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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber-Informed Engineering Research and Development Guide

This document provides guidance on incorporating Cyber Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into the research and development (R&D) of operational technology systems and tools, facilitating the creation and adoption of innovative technologies that are secure and resilient by design. As technological innovation and research are becoming pivotal for economic and national security, cybersecurity has emerged as a paramount concern across industries and sectors. The challenge of integrating robust cybersecurity measures is imperative to safeguard critical infrastructure, protect sensitive data, and preserve national security interests.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Integrating a Microgrid Controller with a Local OpenADR Server

When military microgrids isolate themselves from the main electrical grid, they must locally balance electricity supply and demand. Since local generation may be limited, the current strategy is to shed all but the most critical loads by tripping smart circuit breakers, which must then be reset manually (e.g., ESTCP project EW-201350). This strategy is typically applied at the building level, meaning that entire buildings housing mission critical activities must be excluded from any load management, while those considered non-critical may lose service entirely. The remotely controlled switchgear needed to manage load in this way is very expensive ($\$30,000$-$\$50,000$ per building). While effective at shedding load, this strategy disrupts installation operation and risks damaging equipment during both disconnection and re-energization. With the goals of lowering costs, protecting equipment, and enhancing the agility of DoD microgrids, this report demonstrates the use of cybersecure automated demand response (ADR) technology to manage microgrid loads during grid-independent (a.k.a. "islanded") operation. This automated approach achieves load shedding and shifting through communication signals sent to equipment controllers rather than by cutting off the flow of electricity within the microgrid itself. Because it operates only on the base network, with no connection to external entities, this strategy avoids the main cybersecurity concern raised by past applications of ADR on military bases.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Securing Digital Energy Infrastructure: Procurement, Contracting, and Supply Chain Risk Management Guidance

Recognizing the scale of this industry challenge, the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Grid Deployment Office (GDO) and Cybersecurity Energy Security & Emergency Response office have launched a multi-year BESS supply chain security initiative to identify consequence-driven approaches to addressing BESS supply chain security and provide resources to support prioritization of supply chain security efforts associated with the procurement of BESS equipment and services. This guide is one element of the supporting resources to be provided and sets forth a framework and guidance for procurement bidding, selection, risk analysis, and agreements stakeholders can implement to mitigate cybersecurity risks across the entirety of battery system component ecosystem, including the interconnected software and hardware required for control and monitoring BESSs.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Planning Roadmap for DER Integration in India: Industry Best Practices and Resource Guide

Ensuring safe, reliable, cost-effective DER integration at scale requires holistic planning, broad stakeholder engagement, and should address key development areas such as standards adoption, equipment testing and certification, interoperability and cybersecurity, interconnection procedures, and advanced forecasting and DER management. Each of these areas currently represent significant challenges for utilities, regulators, OEMs, developers, and even consumers worldwide. India has already seen significant growth of DERs and has announced targets for substantial growth yet to come, with the potential for DERs to make up a non-negligible portion of the country's overall generation capacity. As such, it is of critical importance that Indian stakeholders consider the potential impacts of wide-spread adoption of DERs and take preemptive action related to the five development areas listed here, among others. India should consider strategies including the adoption of key DER standards related to interconnection, testing, and cybersecurity; enabling effective and secure communication channels for DER interoperability; testing and certifying DER equipment in accredited testing laboratories; building robust, streamlined interconnection procedures; and revamping legacy system planning structures to incorporate DERs in a holistic planning framework.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment

Hydrogen storage systems may become more widely deployed throughout the country, and so it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity of the facility, and the company that owns the facility. The two main ways bad actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when companies conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks associated with a generic hydrogen storage system by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2024

Resilient Energy Delivery and Control Systems (REDCS) (Final Technical Report)

US critical infrastructure is increasingly the target of cyberattacks, where disturbances could cause considerable damage and disruption. To help provide a new layer of cyber-physical protection for one key energy delivery system, natural gas pipelines, GE Vernova Advanced Research along with partners Florida State University and Intel Corporation created an innovative technology called "Resilient Energy Delivery and Control Systems" (REDCS). This cybersecurity package helps detect anomalies caused by cyberattacks, isolate the subsystem being impacted by the attack, and provide functions that can allow for resiliency – giving better situational awareness to the operators and cybersecurity specialists or in the future perform closed loop control for continued operation while compromised.

03 NATURAL GAS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Utility-Scale Operational Consequences for Solar Grid Services

This report delves into the critical aspects of grid services provided by solar inverter-based resources (IBRs), with an emphasis on the evolving landscape of microgrids, virtual power plants (VPPs), aggregators, and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS). As the energy sector undergoes a transformative shift towards more decentralized and resilient grid architectures, understanding the multifaceted risks associated with these technologies becomes paramount. The report categorizes these risks into organizational, technical, and procedural domains, providing a thorough risk assessment framework that stakeholders can utilize to anticipate and mitigate potential issues. In addressing the increasing complexity of grid interconnections, the report highlights the importance of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). By embedding engineering controls and cybersecurity measures into the early stages of system design, this approach aims to fortify grid infrastructure against emerging cyber threats. The analysis includes an exploration of best practices and strategies for integrating CIE principles to enhance grid security and resilience. To provide practical insights, the report conducts a detailed consequence analysis of various grid services and cyber mitigations that can be applied through the interconnection process. This analysis evaluates the potential impacts of different failure modes and vulnerabilities, offering a clear understanding of the consequences that could arise from disruptions within the energy grid. The findings are further enriched by a series of case studies that illustrate real-world scenarios and lessons learned from past incidents. Through this comprehensive examination of grid services and their criticality, the report aims to prepare industry professionals with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate the complexities of modern energy systems. By providing a comprehensive approach that includes risk assessment, cybersecurity, and consequence analysis, solar stakeholders can more effectively guarantee the reliability, efficiency, and security of the energy grid.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Secure and Resilient Operations Using Open-Source Distributed Systems Platform (OpenDSP)

The goal of this project is to identify and address cybersecurity gaps by developing a multi-layer multi-channel cyber-physical defense and survival mechanism for operating distribution networks with high penetration of solar / inverter-based resource (IBR) / distributed energy resource (DER). The proposed security enhancements are built upon the distributed framework and solution architecture for both information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems. The technical solutions consist of two composite functionalities and six layers: proactive defense (vulnerability assessment, communication protection, and attack detection, as layers 1-3), and adaptive self-healing (attack-resilient control, adaptive recovery, and resilient survival, as layers 4-6). These layers, built on and extended from DHS CISA Cyber Framework, establish an integrated and robust cybersecurity framework for operating large-scale distribution networks.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Zero Trust Framework: CWMD Zero Trust Principles Model

The research focuses on the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity within the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, specifically targeting Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear devices. Traditional perimeter-based security models are insufficient against modern cyber threats, prompting a shift toward Zero Trust principles (ZTP) that emphasize continuous verification and stringent security for all devices. Federal directives mandate the adoption of Zero Trust (ZT) across agencies, supported by guidelines from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and National Security Agency (NSA). The research involved mapping ZT guidance from these agencies to develop tailored CWMD ZTP. The study identified gaps and areas for improvement, including clear transitional guidance from traditional to ZT architectures and the focus on explicit cross cutting capabilities. Design improvements are recommended to ensure increased comprehensive protection and resilience against sophisticated cyber threats for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) devices. Collaborative efforts among federal agencies are essential for the successful deployment of an optimized ZT guidance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop Report

The Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop - held on June 17-18, 2025, National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) in Golden, Colorado - brought together approximately 40 external stakeholders from the energy sector, including VPP owner/operators, aggregators, OEMs, utilities, testing & certification labs, trade associations, and cybersecurity vendors. Led by key facilitators, the workshop focused on addressing cybersecurity challenges and enhancing grid resilience for aggregated Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and Virtual Power Plants (VPPs). The workshop was catalyzed by recognition that traditional, rearward-looking regulatory frameworks are insufficient to keep pace with technological change. There is a "missing understanding" of risk, an "absent security basis" for managing it, and an "untenable responsibility" due to unclear ownership and requirements. The workshop aimed to shift the mindset from reacting to past crises to proactively preparing for emerging threats, fostering forward resilience through risk simulation and collaborative action. This report summarizes the outcomes of the workshop, marking it a significant step toward a secure, reliable and affordable energy future.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cyber Labeling for Energy Industrial IoT

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security and Emergency Response (CESER), at the request of the Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technologies, Anne Neuberger, initiated research in 2023 to develop a cybersecurity labeling proof-of-concept for energy products to expand on the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) proposed U.S. Cyber Trust Mark program. DOE mobilized researchers from six National Laboratories to develop and gather feedback on a proof-of concept label for solar inverters and smart meters, which serve as representative products for market-facing energy sector Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). This report details the research team’s process across two phases and the resulting findings, which include challenges facing cyber labeling programs and recommendations to implement an expanded IIoT cyber labeling program in the U.S.

32 - ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZA↗
DOE OSTI2024

Engineering in Cyber Resilience with Cyber-Informed Engineering

Engineers have super powers to provide cybersecurity resilience with deterministic engineering solutions and to protect systems from the most catastrophic consequences that a cyber saboteur could cause. Come to this session to learn how to use engineering risk management skills to harden your engineered systems from cyberattacks. Objective 1 Identify what system functions could be digitally induced to cause undesired high-impact consequences. Objective 2 Analyze how loss or instability of digital controls in a subsystem could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 3 Analyze how loss or instability in the digital connectivity between systems could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 4 Identify engineering controls which could build resilience by eliminating digital loss or instability pathways or reduce the impact of digital loss or instability. This presentation will introduce Cyber-Informed Engineering, described below, and walk participants through specific engineering use cases to show how engineers can consider the potential for cyber sabotage in their existing system designs and enact deterministic engineering-based controls which eliminate pathways for attack or mitigate specific consequences. A wide variety of application use cases will be considered so that audience members can align the material with familiar engineering applications. CIE is an engineering approach that integrates cyber resilience into the conception, design, build, and operation of any physical system that has digital connectivity, sensors, monitoring, or control. CIE offers the opportunity to use engineering to eliminate or mitigate avenues for cyber attack—starting from the earliest stage of design and continuing throughout the system’s lifecycle. Today, engineers and industrial control system (ICS) technicians build engineered systems with specific goals for safety, reliability, and functionality. While systems engineering includes considerable safety and failure mode analysis, cybersecurity risks are often not specifically addressed—particularly the risks of intentional cyber compromise, exploitation, and misuse. Cyber-Informed Engineering pairs well with traditional cyber defenses and offers an extra designed-in protection to eliminate the most catastrophic consequences which can be realized by an adversary should traditional cyber defenses fail.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G)

The first slide deck provides an overview of the goals and objectives of the DOE Grid Modernization Initiative's Project entitled "Assessment and Coordination of DER Cybersecurity Standards." It covers the project's ongoing efforts to create a library of standards related to the cybersecurity of DER. The presentation will review the progress of this effort to-date and solicit feedback from participants on future directions. The second slide deck summarizes NREL's accomplishments for last three years under S2G project in a 10-12 min presentation.

clean energy↗
DOE OSTI2024

IBR Digital Supply Chain Gap Analysis and Recommendations

The adoption of clean energy technologies, including solar photovoltaics, continues to introduce non-traditional stakeholders to the operations and planning of the electric system. Stakeholders such as manufacturers, vendors, owners, aggregators, and others are enabling the adoption, integration, and optimum operations of solar technologies at accelerated rates. Inverters form the foundation of many digitally controlled energy sources for clean energy technologies, including Solar, Battery Energy Storage Systems, Hybrid Systems, and Hydrogen Fuel Cells. Their supply chain is complex, a series of microchips, electronic switches and other components making up its primary functions. The complexity of this space and the growing digitization associated with these components can create supply chain cyber risks. One measure to mitigate cybersecurity attacks is proper digital supply chain security. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Solar Energy Technologies Office (SETO), in partnership with the Cybersecurity, Energy, Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) office, is hosting a workshop to bring together solar vendors and services providers to discuss digital supply chain security for solar systems and challenges and opportunities in the transitioning to a fully domestic supply chain for solar energy in the U.S. This workshop will support the Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) and Energy Cyber Sense program activities. During the workshop, industry experts and researchers from DOE National Laboratories will discuss the current solar supply chain landscape and the transition to domestic manufacturing of solar components in the U.S. Tools and techniques to better manage and secure the digital supply chain of solar devices and systems will be discussed.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2024

Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment Security Solutions

The EVs@Scale cybersecurity pillar deep dive focuses on the three main tasks that NREL has in the consortium: (1) Analysis of EV charging mobile applications, (2) Cybersecurity risk assessments of EVSE through DER-CF, and (3) PKI for EVSE.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS,MATHEMATICS AND COMPUT↗
DOE OSTI2024

Verifying Cyber Implementation Best Practices With Malcolm

Network traffic analysis can reveal a lot about what's right or wrong with a network's cybersecurity footing. Using Malcolm, a powerful open-source network traffic analysis tool suite for network security monitoring, cyber analysts and asset owners can validate cybersecurity best practices and uncover red flags in network configuration, including: proper network segmentation east-west (cross-segment) and north-south traffic unsecure or outdated network protocols authentication using clear text credentials rogue devices and services unexpected protocols (e.g., IPv6, DNS, DHCP, update checks, etc.) suspicious file transfers

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session Two

The TADA BESS Supply Chain Workshops are designed to equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to address the evolving challenges at the intersection of battery energy storage systems (BESS), cybersecurity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The workshops emphasize the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles using INL’s procurement guide and the CIE-BAT tool. Attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their BESS projects. Additionally, the program fosters a collaborative network of practitioners and provides guidance on navigating emerging regulatory requirements, including FEOC rules under the OBBB framework, to assess and enhance organizational readiness. A comprehensive exploration of BESS cybersecurity supply chain risks, systematic vendor risk assessment through the BESS Procurement Guide, and practical application of the INL SCRM Chatbot for enhanced supply chain resilience. This is Session 2 of 3. (Full Version)

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗