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Development of the J-2X Engine for the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle: Building on the Apollo Program for Lunar Return Missions

The United States (U.S.) Vision for Space Exploration directs NASA to develop two new launch vehicles for sending humans to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. In January 2006, NASA streamlined its hardware development approach for replacing the Space Shuttle after it is retired in 2010. Benefits of this approach include reduced programmatic and technical risks and the potential to return to the Moon by 2020, by developing the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) propulsion elements now, with full extensibility to future Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) lunar systems. This decision was reached after the Exploration Launch Projects Office performed a variety of risk analyses, commonality assessments, and trade studies. The Constellation Program selected the Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne J-2X engine to power the Ares I Upper Stage Element and the Ares V Earth Departure Stage. This paper narrates the evolution of that decision; describes the performance capabilities expected of the J-2X design, including potential commonality challenges and opportunities between the Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles; and provides a current status of J-2X design, development, and hardware testing activities. This paper also explains how the J-2X engine effort mitigates risk by building on the Apollo Program and other lessons lived to deliver a human-rated engine that is on an aggressive development schedule, with its first demonstration flight in 2012.

Snoddy, Jim↗

Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment - How They Play Together

Since the Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, NASA has extensively used probabilistic analysis methods to assess, understand, and communicate the risk of space launch vehicles. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), used in the nuclear industry, is one of the probabilistic analysis methods NASA utilizes to assess Loss of Mission (LOM) and Loss of Crew (LOC) risk for launch vehicles. PRA is a system scenario based risk assessment that uses a combination of fault trees, event trees, event sequence diagrams, and probability distributions to analyze the risk of a system, a process, or an activity. It is a process designed to answer three basic questions: 1) what can go wrong that would lead to loss or degraded performance (i.e., scenarios involving undesired consequences of interest), 2) how likely is it (probabilities), and 3) what is the severity of the degradation (consequences). Since the Challenger accident, PRA has been used in supporting decisions regarding safety upgrades for launch vehicles. Another area that was given a lot of emphasis at NASA after the Challenger accident is reliability engineering. Reliability engineering has been a critical design function at NASA since the early Apollo days. However, after the Challenger accident, quantitative reliability analysis and reliability predictions were given more scrutiny because of their importance in understanding failure mechanism and quantifying the probability of failure, which are key elements in resolving technical issues, performing design trades, and implementing design improvements. Although PRA and reliability are both probabilistic in nature and, in some cases, use the same tools, they are two different activities. Specifically, reliability engineering is a broad design discipline that deals with loss of function and helps understand failure mechanism and improve component and system design. PRA is a system scenario based risk assessment process intended to assess the risk scenarios that could lead to a major/top undesirable system event, and to identify those scenarios that are high-risk drivers. PRA output is critical to support risk informed decisions concerning system design. This paper describes the PRA process and the reliability engineering discipline in detail. It discusses their differences and similarities and how they work together as complementary analyses to support the design and risk assessment processes. Lessons learned, applications, and case studies in both areas are also discussed in the paper to demonstrate and explain these differences and similarities.

Safie, Fayssal↗

Analysis of Launch Vehicle Liftoff Debris: Historical Perspective from Space Shuttle and Application to Artemis I

Human exploration-class launch vehicles are inherently prone to debris due to the extreme environments generated during pre-launch operations, liftoff, and flight. The use of cryogenic propellants often requires thermal protection system (TPS) coatings, typically foam, to maintain the propellant conditions in the tank and prevent an accumulation ice on the external surface of the vehicle. Some ice growth is to be expected at umbilical interfaces, vents, flanges, or brackets where it is difficult to apply TPS. This ice may come loose at any time due to wind on the launch pad, structural vibration and acoustics after rocket ignition, or aerodynamic forces during flight. This phenomena is especially apparent on vehicles with no TPS, such as the Saturn V rockets used in the Apollo Program, see Figure 1. During propellant tanking, the thermal contraction of the underlying substrate may generate cracks in the TPS (Figure 1). Chunks of TPS can release due to the expansion of ingested gas from cryopumping or from aerodynamic forces if the crack creates an offset surface. Most foams will also have a certain amount of “popcorning” where small pieces of foam will pop off during flight because of the differential between the static surface pressure and the pressure of the gas trapped in the foam cell structure. There are a number of other coating or closeout materials that may be shed from the vehicle and become debris. During pre-launch operations and liftoff, the vehicle may also be exposed to debris originating from the launch pad or ground support equipment. This debris is separate from foreign object debris, or FOD, which is not intended to be present and is strictly controlled through operations and maintenance procedures. In this case, debris is generated from hardware and materials that are necessary for launch and are subject to the intense vibration, acoustics, and direct plume impingement of the launch environment. Examples include ice from umbilicals, tape and tie wraps that protect cables, and rust or corrosion from the launch platform. While NASA has historically been aware of debris as a potential issue that could cause a failure resulting in loss of mission, loss of vehicle, or loss of crew, the likelihood and severity of that risk was not always well understood or given sufficient weight in program and flight decisions. After the Space Shuttle Columbia accident (STS-107), the investigation found that foam TPS debris shed from the external tank was the proximate cause of the damage to the orbiter wing. Six previous observations of debris released from the foam ramp that covered the bipod connecting the forward end of the orbiter to the external tank resulted in minor changes or were determined to be accepted flight risks. Two occurrences of bipod ramp foam loss were not identified until the STS-107 investigation. Despite the damage inflicted by these debris strikes, the Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board deemed the vehicle safe to fly. During the Return to Flight effort following the Columbia disaster, NASA Engineering developed a process for the assessment of debris transport, impact, and damage tolerance to support independent assessments of risk by NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). Under this system, each element (vehicle or ground system) defines a catalog of all expected debris based on launch history, component testing, or analysis. Debris transport analysis (DTA) is conducted using the debris catalog characteristics and potential flow transport mechanisms (e.g., vehicle aerodynamics, gravity, wind, plume-driven). The predicted debris impact locations and velocities are provided to the hardware owners, who use available test data and analysis to determine whether each component can withstand the impacts. In cases where the element hardware may be severely damaged or fail, the options are to mitigate the debris source through some change in design or operation, or to work with S&MA to try to characterize the probability of the impact and damage for program risk acceptance. Because of the differences in debris characteristics and transport, the DTA has been divided between the Liftoff and Ascent regimes. The development and application of Liftoff DTA methodology from the Shuttle Program to the current Artemis Program is the subject of this paper. Liftoff DTA covers the time from the start of pre-launch operations at the launch pad, up until the vehicle clears the launch tower and there is no longer any interaction with ground systems. Debris transport during this period is broadly classified as either gravity, wind, and plume-entrained (GWPE) or plume driven (PD). GWPE debris is generally lower speed, travelling in a forward-to-aft direction. PD transport includes flow features from the rocket ignition transient, as well as plume impingement and recirculation that occur as the vehicle lifts off the launch platform. In these cases, the debris typically moves in an aft-to-forward direction at higher speeds. The applicable transport mechanisms must be considered for each piece of debris depending on the material, and release location and time. For example, rust or metallic debris from the tower could fall (GWPE) and impact the vehicle before landing on the launch platform deck where it could be also be transported by plume impingement (PD). However, falling ice (GWPE) from an umbilical is unlikely to survive impact with the vehicle or launch platform and be available for PD transport. Modeling of debris transport is accomplished using a set of DTA tools which simulate debris trajectories subject to a reference frame acceleration (i.e., gravity) and aerodynamic drag. Where the trajectory encounters a solid surface, the debris is allowed to rebound with a specified coefficient of restitution. The drag is calculated by interpolating the fluid state at each point in the debris trajectory from high-fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations of the launch vehicle and pad. The CFD data may either be static (steady state or time averaged), typically for GWPE transport, or dynamic (time-accurate) for PD flow features like the ignition transient. Examples of the CFD flow field solutions for the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and launch pad are shown in Figure 2. Typical SLS debris trajectory predictions from DTA are illustrated in Figure 3. The final version of this paper will include a more detailed examination of the Liftoff DTA process developed during the Shuttle Program, and how it has been augmented and applied to the SLS rocket under the Artemis Program. Comparisons with debris observations from the Artemis I launch will demonstrate validation of the tools and methodology.

Debris↗

Airport Risk Assessment Model Stakeholder Symposium Event Report

On June 22-23, 2021, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory hosted a two-day virtual stakeholder symposium to share how the Airport Risk Assessment Model (ARAM) is putting security resource allocation planning into the hands of our airport’s front lines of defense. This report highlights the key takeaways from the discussions.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Application of Numerical Atmospheric Models

In this study, a numerical modeling framework for simulating extreme storm events was established using the Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) model. Such a framework is necessary for the derivation of engineering parameters such as probable maximum precipitation that are the cornerstone of large water-management infrastructure design. Here, this framework was built based on a heavy storm that occurred in Nashville, Tennessee (U.S.), in 2010, and verified using two other extreme storms. To achieve the optimal setup, several combinations of model resolutions, initial/boundary conditions (IC/BC), cloud microphysics, and cumulus parameterization schemes were evaluated using multiple metrics of precipitation characteristics. The evaluation suggests that WRF is most sensitive to the IC/BC option. Simulation generally benefits from finer resolutions up to 5 km. At the 15 km level, NCEP2 IC/BC produces better results, whereas NAM IC/BC performs best at the 5 km level. The recommended model configuration from this study is: NAM or NCEP2 IC/BC (depending on data availability), 15 km or 15–5 km nested grids, Morrison microphysics, and Kain-Fritsch cumulus schemes. Validation of the optimal framework suggests that these options are good starting choices for modeling extreme events similar to the test cases. This optimal framework is proposed in response to emerging engineering demands of extreme storm event forecasting and analyses for design, operations, and risk assessment of large water infrastructures.

Chen, Xiaodong↗

Advanced Health Management System for the Space Shuttle Main Engine

Boeing-Canoga Park (BCP) and NASA-Marshall Space Flight Center (NASA-MSFC) are developing an Advanced Health Management System (AHMS) for use on the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) that will improve Shuttle safety by reducing the probability of catastrophic engine failures during the powered ascent phase of a Shuttle mission. This is a phased approach that consists of an upgrade to the current Space Shuttle Main Engine Controller (SSMEC) to add turbomachinery synchronous vibration protection and addition of a separate Health Management Computer (HMC) that will utilize advanced algorithms to detect and mitigate predefined engine anomalies. The purpose of the Shuttle AHMS is twofold; one is to increase the probability of successfully placing the Orbiter into the intended orbit, and the other is to increase the probability of being able to safely execute an abort of a Space Transportation System (STS) launch. Both objectives are achieved by increasing the useful work envelope of a Space Shuttle Main Engine after it has developed anomalous performance during launch and the ascent phase of the mission. This increase in work envelope will be the result of two new anomaly mitigation options, in addition to existing engine shutdown, that were previously unavailable. The added anomaly mitigation options include engine throttle-down and performance correction (adjustment of engine oxidizer to fuel ratio), as well as enhanced sensor disqualification capability. The HMC is intended to provide the computing power necessary to diagnose selected anomalous engine behaviors and for making recommendations to the engine controller for anomaly mitigation. Independent auditors have assessed the reduction in Shuttle ascent risk to be on the order of 40% with the combined system and a three times improvement in mission success.

Davidson, Matt↗

MASTODON: An Open-Source Software for Seismic Analysis and Risk Assessment of Critical Infrastructure

Seismic analysis and risk assessment of safety-critical infrastructure like hospitals, nuclear power plants, dams, and facilities handling radioactive materials involve computationally intensive numerical models and coupled multiphysics scenarios. They are also performed in a strict regulatory environment that requires high software quality assurance standards, and in the case of safety-related nuclear facilities, a conformance to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA-1) standard. This paper introduces the open-source finite-element software, MASTODON (Multi-hazard Analysis of Stochastic Time-Domain Phenomena), which implements state-of-the-art seismic analysis and risk assessment tools in a quality-controlled environment. MASTODON is built on MOOSE (Multi-physics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment), which is a highly parallelizable, NQA-1 conforming, coupled multiphysics, finite-element framework developed at Idaho National Laboratory. MASTODON is capable of fault rupture and source-to-site wave propagation using the domain reduction method, nonlinear site response, and soil-structure interaction analysis, implicit and explicit time integration, automated stochastic simulations, and seismic probabilistic risk assessment. When coupled with other MOOSE applications, MASTODON can also solve strongly and weakly coupled multiphysics problems. This paper presents a summary of the capabilities of MASTODON and some demonstrative examples.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Probabilistic risk assessment of the Space Shuttle. Phase 3: A study of the potential of losing the vehicle during nominal operation, volume 1

This document is the Executive Summary of a technical report on a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of the Space Shuttle vehicle performed under the sponsorship of the Office of Space Flight of the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It briefly summarizes the methodology and results of the Shuttle PRA. The primary objective of this project was to support management and engineering decision-making with respect to the Shuttle program by producing (1) a quantitative probabilistic risk model of the Space Shuttle during flight, (2) a quantitative assessment of in-flight safety risk, (3) an identification and prioritization of the design and operations that principally contribute to in-flight safety risk, and (4) a mechanism for risk-based evaluation proposed modifications to the Shuttle System. Secondary objectives were to provide a vehicle for introducing and transferring PRA technology to the NASA community, and to demonstrate the value of PRA by applying it beneficially to a real program of great international importance.

Fragola, Joseph R.↗

Probability of failure and risk assessment of propulsion structural components

The probabilistic structural analysis method (PSAM) was developed to analyze the effects of fluctuating loads, variable material properties, and uncertain analytical models especially for high performance structures such as the Space Shuttle Main Engine turbopump blades. Risk is calculated after expensive service experience. However, probabilistic structural analysis provides a rational alternative method to quantify uncertainties in the structural performance and durability. NESSUS (Numerical Evaluation of Stochastic Structures Under Stress) was developed as a probabilistic structural analysis computer code which integrates finite element methods and reliability algorithms, capable to predicting the probability distributions of structural response variables such as stress, displacement, natural frequencies, and buckling loads. This computer code is detailed.

Shiao, Michael C.↗

NASA's Gravitational - Wave Mission Concept Study

With the conclusion of the NASA/ESA partnership on the Laser Interferometer Space Antenna (LISA) Project, NASA initiated a study to explore mission concepts that will accomplish some or all of the LISA science objectives at lower cost. The Gravitational-Wave Mission Concept Study consisted of a public Request for Information (RFI), a Core Team of NASA engineers and scientists, a Community Science Team, a Science Task Force, and an open workshop. The RFI yielded were 12 mission concepts, 3 instrument concepts and 2 technologies. The responses ranged from concepts that eliminated the drag-free test mass of LISA to concepts that replace the test mass with an atom interferometer. The Core Team reviewed the noise budgets and sensitivity curves, the payload and spacecraft designs and requirements, orbits and trajectories and technical readiness and risk. The Science Task Force assessed the science performance by calculating the horizons. the detection rates and the accuracy of astrophysical parameter estimation for massive black hole mergers, stellar-mass compact objects inspiraling into central engines. and close compact binary systems. Three mission concepts have been studied by Team-X, JPL's concurrent design facility. to define a conceptual design evaluate kt,y performance parameters. assess risk and estimate cost and schedule. The Study results are summarized.

Stebbins, Robin↗

Direct Air Capture-Based Carbon Dioxide Removal with United States Low-Carbon Energy and Sinks

The overall objective of this project was to complete an initial design of a commercial-scale, Carbon Capture and Storage system for Direct Air Capture (CCS-DAC) that separates and stores a minimum of 100,000 tonnes/year (t/yr.) net CO 2 from air. Three geographically diverse host sites will be used to determine the impact of different climates on the design and cost of the CCS-DAC systems; California (dry-hot), Louisiana (humid-hot), and Wyoming (mid-continental). In addition, the impact of using different low-carbon energy sources was also examined. The focus of this project was to geologically store the CO 2 , rather than the utilization of CO 2 . This Final Scientific/Technical Report is a collection of the deliverables for the project. The project team was able to successfully complete all the necessary tasks needed to determine the feasibility of the designs and operational needs of the DAC systems for each location. The data created by this allowed the project team to conduct the required evaluations to meet the requirements of the deliverables. The following deliverables were drafted and submitted to DOE prior to the conclusion of the project: (1) Initial Engineering Design; (2) Costing Estimate; (3) Techno-Economic Analysis (TEA); (4) Life Cycle Analysis (LCA); (5) Business Case Assessment; and (6) Technology EH&S Risk Assessment.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Managing Risk for Cassini During Mission Operations and Data Analysis (MOandDA)

A Risk Management Process has been tailored for Cassini that not only satisfies the requirements of NASA and JPL, but also allows the Program to proactively identify and assess risks that threaten mission objectives. Cassini Risk Management is a team effort that involves both management and engineering staff. The process is managed and facilitated by the Mission Assurance Manager (MAM), but requires regular interactions with Program Staff and team members to instill the risk management philosophy into the day to day mission operations. While Risk Management is well defined for projects in the development phase, it is a relatively new concept for Mission Operations. The Cassini team has embraced this process and has begun using it in an effective, proactive manner, to ensure mission success. It is hoped that the Cassini Risk Management Process will form the basis by which risk management is conducted during MO&DA on future projects. proactive in identifying, assessing and mitigating risks before they become problems. Cost ehtiveness is achieved by: Comprehensively identifying risks Rapidly assessing which risks require the expenditure of pruject cewums Taking early actions to mitigate these risks Iterating the process frequently, to be responsive to the dynamic internal and external environments The Cassini Program has successfully implemented a Risk Management Process for mission operations, The initial SRL has been developed and input into he online tool. The Risk Management webbased system has been rolled out for use by the flight team and risk owners we working proactive in identifying, assessing and mitigating risks before they become problems. Cost ehtiveness is achieved by: Comprehensively identifying risks Rapidly assessing which risks require the expenditure of pruject cewums Taking early actions to mitigate these risks Iterating the process frequently, to be responsive to the dynamic internal and external environments The Cassini Program has successfully implemented a Risk Management Process for mission operations, The initial SRL has been developed and input into he online tool. The Risk Management webbased system has been rolled out for use by the flight team and risk owners we working put into place will become visible and will be illusmted in future papers.

risk management↗

Probabilistic failure assessment with application to solid rocket motors

A quantitative methodology is being developed for assessment of risk of failure of solid rocket motors. This probabilistic methodology employs best available engineering models and available information in a stochastic framework. The framework accounts for incomplete knowledge of governing parameters, intrinsic variability, and failure model specification error. Earlier case studies have been conducted on several failure modes of the Space Shuttle Main Engine. Work in progress on application of this probabilistic approach to large solid rocket boosters such as the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor for the Space Shuttle is described. Failure due to debonding has been selected as the first case study for large solid rocket motors (SRMs) since it accounts for a significant number of historical SRM failures. Impact of incomplete knowledge of governing parameters and failure model specification errors is expected to be important.

Jan, Darrell L.↗

Orbital Debris Quarterly News: No. 1 - Volume 13

Topics discussed include: new debris from a decommissioned satellite with a nuclear power source; debris from the destruction of the Fengyun-1C meteorological satellite; quantitative analysis of the European Space Agency's Automated Transfer Vehicle 'Jules Verne' reentry event; microsatellite impact tests; solar cycle 24 predictions and other long-term projections and geosynchronus (GEO) environment for the Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM2008). Abstracts from the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, examining satellite reentry risk assessments and statistical issues for uncontrolled reentry hazards, are also included.

Liou, J.-C.↗

An Investigation of Risk Management Approaches for NASA Piloted X-Plane Projects

NASA is resuming X-plane research. It plans to build a low-boom supersonic flight demonstrator (LBFD), an all-electric general aviation aircraft (X-57), and possibly an ultra-efficient subsonic transport (UEST) demonstrator. In an attempt to define what levels of risk are appropriate in piloted X-plane research, the NASA Office of the Chief Engineer (OCE) evaluated numerous NASA, Department of Defense (DoD), and industry project management and risk assessment tools. Provided are the results of the evaluations of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5, 7120.8, and 8705.4; Langley Research Center (LaRC) Procedural Requirement (LPR) 7120.5; Dryden (Armstrong) Center Procedures S-002 and X-009; and Military Handbook 516C. Some of these were applied to the LBFD and X-57 aircraft. The impacts on risk of budgeting decisions and specialized flight conditions were also considered. None of the evaluated processes were found to be fully appropriate for governing experimental aircraft projects, but many useful elements were found in some of them.

X-59↗

Probabilistic Risk-Based Approach to Aeropropulsion System Assessment Developed

In an era of shrinking development budgets and resources, where there is also an emphasis on reducing the product development cycle, the role of system assessment, performed in the early stages of an engine development program, becomes very critical to the successful development of new aeropropulsion systems. A reliable system assessment not only helps to identify the best propulsion system concept among several candidates, it can also identify which technologies are worth pursuing. This is particularly important for advanced aeropropulsion technology development programs, which require an enormous amount of resources. In the current practice of deterministic, or point-design, approaches, the uncertainties of design variables are either unaccounted for or accounted for by safety factors. This could often result in an assessment with unknown and unquantifiable reliability. Consequently, it would fail to provide additional insight into the risks associated with the new technologies, which are often needed by decisionmakers to determine the feasibility and return-on-investment of a new aircraft engine.

Tong, Michael T.↗

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs.) An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. The xEMU shares similarities with the legacy Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit that is currently used for ISS EVAs, however differences in the layup (e.g., materials, thicknesses, and layers) of the fabric environmental protection garment (EPG), portable life support system (xPLSS) and helmet required an extensive test program to determine ballistic performance. Over 100 hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for MMOD impacts. Additionally, over 50 low speed tests (< 1km/s) were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate BLEs for lunar ejecta impacts. Post testing, ballistic limit equations (BLEs) used to define the performance of the various regions on the xEMU spacesuit were developed from a generic set of BLEs. The HVI and low speed testing was performed to establish a physical basis for the equations with the coefficients and exponents of the generic BLEs adjusted to fit the test data. The xEMU BLEs were added to the NASA/JSC software application used for spacecraft MMOD risk assessments (BUMPER-3). A finite element model (FEM) of the xEMU spacesuit, which defines the size and shape of the spacesuit as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations, was created based on a solid model provided by the xEMU program office. Using the FEM file and added xEMU BLEs, BUMPER-3 assessments of the xEMU spacesuit for probability of no penetration (PNP) were performed. For the LEO assessment of a typical ISS EVA, the orbital debris and meteoroids environments were defined using the latest engineering models, ORDEM 3.2 and MEM-3 respectively. The lunar surface assessment again used the MEM-3 engineering model to define the meteoroid environment along with the current released lunar surface ejecta model, NASA SP-8013 (developed during the Apollo Program). The Space Team in the Natural Environments Branch at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will soon release the new Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), at which time the xEMU lunar surface EVA will be reassessed. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds. Similar to the legacy EMU spacesuit, the majority of the MMOD risk (96% of the LEO EVA risk and 99% of the lunar surface EVA risk) is concentrated in regions of xEMU that are comprised primarily of softgoods (arms, legs, and gloves) rather than the hardgoods (xPLSS, hard upper torso and helmet).

Micrometeoroid↗