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NASA NTRS1994

Matrix Failure Modes and Effects Analysis as a Knowledge Base for a Real Time Automated Diagnosis Expert System

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis contain a wealth of information that can be used to create the knowledge base required for building automated diagnostic Expert systems. A real time monitoring and diagnosis expert system based on an actual NASA project's matrix failure modes and effects analysis was developed. This Expert system Was developed at NASA Ames Research Center. This system was first used as a case study to monitor the Research Animal Holding Facility (RAHF), a Space Shuttle payload that is used to house and monitor animals in orbit so the effects of space flight and microgravity can be studied. The techniques developed for the RAHF monitoring and diagnosis Expert system are general enough to be used for monitoring and diagnosis of a variety of other systems that undergo a Matrix FMEA. This automated diagnosis system was successfully used on-line and validated on the Space Shuttle flight STS-58, mission SLS-2 in October 1993.

Herrin, Stephanie↗
NASA NTRS2000

Influence of Design Variations on Systems Performance

High-risk aerospace components have to meet very stringent quality, performance, and safety requirements. Any source of variation is a concern, as it may result in scrap or rework. poor performance, and potentially unsafe flying conditions. The sources of variation during product development, including design, manufacturing, and assembly, and during operation are shown. Sources of static and dynamic variation during development need to be detected accurately in order to prevent failure when the components are placed in operation. The Systems' Health and Safety (SHAS) research at the NASA Ames Research Center addresses the problem of detecting and evaluating the statistical variation in helicopter transmissions. In this work, we focus on the variations caused by design, manufacturing, and assembly of these components, prior to being placed in operation (DMV). In particular, we aim to understand and represent the failure and variation information, and their correlation to performance and safety and feed this information back into the development cycle at an early stage. The feedback of such critical information will assure the development of more reliable components with less rework and scrap. Variations during design and manufacturing are a common source of concern in the development and production of such components. Accounting for these variations, especially those that have the potential to affect performance, is accomplished in a variety ways, including Taguchi methods, FMEA, quality control, statistical process control, and variation risk management. In this work, we start with the assumption that any of these variations can be represented mathematically, and accounted for by using analytical tools incorporating these mathematical representations. In this paper, we concentrate on variations that are introduced during design. Variations introduced during manufacturing are investigated in parallel work.

Tumer, Irem Y.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Failure Mode Identification Through Clustering Analysis

Research has shown that nearly 80% of the costs and problems are created in product development and that cost and quality are essentially designed into products in the conceptual stage. Currently, failure identification procedures (such as FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis), FMECA (Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis) and FTA (Fault Tree Analysis)) and design of experiments are being used for quality control and for the detection of potential failure modes during the detail design stage or post-product launch. Though all of these methods have their own advantages, they do not give information as to what are the predominant failures that a designer should focus on while designing a product. This work uses a functional approach to identify failure modes, which hypothesizes that similarities exist between different failure modes based on the functionality of the product/component. In this paper, a statistical clustering procedure is proposed to retrieve information on the set of predominant failures that a function experiences. The various stages of the methodology are illustrated using a hypothetical design example.

Arunajadai, Srikesh G.↗
NASA NTRS2002

[High Pressure Gas Tanks]

Four high-pressure gas tanks, the basis of this study, were especially made by a private contractor and tested before being delivered to NASA Kennedy Space Center. In order to insure 100% reliability of each individual tank the staff at KSC decided to again submit the four tanks under more rigorous tests. These tests were conducted during a period from April 10 through May 8 at KSC. This application further validates the predictive safety model for accident prevention and system failure in the testing of four high-pressure gas tanks at Kennedy Space Center, called Continuous Hazard Tracking and Failure Prediction Methodology (CHTFPM). It is apparent from the variety of barriers available for a hazard control that some barriers will be more successful than others in providing protection. In order to complete the Barrier Analysis of the system, a Task Analysis and a Biomechanical Study were performed to establish the relationship between the degree of biomechanical non-conformities and the anomalies found within the system on particular joints of the body. This relationship was possible to obtain by conducting a Regression Analysis to the previously generated data. From the information derived the body segment with the lowest percentage of non-conformities was the neck flexion with 46.7%. Intense analysis of the system was conducted including Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), and Barrier Analysis. These analyses resulted in the identification of occurrences of conditions, which may be becoming hazardous in the given system. These conditions, known as dendritics, may become hazards and could result in an accident, system malfunction, or unacceptable risk conditions. A total of 56 possible dendritics were identified. Work sampling was performed to observe the occurrence each dendritic. The out of control points generated from a Weighted c control chart along with a Pareto analysis indicate that the dendritics "Personnel not Wearing Proper Protective and Hose/tubing located in high-traffic area" which account for 59.18% of total dendritic frequency need to be addressed to reduce the chance of a hazard from occurring. However, the occurrences of some dendritics are more important than others. As a result immediate, from a Weighted c perspective, corrective action should be taken to ameliorate the cause of the Class A dendritic "Personnel located under suspended or moving loads" rather than just the most commonly occurring dendritics. In any case the vast majority of data obtained indicates that testing operations possess a relatively high degree of safety.

Quintana, Rolando↗
NASA NTRS2003

A Study of Technical Engineering Peer Reviews at NASA

This report describes the state of practices of design reviews at NASA and research into what can be done to improve peer review practices. There are many types of reviews at NASA: required and not, formalized and informal, programmatic and technical. Standing project formal reviews such as the Preliminary Design Review and Critical Design Review are a required part of every project and mission development. However, the technical, engineering peer reviews that support teams' work on such projects are informal, some times ad hoc, and inconsistent across the organization. The goal of this work is to identify best practices and lessons learned from NASA's experience, supported by academic research and methodologies to ultimately improve the process. This research has determined that the organization, composition, scope, and approach of the reviews impact their success. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) can identify key areas of concern before or in the reviews. Product definition tools like the Project Priority Matrix, engineering-focused Customer Value Chain Analysis (CVCA), and project or system-based Quality Function Deployment (QFD) help prioritize resources in reviews. The use of information technology and structured design methodologies can strengthen the engineering peer review process to help NASA work towards error-proofing the design process.

Chao, Lawrence P.↗
NASA NTRS2006

A Comparison of Functional Models for Use in the Function-Failure Design Method

When failure analysis and prevention, guided by historical design knowledge, are coupled with product design at its conception, shorter design cycles are possible. By decreasing the design time of a product in this manner, design costs are reduced and the product will better suit the customer s needs. Prior work indicates that similar failure modes occur with products (or components) with similar functionality. To capitalize on this finding, a knowledge base of historical failure information linked to functionality is assembled for use by designers. One possible use for this knowledge base is within the Elemental Function-Failure Design Method (EFDM). This design methodology and failure analysis tool begins at conceptual design and keeps the designer cognizant of failures that are likely to occur based on the product s functionality. The EFDM offers potential improvement over current failure analysis methods, such as FMEA, FMECA, and Fault Tree Analysis, because it can be implemented hand in hand with other conceptual design steps and carried throughout a product s design cycle. These other failure analysis methods can only truly be effective after a physical design has been completed. The EFDM however is only as good as the knowledge base that it draws from, and therefore it is of utmost importance to develop a knowledge base that will be suitable for use across a wide spectrum of products. One fundamental question that arises in using the EFDM is: At what level of detail should functional descriptions of components be encoded? This paper explores two approaches to populating a knowledge base with actual failure occurrence information from Bell 206 helicopters. Functional models expressed at various levels of detail are investigated to determine the necessary detail for an applicable knowledge base that can be used by designers in both new designs as well as redesigns. High level and more detailed functional descriptions are derived for each failed component based on NTSB accident reports. To best record this data, standardized functional and failure mode vocabularies are used. Two separate function-failure knowledge bases are then created aid compared. Results indicate that encoding failure data using more detailed functional models allows for a more robust knowledge base. Interestingly however, when applying the EFDM, high level descriptions continue to produce useful results when using the knowledge base generated from the detailed functional models.

Stock, Michael E.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA): A Practical and Cost Effective Approach

The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) is the first mission of the Robotic Lunar Exploration Program (RLEP), a space exploration venture to the Moon, Mars and beyond. The LRO mission includes spacecraft developed by NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and seven instruments built by GSFC, Russia, and contractors across the nation. LRO is defined as a measurement mission, not a science mission. It emphasizes the overall objectives of obtaining data to facilitate returning mankind safely to the Moon in preparation for an eventual manned mission to Mars. As the first mission in response to the President's commitment of the journey of exploring the solar system and beyond: returning to the Moon in the next decade, then venturing further into the solar system, ultimately sending humans to Mars and beyond, LRO has high-visibility to the public but limited resources and a tight schedule. This paper demonstrates how NASA's Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter Mission project office incorporated reliability analyses in assessing risks and performing design tradeoffs to ensure mission success. Risk assessment is performed using NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8705.5 - Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Procedures for NASA Programs and Projects to formulate probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). As required, a limited scope PRA is being performed for the LRO project. The PRA is used to optimize the mission design within mandated budget, manpower, and schedule constraints. The technique that LRO project office uses to perform PRA relies on the application of a component failure database to quantify the potential mission success risks. To ensure mission success in an efficient manner, low cost and tight schedule, the traditional reliability analyses, such as reliability predictions, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), are used to perform PRA for the large system of LRO with more than 14,000 piece parts and over 120 purchased or contractor built components.

Lee, Lydia L.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Engineering and Safety Partnership Enhances Safety of the Space Shuttle Program (SSP)

Project Management must use the risk assessment documents (RADs) as tools to support their decision making process. Therefore, these documents have to be initiated, developed, and evolved parallel to the life of the project. Technical preparation and safety compliance of these documents require a great deal of resources. Updating these documents after-the-fact not only requires substantial increase in resources - Project Cost -, but this task is also not useful and perhaps an unnecessary expense. Hazard Reports (HRs), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEAs), Critical Item Lists (CILs), Risk Management process are, among others, within this category. A positive action resulting from a strong partnership between interested parties is one way to get these documents and related processes and requirements, released and updated in useful time. The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) at the Marshall Space Flight Center has implemented a process which is having positive results and gaining acceptance within the Agency. A hybrid Panel, with equal interest and responsibilities for the two larger organizations, Safety and Engineering, is the focal point of this process. Called the Marshall Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP), its charter (Space Shuttle Program Directive 110 F, April 15, 2005), and its Operating Control Plan emphasizes the technical and safety responsibilities over the program risk documents: HRs; FMEA/CILs; Engineering Changes; anomalies/problem resolutions and corrective action implementations, and trend analysis. The MSERP has undertaken its responsibilities with objectivity, assertiveness, dedication, has operated with focus, and has shown significant results and promising perspectives. The MSERP has been deeply involved in propulsion systems and integration, real time technical issues and other relevant reviews, since its conception. These activities have transformed the propulsion MSERP in a truly participative and value added panel, making a difference for the safety of the Space Shuttle Vehicle, its crew, and personnel. Because of the MSERP's valuable contribution to the assessment of safety risk for the SSP, this paper also proposes an enhanced Panel concept that takes this successful partnership concept to a higher level of 'true partnership'. The proposed panel is aimed to be responsible for the review and assessment of all risk relative to Safety for new and future aerospace and related programs.

Duarte, Alberto↗
NASA NTRS2007

Development of the Functional Flow Block Diagram for the J-2X Rocket Engine System

The J-2X program calls for the upgrade of the Apollo-era Rocketdyne J-2 engine to higher power levels, using new materials and manufacturing techniques, and with more restrictive safety and reliability requirements than prior human-rated engines in NASA history. Such requirements demand a comprehensive systems engineering effort to ensure success. Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne system engineers performed a functional analysis of the engine to establish the functional architecture. J-2X functions were captured in six major operational blocks. Each block was divided into sub-blocks or states. In each sub-block, functions necessary to perform each state were determined. A functional engine schematic consistent with the fidelity of the system model was defined for this analysis. The blocks, sub-blocks, and functions were sequentially numbered to differentiate the states in which the function were performed and to indicate the sequence of events. The Engine System was functionally partitioned, to provide separate and unique functional operators. Establishing unique functional operators as work output of the System Architecture process is novel in Liquid Propulsion Engine design. Each functional operator was described such that its unique functionality was identified. The decomposed functions were then allocated to the functional operators both of which were the inputs to the subsystem or component performance specifications. PWR also used a novel approach to identify and map the engine functional requirements to customer-specified functions. The final result was a comprehensive Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD) for the J-2X Engine System, decomposed to the component level and mapped to all functional requirements. This FFBD greatly facilitates component specification development, providing a well-defined trade space for functional trades at the subsystem and component level. It also provides a framework for function-based failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), and a rigorous baseline for the functional architecture.

White, Thomas↗
NASA NTRS2007

CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) Connectors in Space Flight Applications

This report documents the current status of CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors in GSFC spaceflight applications. To the extent the information is known, this report summarizes to what component quality level each NASA contractor (referred to as OEM in this report) procured the parts, and what board level and system level testing was performed. The report also provides the current status of the reliability assessment for each GSFC project based on the results of testing and FMEA (Failure Mode Effects Analysis). This report addresses how the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors came into existence, and how these became the connector style chosen by many designers of space flight hardware. It identifies the design philosophy and the lack of robustness which has led to several known failure modes. These failure modes include fretting of connector pins during vibration, shock and thermal cycling, exposure of underplating, and increased resistance, including brief excursions to very high resistance. Each of these are signs of aging, which becomes an increasing concern for long duration orbiting space flight applications. This report addresses the mitigation strategy to replace CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors with space qualified Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connectors. The Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connectors are pin-to-pin compatible with the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors and meet all of the same technical requirements, except the ability to hot mate, and to mate directly with a CompactPCI of the opposite gender. A detailed comparison of the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connector and the Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connector is provided to describe the ruggedness of Hypertronics connector for space flight applications. Finally, this report makes recommendations for flight hardware for the future missions where the hardware is yet to be built, as well as for the hardware which has already been built with CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors.

Williams, Richard↗
NASA NTRS2009

Parts and Components Reliability Assessment: A Cost Effective Approach

System reliability assessment is a methodology which incorporates reliability analyses performed at parts and components level such as Reliability Prediction, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to assess risks, perform design tradeoffs, and therefore, to ensure effective productivity and/or mission success. The system reliability is used to optimize the product design to accommodate today?s mandated budget, manpower, and schedule constraints. Stand ard based reliability assessment is an effective approach consisting of reliability predictions together with other reliability analyses for electronic, electrical, and electro-mechanical (EEE) complex parts and components of large systems based on failure rate estimates published by the United States (U.S.) military or commercial standards and handbooks. Many of these standards are globally accepted and recognized. The reliability assessment is especially useful during the initial stages when the system design is still in the development and hard failure data is not yet available or manufacturers are not contractually obliged by their customers to publish the reliability estimates/predictions for their parts and components. This paper presents a methodology to assess system reliability using parts and components reliability estimates to ensure effective productivity and/or mission success in an efficient manner, low cost, and tight schedule.

Lee, Lydia↗
NASA NTRS2008

Reliability Practice at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

This paper describes in brief the Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) Programs performed directly by the reliability branch at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). The mission assurance requirements flow down is explained. GSFC practices for PRA, reliability prediction/fault tree analysis/reliability block diagram, FMEA, part stress and derating analysis, worst case analysis, trend analysis, limit life items are presented. Lessons learned are summarized and recommendations on improvement are identified.

Pruessner, Paula S.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Contamination Sources Effects Analysis (CSEA) - A Tool to Balance Cost/Schedule While Managing Facility Availability

A CSEA is similar to a Failure Modes Effects Analysis (FMEA). A CSEA tracks risk, deterrence, and occurrence of sources of contamination and their mitigation plans. Documentation is provided spanning mechanical and electrical assembly, precision cleaning, thermal vacuum bake-out, and thermal vacuum testing. These facilities all may play a role in contamination budgeting and reduction ultimately affecting test and flight. With a CSEA, visibility can be given to availability of these facilities, test sequencing and trade-offs. A cross-functional team including specialty engineering, contamination control, electrostatic dissipation, manufacturing, testing, and material engineering participate in an exercise that identifies contaminants and minimizes the complexity of scheduling these facilities considering their volatile schedules. Care can be taken in an efficient manner to insure correct cleaning processes are employed. The result is reduction in cycle time ("schedule hits"), reduced cost due to rework, reduced risk and improved communication and quality while achieving adherence to the Contamination Control Plan.

Wilcox, Margaret↗
NASA NTRS2009

Information Extraction for System-Software Safety Analysis: Calendar Year 2008 Year-End Report

This annual report describes work to integrate a set of tools to support early model-based analysis of failures and hazards due to system-software interactions. The tools perform and assist analysts in the following tasks: 1) extract model parts from text for architecture and safety/hazard models; 2) combine the parts with library information to develop the models for visualization and analysis; 3) perform graph analysis and simulation to identify and evaluate possible paths from hazard sources to vulnerable entities and functions, in nominal and anomalous system-software configurations and scenarios; and 4) identify resulting candidate scenarios for software integration testing. There has been significant technical progress in model extraction from Orion program text sources, architecture model derivation (components and connections) and documentation of extraction sources. Models have been derived from Internal Interface Requirements Documents (IIRDs) and FMEA documents. Linguistic text processing is used to extract model parts and relationships, and the Aerospace Ontology also aids automated model development from the extracted information. Visualizations of these models assist analysts in requirements overview and in checking consistency and completeness.

Malin, Jane T.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Automation for System Safety Analysis

This presentation describes work to integrate a set of tools to support early model-based analysis of failures and hazards due to system-software interactions. The tools perform and assist analysts in the following tasks: 1) extract model parts from text for architecture and safety/hazard models; 2) combine the parts with library information to develop the models for visualization and analysis; 3) perform graph analysis and simulation to identify and evaluate possible paths from hazard sources to vulnerable entities and functions, in nominal and anomalous system-software configurations and scenarios; and 4) identify resulting candidate scenarios for software integration testing. There has been significant technical progress in model extraction from Orion program text sources, architecture model derivation (components and connections) and documentation of extraction sources. Models have been derived from Internal Interface Requirements Documents (IIRDs) and FMEA documents. Linguistic text processing is used to extract model parts and relationships, and the Aerospace Ontology also aids automated model development from the extracted information. Visualizations of these models assist analysts in requirements overview and in checking consistency and completeness.

Malin, Jane T.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners (Second Edition)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance. NASA's objective is to better understand and effectively manage risk, and thus more effectively ensure mission and programmatic success, and to achieve and maintain high safety standards at NASA. NASA intends to use risk assessment in its programs and projects to support optimal management decision making for the improvement of safety and program performance. In addition to using quantitative/probabilistic risk assessment to improve safety and enhance the safety decision process, NASA has incorporated quantitative risk assessment into its system safety assessment process, which until now has relied primarily on a qualitative representation of risk. Also, NASA has recently adopted the Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process [1-1] as a valuable addition to supplement existing deterministic and experience-based engineering methods and tools. Over the years, NASA has been a leader in most of the technologies it has employed in its programs. One would think that PRA should be no exception. In fact, it would be natural for NASA to be a leader in PRA because, as a technology pioneer, NASA uses risk assessment and management implicitly or explicitly on a daily basis. NASA has probabilistic safety requirements (thresholds and goals) for crew transportation system missions to the International Space Station (ISS) [1-2]. NASA intends to have probabilistic requirements for any new human spaceflight transportation system acquisition. Methods to perform risk and reliability assessment in the early 1960s originated in U.S. aerospace and missile programs. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an example. It would have been a reasonable extrapolation to expect that NASA would also become the world leader in the application of PRA. That was, however, not to happen. Early in the Apollo program, estimates of the probability for a successful roundtrip human mission to the moon yielded disappointingly low (and suspect) values and NASA became discouraged from further performing quantitative risk analyses until some two decades later when the methods were more refined, rigorous, and repeatable. Instead, NASA decided to rely primarily on the Hazard Analysis (HA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methods for system safety assessment.

Stamatelatos,Michael↗
NASA NTRS2012

Combining System Safety and Reliability to Ensure NASA CoNNeCT's Success

Hazard Analysis, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), the Limited-Life Items List (LLIL), and the Single Point Failure (SPF) List were applied by System Safety and Reliability engineers on NASA's Communications, Navigation, and Networking reConfigurable Testbed (CoNNeCT) Project. The integrated approach involving cross reviews of these reports by System Safety, Reliability, and Design engineers resulted in the mitigation of all identified hazards. The outcome was that the system met all the safety requirements it was required to meet.

Havenhill, Maria↗
NASA NTRS2016

Addressing Uniqueness and Unison of Reliability and Safety for a Better Integration

Over time, it has been observed that Safety and Reliability have not been clearly differentiated, which leads to confusion, inefficiency, and, sometimes, counter-productive practices in executing each of these two disciplines. It is imperative to address this situation to help Reliability and Safety disciplines improve their effectiveness and efficiency. The paper poses an important question to address, "Safety and Reliability - Are they unique or unisonous?" To answer the question, the paper reviewed several most commonly used analyses from each of the disciplines, namely, FMEA, reliability allocation and prediction, reliability design involvement, system safety hazard analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment. The paper pointed out uniqueness and unison of Safety and Reliability in their respective roles, requirements, approaches, and tools, and presented some suggestions for enhancing and improving the individual disciplines, as well as promoting the integration of the two. The paper concludes that Safety and Reliability are unique, but compensating each other in many aspects, and need to be integrated. Particularly, the individual roles of Safety and Reliability need to be differentiated, that is, Safety is to ensure and assure the product meets safety requirements, goals, or desires, and Reliability is to ensure and assure maximum achievability of intended design functions. With the integration of Safety and Reliability, personnel can be shared, tools and analyses have to be integrated, and skill sets can be possessed by the same person with the purpose of providing the best value to a product development.

Huang, Zhaofeng↗