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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2013

Helicopter Flight Test of a Compact, Real-Time 3-D Flash Lidar for Imaging Hazardous Terrain During Planetary Landing

A second generation, compact, real-time, air-cooled 3-D imaging Flash Lidar sensor system, developed from a number of cutting-edge components from industry and NASA, is lab characterized and helicopter flight tested under the Autonomous Precision Landing and Hazard Detection and Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project. The ALHAT project is seeking to develop a guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) and sensing system based on lidar technology capable of enabling safe, precise crewed or robotic landings in challenging terrain on planetary bodies under any ambient lighting conditions. The Flash Lidar incorporates a 3-D imaging video camera based on Indium-Gallium-Arsenide Avalanche Photo Diode and novel micro-electronic technology for a 128 x 128 pixel array operating at a video rate of 20 Hz, a high pulse-energy 1.06 μm Neodymium-doped: Yttrium Aluminum Garnet (Nd:YAG) laser, a remote laser safety termination system, high performance transmitter and receiver optics with one and five degrees field-of-view (FOV), enhanced onboard thermal control, as well as a compact and self-contained suite of support electronics housed in a single box and built around a PC-104 architecture to enable autonomous operations. The Flash Lidar was developed and then characterized at two NASA-Langley Research Center (LaRC) outdoor laser test range facilities both statically and dynamically, integrated with other ALHAT GN&C subsystems from partner organizations, and installed onto a Bell UH-1H Iroquois "Huey" helicopter at LaRC. The integrated system was flight tested at the NASA-Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on simulated lunar approach to a custom hazard field consisting of rocks, craters, hazardous slopes, and safe-sites near the Shuttle Landing Facility runway starting at slant ranges of 750 m. In order to evaluate different methods of achieving hazard detection, the lidar, in conjunction with the ALHAT hazard detection and GN&C system, operates in both a narrow 1deg FOV raster-scanning mode in which successive, gimbaled images of the hazard field are mosaicked together as well as in a wider, 4.85deg FOV staring mode in which digital magnification, via a novel 3-D superresolution technique, is used to effectively achieve the same spatial precision attained with the more narrow FOV optics. The lidar generates calibrated and corrected 3-D range images of the hazard field in real-time and passes them to the ALHAT Hazard Detection System (HDS) which stitches the images together to generate on-the-fly Digital Elevation Maps (DEM's) and identifies hazards and safe-landing sites which the ALHAT GN&C system can then use to guide the host vehicle to a safe landing on the selected site. Results indicate that, for the KSC hazard field, the lidar operational range extends from 100m to 1.35 km for a 30 degree line-of-sight angle and a range precision as low as 8 cm which permits hazards as small as 25 cm to be identified. Based on the Flash Lidar images, the HDS correctly found and reported safe sites in near-real-time during several of the flights. A follow-on field test, planned for 2013, seeks to complete the closing of the GN&C loop for fully-autonomous operations on-board the Morpheus robotic, rocket-powered, free-flyer test bed in which the ALHAT system would scan the KSC hazard field (which was vetted during the present testing) and command the vehicle to landing on one of the selected safe sites.

Roback, VIncent E.↗
NASA NTRS2024

Integration of Automated Systems Test Campaign NC-IAS

NASA’s 2022 strategic plan included the goal to catalyze economic growth and drive innovation in the aviation industry, and to address challenges in air transportation and airspace management within the National Airspace System (NAS). The Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) specifically was tasked with leading aviation innovation to enable safe and sustainable air transportation through revolutionary vehicle advances and efficient flight operations. As a part of meeting these objectives and advancing air mobility concepts, NASA initiated the National Campaign (NC) in the Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) Project within the Airspace Operations and Safety Program (AOSP). The NC was designed to support operational demonstrations with industry as well as the research and development needed to support NASA-led research flight demonstrations. Within NC, the Integration of Automated Systems (IAS), an NC activity, tested and evaluated flight deck automation and airspace operations management functions needed to enable Urban Air Mobility (UAM) operations. This was accomplished through a partnership with Sikorsky Aircraft (specifically Sikorsky Innovations), a Lockheed Martin company, and DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), by leveraging two automation-enabled helicopters equipped with unique capabilities that enabled NASA to develop and test two-ship conflict encounters to demonstrate flight path management and hazard avoidance technologies. The enabler in this testing was NASA-developed “Middleware” (MW) software (also known as Expandable Variable Autonomy Architecture, or EVAA), which among other things allowed multiple algorithms to be incorporated into one software build that was hosted on the dissimilar-type Sikorsky helicopters. The IAS test campaign period of performance was from March 2022 through October 2023 and was structured as a phased, or spiral, approach that ultimately led to the first-ever demonstration of two-ship UAM/AAM operations designed to safely choreograph specific conflict encounters and mission scenarios to test the research algorithms for strategic and tactical aircraft deconfliction. Lessons learned are included in the body of the report. Data collected will be used to inform FAA and industry standards groups on the increasingly automated systems needed for future AAM operations. The test encounters developed for these flight tests were proven to be highly predictable, repeatable, and safely exercised flight path planning and Detect and Avoid (DAA) algorithms. These same test encounters should be leveraged by future flight test campaigns to verify that operational safety is not compromised as the AAM architecture matures. Next steps include repeating similar encounters using unmanned aircraft carrying DAA sensors in the National Airspace.

AAM↗
NASA NTRS2006

Unmanned Aircraft Hazards and their Implications for Regulation

Use of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) has been characterized as the next great step forward in the evolution of civil aviation. Indeed, UASs are in limited civil use in the United States today, and many believe that the time is rapidly approaching when they will move into the commercial marketplace, too. To make this a reality, a number of challenges must be overcome to develop the necessary regulatory framework for assuring safe operation of this special class of aircraft. This paper discusses some of what must be done to establish that framework. In particular, we examine hazards specific to the design, operation, and flight crew of UASs, and discuss implications of these hazards for existing policy and guidance. Understanding unique characteristics of UASs that pose new hazards is essential to developing a cogent argument, and the corresponding regulatory framework, for safely integrating these aircraft into civil airspace.

Hayhurst, Kelly J.↗
NASA NTRS2019

The Role of Alerting System Failures in Loss of Control Accidents CAST SE-210 Output 2

This report is part of a series of reports that address flight deck design and evaluation, written as a response to loss of control accidents. In particular, this activity is directed at failures in airplane state awareness in which the pilot loses awareness of the airplane's energy state or attitude and enters an upset condition. In a report by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, an analysis of accidents and incidents related to loss of airplane state awareness determined that hazard alerting was not effective in producing the appropriate pilot response to a hazard (CAST, 2014). In the current report, we take a detailed look at 28 airplane state awareness accidents and incidents to determine how well the hazard alerting worked. We describe a five-step integrated alerting-to-recovery sequence that prescribes how hazard alerting should lead to effective flight crew actions for managing the hazard. Then, for each hazard in each of the 28 events, we determine if that sequence failed and, if so, how it failed. The results show that there was an alerting failure in every one of the 28 safety events, and that the most frequent failure (20/28) was tied to the flight crew not orienting to (not being aware of) the hazard. The discussion section summarizes findings and identifies alerting issues that are being addressed and issues that are not currently being addressed. We identify a few recent upgrades that have addressed certain alerting failures. Two of these upgrades address alerting design, but one response to the safety events is to upgrade training for approach to stall and stall recovery. We also describe issues that are not being addressed adequately: better alert integration for flight path management types of hazards, airplanes in the fleet that do not meet the current alerting regulations, a lack of innovation for addressing cases of channelized attention, and existing vulnerabilities in managing data validity.

aviation safety↗
NASA NTRS1991

NASA Langley flight test program

General overview of NASA/Langley Research Center wind shear flight project is presented in the form of view-graphs. The following subject areas are covered: program elements (hazard characterization, sensor technology, and flight management systems); flight test objective; facility; flight requirements; flight operations; and status/schedule.

Lewis, Mike↗
NASA NTRS2017

Preparing for Veg-04 and Veg-05: Improving Pick-And-Eat Food Capabilities for the International Space Station

The capability to grow nutritious, palatable food for crew consumption during spaceflight has the potential to provide health-promoting, bioavailable nutrients, enhance the dietary experience, and reduce launch mass as we move toward longer-duration missions. Studies of edible produce during spaceflight have been limited, leaving a significant knowledge gap in the methods required to grow safe, acceptable, nutritious crops for consumption in space. Researchers from Kennedy Space Center, Johnson Space Center, Purdue University and ORBITEC have teamed up to explore the potential for plant growth and food production on the International Space Station (ISS) and future exploration missions. Ground testing of Chinese cabbage and dwarf tomato crops under different LED lighting and fertilizer conditions is being conducted to allow for a preliminary down selection of the two best lighting recipes and the best fertilizer treatment. Two trials of Chinese cabbage and one trial on dwarf tomato have been completed in on-going ground tests. Horticultural data on crop growth and productivity and chemical data on specific nutrients have been collected and are being analyzed to allow preliminary down selection. Taste test evaluations are planned on the preliminary down selection treatments to allow a final down selection for flight testing. Microbial assessment for hazard analysis critical control points (HACCP) evaluation is also underway to enable implementation of food consumption. Following down selection flight preparation will commence for testing these crops in the Veggie vegetable-production system on the ISS. A crew questionnaire has been developed to better understand the impact of crop growth in Veggie on crew behavioral health. A single Veggie plant growth chamber is currently installed on ISS, and preparations are underway to launch a second Veggie, allowing side-by-side testing under different lighting conditions. Veg-04 will be the first mission that will use this dual-Veggie capability, where the selected cultivar of Tokyo bekana Chinese cabbage will be grown under two different red-to-blue light ratios. ORBITEC has developed custom lighting software allowing independent selection of red and blue light levels. The VEG-05 experiment will test similar light treatments using Red Robin dwarf tomato. These tests offer an opportunity to develop a pick-and-eat fresh vegetable component to the ISS food system as a first step to regular supplemental food production. Our work will help define light colors, levels, and horticultural best practices to achieve high yields of safe, nutritious leafy greens and tomatoes to supplement a space diet of prepackaged food. With this work we will continue the synergistic research to help close gaps in the human research roadmap, and enable humans to venture to Mars and beyond. This research was co-funded by the Human Research Program and Space Biology (MTL1075) in the ILSRA 2015 NRA call.

International Space Station↗
NASA NTRS2015

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗
NASA NTRS1979

Solar-terrestrial Predictions Proceedings. Volume 1: Prediction Group Reports

The current practice in solar terrestrial predictions is reviewed with emphasis of prediction, warning, and monitoring services. Topics covered include: ionosphere-reflected HF radio propagation; radiation hazards for manned space flights and high altitude and high latitude aircraft flights; and geomagnetic activity.

Donnelly, R. F.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Arcing on dc power systems

Unexpected and undesirable arcing on dc power systems can produce hazardous situations aboard space flights. The potential for fire and shock might exist in a situation where there is a broken conductor, a loose power connection, or a break in the insulation of the power cable. Such arcing has been found to be reproducible in a laboratory environment. Arcing tests show that the phenomena can last for several seconds and yet be undetectable by present protection schemes used in classical power relaying and remote power controller applications. This paper characterizes the arcing phenomena and suggests future research that is needed.

Moores, Greg↗
NASA NTRS1994

Vertical wind estimation from horizontal wind measurements

The objective of this study was to assess the ability of simple vertical wind models to improve the hazard prediction capability of an airborne Doppler sensor in a realistic microburst environment. The results indicate that in the altitude region of interest (at or below 300 meters), both the linear and empirical vertical wind models improved the hazard estimate. The radar simulation study showed that the magnitude of the performance improvement was altitude dependent. The altitude of maximum performance improvement occurred at about 300 meters. At the lower altitudes the percent improvement was minimized by the diminished contribution of the vertical wind. The vertical hazard estimate errors from flight tests were less than those of the radar simulation study.

Vicroy, Dan D.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Resistance exercise as a countermeasure to disuse-induced bone loss

During spaceflight, skeletal unloading results in loss of bone mineral density (BMD). This occurs primarily in the spine and lower body regions. This loss of skeletal mass could prove hazardous to astronauts on flights of long duration. In this study, intense resistance exercise was used to test whether a training regimen would prevent the loss of BMD that accompanies disuse. Nine subjects (5 men, 4 women) participated in a supine maximal resistance exercise training program during 17 wk of horizontal bed rest. These subjects were compared with 18 control subjects (13 men, 5 women) who followed the same bed rest protocol without exercise. Determination of treatment effect was based on measures of BMD, bone metabolism markers, and calcium balance obtained before, during, and after bed rest. Exercisers and controls had significantly (P < 0.05) different means, represented by the respective following percent changes: lumbar spine BMD, +3% vs. -1%; total hip BMD, +1% vs. -3%; calcaneus BMD, +1% vs. -9%; pelvis BMD, -0.5% vs. -3%; total body BMD, 0% vs. -1%; bone-specific alkaline phosphatase, +64% vs. 0%; alkaline phosphatase, +31% vs. +5%; osteocalcin, +43% vs. +10%; 1,25 dihydroxyvitamin D, +12% vs. -15%; parathyroid hormone intact molecule, +18% vs. -25%; and serum and ionized calcium, -1% vs. +1%. The difference in net calcium balance was also significant (+21 mg/day vs. -199 mg/day, exercise vs. control). The gastrocnemius and soleus muscle volumes decreased significantly in the exercise group, but the loss was significantly less than observed in the control group. The results indicate that resistance exercise had a positive treatment effect and thus might be useful as a countermeasure to prevent the deleterious skeletal changes associated with long-duration spaceflight.

Clinical Trial↗
NASA NTRS2006

Material Issues in Space Shuttle Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV) store gases used in four subsystems for NASA's Space Shuttle Fleet. While there are 24 COPV on each Orbiter ranging in size from 19-40", stress rupture failure of a pressurized Orbiter COPV on the ground or in flight is a catastrophic hazard and would likely lead to significant damage/loss of vehicle and/or life and is categorized as a Crit 1 failure. These vessels were manufactured during the late 1970's and into the early 1980's using Titanium liners, Kevlar 49 fiber, epoxy matrix resin, and polyurethane coating. The COPVs are pressurized periodically to 3-5ksi and therefore experience significant strain in the composite overwrap. Similar composite vessels were developed in a variety of DOE Programs (primarily at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories or LLNL), as well as for NASA Space Shuttle Fleet Leader COPV program. The NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) formed an Independent Technical Assessment (ITA) team whose primary focus was to investigate whether or not enough composite life remained in the Shuttle COPV in order to provide a strategic rationale for continued COPV use aboard the Space Shuttle Fleet with the existing 25-year-old vessels. Several material science issues were examined and will be discussed in this presentation including morphological changes to Kevlar 49 fiber under stress, manufacturing changes in Kevlar 49 and their effect on morphology and tensile strength, epoxy resin strain, composite creep, degradation of polyurethane coatings, and Titanium yield characteristics.

Sutter, James K.↗