircraft for every test point, with the NASA test pilot responsible for interacting with the research systems under test. This portion of the panel presentation focuses on the results of the flight test that assessed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) next-generation collision avoidance system, the Airborne Collision Avoidance System X for Rotorcraft (ACAS Xr). The two configurations available within ACAS Xr – the Collision Avoidance System (CAS) configuration and the Detect and Avoid (DAA) configuration – were flown with an onboard pilot under Visual Flight Rules in controlled airspace over the Long Island Sound (Connecticut, USA). A total of 33 flight test cards were flown with ACAS Xr active. Results showed that the ACAS Xr alerting and guidance was largely effective and rated positively by the NASA test pilots, exemplified by zero instances of the pilots overriding an ACAS Xr Resolution Advisory (RA). Key areas of improvement, however, were noted, particularly with regards to the lack of an aural alert indicating a need to accelerate when receiving an RA at low speed and the occurrence of multiple RAs that the pilots found to be unacceptable.
detect and avoid↗
Assessment of pilot workload with the introduction of an airborne threat-alert system
Simulated line operations were used to assess the value of the TCAS on the pilot's ability to avoid a collision and to determine the effects of various display configurations and information contents on the flight-crew performance and workload. The crew flew a Phase II Link/Boeing 727 simulator in a simulated ATC environment. Four levels of collision avoidance information were evaluated using the following TCAS display formats: no TCAS information, TCAS information with no traffic display information, TCAS information with threat-activated traffic display information, and TCAS information with a full-time traffic display of threat information. It was found that the use of a threat-activated TCAS display significantly reduced the first officers' workload was significantly reduced by the threat-activated TCAS display, as were the workloads of the captain and the second officer.
Battiste, Vernol↗