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Proposed system safety design and test requirements for the microlaser ordnance system

Safety for pyrotechnic ignition systems is becoming a major concern for the military. In the past twenty years, stray electromagnetic fields have steadily increased during peacetime training missions and have dramatically increased during battlefield missions. Almost all of the ordnance systems in use today depend on an electrical bridgewire for ignition. Unfortunately, the bridgewire is the cause of the majority of failure modes. The common failure modes include the following: broken bridgewires; transient RF power, which induces bridgewire heating; and cold temperatures, which contracts the explosive mix away from the bridgewire. Finding solutions for these failure modes is driving the costs of pyrotechnic systems up. For example, analyses are performed to verify that the system in the environment will not see more energy than 20 dB below the 'No-fire' level. Range surveys are performed to determine the operational, storage, and transportation RF environments. Cryogenic tests are performed to verify the bridgewire to mix interface. System requirements call for 'last minute installation,' 'continuity checks after installation,' and rotating safety devices to 'interrupt the explosive train.' As an alternative, MDESC has developed a new approach based upon our enabling laser diode technology. We believe that Microlaser initiated ordnance offers a unique solution to the bridgewire safety concerns. For this presentation, we will address, from a system safety viewpoint, the safety design and the test requirements for a Microlaser ordnance system. We will also review how this system could be compliant to MIL-STD-1576 and DOD-83578A and the additional necessary requirements.

Stoltz, Barb A.↗

Development of a Numerical Model of Hypervelocity Impact into a Pressurized Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel

As the outlook for space exploration becomes more ambitious and spacecraft travel deeper into space than ever before, it is increasingly important that propulsion systems perform reliably within the space environment. The increased reliability compels designers to increase design margin at the expense of system mass, which contrasts with the need to limit vehicle mass to maximize payload. Such are the factors that motivate the integration of high specific strength composite materials in the construction of pressure vessels commonly referred to as composite overwrapped pressure vessels (COPV). The COPV consists of a metallic liner for the inner shell of the COPV that is stiff, negates fluid permeation and serves as the anchor for composite laminates or filaments, but the liner itself cannot contain the stresses from the pressurant it contains. The compo-site-fiber reinforced polymer (CFRP) is wound around the liner using a combination of hoop (circumferential) and helical orientations. Careful consideration of wrap orientation allows the composite to evenly bear structural loading and creates the COPV's characteristic high strength to weight ratio. As the CFRP overwrap carries most of the stresses induced by pressurization, damage to the overwrap can affect mission duration, mission success and potentially cause loss-of-vehicle/loss-of-crew. For this reason, it is critical to establish a fundamental understanding of the mechanisms involved in the failure of a stressed composite such as that of the COPV. One of the greatest external threats to the integrity of a spacecraft's COPV is an impact from the meteoroid and orbital debris environments (MMOD). These impacts, even from submillimeter particles, generate extremely high stress states in the CFRP that can damage numerous fibers. As a result of this possibility, initial assumptions in survivability analysis for some human-rated NASA space-craft have assumed that any alteration of the vessel due to impact is considered a catastrophic failure. This assumption is conservative and made due to lack of knowledge on the level of allow-able damage to the composite overwrap that can be sustained and still allow successful completion of the mission. To quantify the allowable damage level to the composite overwrap involves assessing stress redistribution following damage as well as evaluating possible time-dependent mechanisms involved in the COPV response to an impact event. Limited published work in this subject has shown that COPV can withstand at least some level of damage due to high energy impacts. These observations have been confirmed and expanded upon in recent experimental research performed by NASA. This research has demonstrated that there is not only robustness in a COPV to compensate for CFRP damage, but has also identified two significant failure modes for pressurized COPV. The lowest threshold failure mode involves the perforation of the vessel, and the highest threshold failure mode is the catastrophic rupture. While both of these failure modes mean a loss of the COPV, system robustness affords some tolerance to the venting as opposed to the more catastrophic rupture. As a consequence, it is necessary to understand the conditions that result in the transition between these failure modes. The aforementioned experimental research has been performed in both the unpressurized and pressurized condition to identify the damage level that triggered the failure thresh-old. This COPV test program was sponsored by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), and tests were performed at NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). Planning and coordination were provided by NASA JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group, and the COPVs were provided by the ISS Program. Unpressurized testing has been conducted at the pressure of the vacuum test chamber, while, the pressurized testing has been conducted at 290 +/- 10 bar (4,200  100 psi) using nitrogen as the pressurizing gas, which corresponds to the design pressure for the target COPV. In this research, spherical aluminum projectiles with varying diameter has been chosen as the impactor. For the unpressurized COPV, the dependence of penetration up to the dependence of hole size in the liner has been obtained as a function of impact conditions. For the pressurized research, the dependence of penetration up to rupture has been obtained as a function of im-pact conditions. Two representative post-test photographs of the failed COPV's from a nor-mal impact into the COPV surface are shown in Fig. 1. These images display the dramatic difference between failure modes, venting (Fig. 1a) and rupture (Fig. 1b). For venting, liner perforation, severed composite fibers/tows and ply delamination are commonly observed damage characteristics of this COPV failure mode. In the case of rupture, the COPV typically experienced a separation of its domed regions and severe break-up of the cylindrical region. Fully understanding the transition from venting to rupture experimentally is costly and potentially unachievable for conditions that cannot be generated in the laboratory. These shortcomings have motivated the performance of three-dimensional numerical simulations to expand the existing experimental database. These simulations have been carried out with the nonlinear-structural-dynamics, analysis-tool, CTH. A typical pressure contour plot from an impact simulation of an entire COPV is shown in Fig. 2. To generate the COPV stress state without initiating a shock wave, the pressure in the simulated COPV is ramped up to the final pressure over a millisecond prior to impact of the projectile with nitrogen gas. Figure 2a shows the system in this initial condition. After one millisecond, a projectile is initiated into the simulation and impacts the COPV. Figure 2b shows the system after this impact. In the figure, the onset of venting is represented as the change in pressure (μbar), red to green, at the perforation site. Also seen in the figure is the eroded projectile that had passed into the COPV vessel with the generated shock wave in the pressurant propagating just ahead of the material. In this paper, pertinent experimental details and the development of the material constitutive models necessary for this work along with the efforts to validate their use are dis-cussed. The simulation results are presented and compared with the NASA experimental observations. While work is on-going from this effort, early observations pertinent to the failure threshold are presented.

Garcia, M. A.↗

Analytical Method to Evaluate Failure Potential During High-Risk Component Development

Communicating failure mode information during design and manufacturing is a crucial task for failure prevention. Most processes use Failure Modes and Effects types of analyses, as well as prior knowledge and experience, to determine the potential modes of failures a product might encounter during its lifetime. When new products are being considered and designed, this knowledge and information is expanded upon to help designers extrapolate based on their similarity with existing products and the potential design tradeoffs. This paper makes use of similarities and tradeoffs that exist between different failure modes based on the functionality of each component/product. In this light, a function-failure method is developed to help the design of new products with solutions for functions that eliminate or reduce the potential of a failure mode. The method is applied to a simplified rotating machinery example in this paper, and is proposed as a means to account for helicopter failure modes during design and production, addressing stringent safety and performance requirements for NASA applications.

Tumer, Irem Y.↗

Spacecraft Parachute Recovery System Testing from a Failure Rate Perspective

Spacecraft parachute recovery systems, especially those with a parachute cluster, require testing to identify and reduce failures. This is especially important when the spacecraft in question is human-rated. Due to the recent effort to make spaceflight affordable, the importance of determining a minimum requirement for testing has increased. The number of tests required to achieve a mature design, with a relatively constant failure rate, can be estimated from a review of previous complex spacecraft recovery systems. Examination of the Apollo parachute testing and the Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster recovery chute system operation will clarify at which point in those programs the system reached maturity. This examination will also clarify the risks inherent in not performing a sufficient number of tests prior to operation with humans on-board. When looking at complex parachute systems used in spaceflight landing systems, a pattern begins to emerge regarding the need for a minimum amount of testing required to wring out the failure modes and reduce the failure rate of the parachute system to an acceptable level for human spaceflight. Not only a sufficient number of system level testing, but also the ability to update the design as failure modes are found is required to drive the failure rate of the system down to an acceptable level. In addition, sufficient data and images are necessary to identify incipient failure modes or to identify failure causes when a system failure occurs. In order to demonstrate the need for sufficient system level testing prior to an acceptable failure rate, the Apollo Earth Landing System (ELS) test program and the Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Recovery System failure history will be examined, as well as some experiences in the Orion Capsule Parachute Assembly System will be noted.

Stewart, Christine E.↗

An evaluation of mixed-mode delamination failure criteria

Many different failure criteria have been suggested for mixed mode delamination toughness, but few sets of mixed mode data exist that are consistent over the full mode I opening to mode II shear load range. The mixed mode bending (MMB) test was used to measure the delamination toughness of a brittle epoxy composite, a state of the art toughened epoxy composite, and a tough thermoplastic composite over the full mixed mode range. To gain insight into the different failure responses of the different materials, the delamination fracture surfaces were also examined. An evaluation of several failure criteria which have been reported in the literature was performed, and the range of responses modeled by each criterion was analyzed. A new bilinear failure criterion was analyzed. A new bilinear failure criterion was developed based on a change in the failure mechanism observed from the delamination surfaces. The different criteria were compared to the failure criterion. The failure response of the tough thermoplastic composite could be modeled well with the bilinear criterion but could also be modeled with the more simple linear failure criterion. Since the materials differed in their mixed mode failure response, mixed mode delamination testing will be needed to characterize a composite material. A critical evaluation is provided of the mixed mode failure criteria and should provide general guidance for selecting an appropriate criterion for other materials.

Reeder, J. R.↗

Extended Testability Analysis Tool

The Extended Testability Analysis (ETA) Tool is a software application that supports fault management (FM) by performing testability analyses on the fault propagation model of a given system. Fault management includes the prevention of faults through robust design margins and quality assurance methods, or the mitigation of system failures. Fault management requires an understanding of the system design and operation, potential failure mechanisms within the system, and the propagation of those potential failures through the system. The purpose of the ETA Tool software is to process the testability analysis results from a commercial software program called TEAMS Designer in order to provide a detailed set of diagnostic assessment reports. The ETA Tool is a command-line process with several user-selectable report output options. The ETA Tool also extends the COTS testability analysis and enables variation studies with sensor sensitivity impacts on system diagnostics and component isolation using a single testability output. The ETA Tool can also provide extended analyses from a single set of testability output files. The following analysis reports are available to the user: (1) the Detectability Report provides a breakdown of how each tested failure mode was detected, (2) the Test Utilization Report identifies all the failure modes that each test detects, (3) the Failure Mode Isolation Report demonstrates the system s ability to discriminate between failure modes, (4) the Component Isolation Report demonstrates the system s ability to discriminate between failure modes relative to the components containing the failure modes, (5) the Sensor Sensor Sensitivity Analysis Report shows the diagnostic impact due to loss of sensor information, and (6) the Effect Mapping Report identifies failure modes that result in specified system-level effects.

Melcher, Kevin↗

Application of Function-Failure Similarity Method to Rotorcraft Component Design

Performance and safety are the top concerns of high-risk aerospace applications at NASA. Eliminating or reducing performance and safety problems can be achieved with a thorough understanding of potential failure modes in the designs that lead to these problems. The majority of techniques use prior knowledge and experience as well as Failure Modes and Effects as methods to determine potential failure modes of aircraft. During the design of aircraft, a general technique is needed to ensure that every potential failure mode is considered, while avoiding spending time on improbable failure modes. In this work, this is accomplished by mapping failure modes to specific components, which are described by their functionality. The failure modes are then linked to the basic functions that are carried within the components of the aircraft. Using this technique, designers can examine the basic functions, and select appropriate analyses to eliminate or design out the potential failure modes. The fundamentals of this method were previously introduced for a simple rotating machine test rig with basic functions that are common to a rotorcraft. In this paper, this technique is applied to the engine and power train of a rotorcraft, using failures and functions obtained from accident reports and engineering drawings.

Roberts, Rory A.↗

Deriving Function-failure Similarity Information for Failure-free Rotorcraft Component Design

Performance and safety are the top concerns of high-risk aerospace applications at NASA. Eliminating or reducing performance and safety problems can be achieved with a thorough understanding of potential failure modes in the design that lead to these problems. The majority of techniques use prior knowledge and experience as well as Failure Modes and Effects as methods to determine potential failure modes of aircraft. The aircraft design needs to be passed through a general technique to ensure that every potential failure mode is considered, while avoiding spending time on improbable failure modes. In this work, this is accomplished by mapping failure modes to certain components, which are described by their functionality. In turn, the failure modes are then linked to the basic functions that are carried within the components of the aircraft. Using the technique proposed in this paper, designers can examine the basic functions, and select appropriate analyses to eliminate or design out the potential failure modes. This method was previously applied to a simple rotating machine test rig with basic functions that are common to a rotorcraft. In this paper, this technique is applied to the engine and power train of a rotorcraft, using failures and functions obtained from accident reports and engineering drawings.

Roberts, Rory A.↗

The Use of Probabilistic Methods to Evaluate the Systems Impact of Component Design Improvements on Large Turbofan Engines

Probabilistic Structural Analysis (PSA) is now commonly used for predicting the distribution of time/cycles to failure of turbine blades and other engine components. These distributions are typically based on fatigue/fracture and creep failure modes of these components. Additionally, reliability analysis is used for taking test data related to particular failure modes and calculating failure rate distributions of electronic and electromechanical components. How can these individual failure time distributions of structural, electronic and electromechanical component failure modes be effectively combined into a top level model for overall system evaluation of component upgrades, changes in maintenance intervals, or line replaceable unit (LRU) redesign? This paper shows an example of how various probabilistic failure predictions for turbine engine components can be evaluated and combined to show their effect on overall engine performance. A generic model of a turbofan engine was modeled using various Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) tools (Quantitative Risk Assessment Software (QRAS) etc.). Hypothetical PSA results for a number of structural components along with mitigation factors that would restrict the failure mode from propagating to a Loss of Mission (LOM) failure were used in the models. The output of this program includes an overall failure distribution for LOM of the system. The rank and contribution to the overall Mission Success (MS) is also given for each failure mode and each subsystem. This application methodology demonstrates the effectiveness of PRA for assessing the performance of large turbine engines. Additionally, the effects of system changes and upgrades, the application of different maintenance intervals, inclusion of new sensor detection of faults and other upgrades were evaluated in determining overall turbine engine reliability.

Packard, Michael H.↗

S&MA Internship to Support Orion and the European Service Module

As a University Space Research Association (USRA) intern for NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) during the summer 2016 work term, I worked on three main projects for the Space Exploration Division (NC) of the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate. I worked on all three projects concurrently. One of the projects involved facilitating the status and closure of technical actions that were created during European Service Module (ESM) safety reviews by the MPCV Safety & Engineering Review Panel (MSERP). The two main duties included accurately collecting and summarizing qualitative data, and communicating that information to the European Space Agency (ESA) and Airbus (ESA's prime contractor) in a clear, succinct and precise manner. This project also required that I create a report on the challenges and opportunities of international S&MA. With its heavy emphasis on soft skills, this project taught me how to communicate better, by showing me how to present and share information in an easy-to-read and understandable format, and by showing me how to cooperate with and culturally respect international partners on a technical project. The second project involved working with the Orion Thermal Protection System (TPS) Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (PFMEA) Working Group to create the first full version of the Orion TPS PFMEA. The Orion TPS PFMEA Working Group met twice a week to analyze the Avcoat block installation process for failure modes, the failure modes effects, and how such failure modes could be controlled. I was in charge of implementing changes that were discussed in meeting, but were not implemented real time. Another major task included creating a significant portion of the content alongside another team member outside the two weekly meetings. This project caused me to become knowledgeable about TPS, heatshields, space-rated manufacturing, and non-destructive evaluation (NDE). The project also helped me to become better at working with a small team and helped improved my technical communication skills. My main duty for the third project was creating a Safety Verification Tracking Log (SVTL) for the Orbital Maneuvering System Engine (OMS-E), and contacting subject matter experts to close Hazard Report (HR) control verifications. This project also required me to support other OMS-E safety process tasks, like monitoring OMS-E vibration testing for Quality Assurance (QA) purposes. This project helped me become even more proficient in Excel. Throughout the project, I gained knowledge about the OMS-E system and improved my understanding of pressure systems and propellant systems. In terms of education goals, this work term has affirmed my desire to take a few more space-related courses, like orbital mechanics, so that I can have a better understanding of human spaceflight and the industry surrounding it. However, the work term did not persuade me to pursue a master's degree. In terms of career goals, this work term has helped me clarify the direction I would like to head in the future. The perspective of three summer terms working for NASA in S&MA has allowed me to observe that most S&MA employees joined S&MA after working in other NASA directorates, such as Engineering or Flight Operations. It is my belief that it would be advantageous for both NASA and I for me to broaden my knowledge base and technical skill set by completing hands-on technical work on human spaceflight projects, and for me to integrate my safety experience directly into technical work in other directorates. The other significant advantage to this proposed situation is that if I were to eventually return to S&MA, I would be returning with a substantial set of hands-on technical experience and knowledge, which would be a significant resource for S&MA tasks and projects.

Hutcheson, Connor↗

Thermal barrier coating life prediction model development

A methodology is established to predict thermal barrier coating life in a environment similar to that experienced by gas turbine airfoils. Experiments were conducted to determine failure modes of the thermal barrier coating. Analytical studies were employed to derive a life prediction model. A review of experimental and flight service components as well as laboratory post evaluations indicates that the predominant mode of TBC failure involves thermomechanical spallation of the ceramic coating layer. This ceramic spallation involves the formation of a dominant crack in the ceramic coating parallel to and closely adjacent to the topologically complex metal ceramic interface. This mechanical failure mode clearly is influenced by thermal exposure effects as shown in experiments conducted to study thermal pre-exposure and thermal cycle-rate effects. The preliminary life prediction model developed focuses on the two major damage modes identified in the critical experiments tasks. The first of these involves a mechanical driving force, resulting from cyclic strains and stresses caused by thermally induced and externally imposed mechanical loads. The second is an environmental driving force based on experimental results, and is believed to be related to bond coat oxidation. It is also believed that the growth of this oxide scale influences the intensity of the mechanical driving force.

Demasi, J. T.↗

A Reliability Model for Ni-BaTiO3-Based (BME) Ceramic Capacitors

The evaluation of multilayer ceramic capacitors (MLCCs) with base-metal electrodes (BMEs) for potential NASA space project applications requires an in-depth understanding of their reliability. The reliability of an MLCC is defined as the ability of the dielectric material to retain its insulating properties under stated environmental and operational conditions for a specified period of time t. In this presentation, a general mathematic expression of a reliability model for a BME MLCC is developed and discussed. The reliability model consists of three parts: (1) a statistical distribution that describes the individual variation of properties in a test group of samples (Weibull, log normal, normal, etc.), (2) an acceleration function that describes how a capacitors reliability responds to external stresses such as applied voltage and temperature (All units in the test group should follow the same acceleration function if they share the same failure mode, independent of individual units), and (3) the effect and contribution of the structural and constructional characteristics of a multilayer capacitor device, such as the number of dielectric layers N, dielectric thickness d, average grain size r, and capacitor chip size S. In general, a two-parameter Weibull statistical distribution model is used in the description of a BME capacitors reliability as a function of time. The acceleration function that relates a capacitors reliability to external stresses is dependent on the failure mode. Two failure modes have been identified in BME MLCCs: catastrophic and slow degradation. A catastrophic failure is characterized by a time-accelerating increase in leakage current that is mainly due to existing processing defects (voids, cracks, delamination, etc.), or the extrinsic defects. A slow degradation failure is characterized by a near-linear increase in leakage current against the stress time; this is caused by the electromigration of oxygen vacancies (intrinsic defects). The two identified failure modes follow different acceleration functions. Catastrophic failures follow the traditional power-law relationship to the applied voltage. Slow degradation failures fit well to an exponential law relationship to the applied electrical field. Finally, the impact of capacitor structure on the reliability of BME capacitors is discussed with respect to the number of dielectric layers in an MLCC unit, the number of BaTiO3 grains per dielectric layer, and the chip size of the capacitor device.

reliability↗

Development of STS/Centaur failure probabilities liftoff to Centaur separation

The results of an analysis to determine STS/Centaur catastrophic vehicle response probabilities for the phases of vehicle flight from STS liftoff to Centaur separation from the Orbiter are presented. The analysis considers only category one component failure modes as contributors to the vehicle response mode probabilities. The relevant component failure modes are grouped into one of fourteen categories of potential vehicle behavior. By assigning failure rates to each component, for each of its failure modes, the STS/Centaur vehicle response probabilities in each phase of flight can be calculated. The results of this study will be used in a DOE analysis to ascertain the hazard from carrying a nuclear payload on the STS.

Hudson, J. M.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the purge, vent and drain subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter PV and D (Purge, Vent and Drain) Subsystem hardware. The PV and D Subsystem controls the environment of unpressurized compartments and window cavities, senses hazardous gases, and purges Orbiter/ET Disconnect. The subsystem is divided into six systems: Purge System (controls the environment of unpressurized structural compartments); Vent System (controls the pressure of unpressurized compartments); Drain System (removes water from unpressurized compartments); Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS) (monitors hazardous gas concentrations); Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS) (maintains clear windows and provides pressure control of the window cavities); and External Tank/Orbiter Disconnect Purge System (prevents cryo-pumping/icing of disconnect hardware). Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Four of the sixty-two failure modes analyzed were determined as single failures which could result in the loss of crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any of twelve single failures occurred. Two of the criticality 1/1 failures are in the Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS) outer window cavity, where leakage and/or restricted flow will cause failure to depressurize/repressurize the window cavity. Two criticality 1/1 failures represent leakage and/or restricted flow in the Orbiter/ET disconnect purge network which prevent cryopumping/icing of disconnect hardware. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Bynum, M. C., III↗

Determination of Turbine Blade Life from Engine Field Data

It is probable that no two engine companies determine the life of their engines or their components in the same way or apply the same experience and safety factors to their designs. Knowing the failure mode that is most likely to occur minimizes the amount of uncertainty and simplifies failure and life analysis. Available data regarding failure mode for aircraft engine blades, while favoring low-cycle, thermal-mechanical fatigue (TMF) as the controlling mode of failure, are not definitive. Sixteen high-pressure turbine (HPT) T-1 blade sets were removed from commercial aircraft engines that had been commercially flown by a single airline and inspected for damage. Each set contained 82 blades. The damage was cataloged into three categories related to their mode of failure: (1) TMF, (2) Oxidation/erosion (O/E), and (3) Other. From these field data, the turbine blade life was determined as well as the lives related to individual blade failure modes using Johnson-Weibull analysis. A simplified formula for calculating turbine blade life and reliability was formulated. The L10 blade life was calculated to be 2427 cycles (11 077 hr). The resulting blade life attributed to O/E equaled that attributed to TMF. The category that contributed most to blade failure was Other. If there were no blade failures attributed to O/E and TMF, the overall blade L(sub 10) life would increase approximately 11 to 17 percent.

Zaretsky, Erwin V.↗

Determination of Turbine Blade Life from Engine Field Data

It is probable that no two engine companies determine the life of their engines or their components in the same way or apply the same experience and safety factors to their designs. Knowing the failure mode that is most likely to occur minimizes the amount of uncertainty and simplifies failure and life analysis. Available data regarding failure mode for aircraft engine blades, while favoring low-cycle, thermal mechanical fatigue as the controlling mode of failure, are not definitive. Sixteen high-pressure turbine (HPT) T-1 blade sets were removed from commercial aircraft engines that had been commercially flown by a single airline and inspected for damage. Each set contained 82 blades. The damage was cataloged into three categories related to their mode of failure: (1) Thermal-mechanical fatigue, (2) Oxidation/Erosion, and (3) "Other." From these field data, the turbine blade life was determined as well as the lives related to individual blade failure modes using Johnson-Weibull analysis. A simplified formula for calculating turbine blade life and reliability was formulated. The L(sub 10) blade life was calculated to be 2427 cycles (11 077 hr). The resulting blade life attributed to oxidation/erosion equaled that attributed to thermal-mechanical fatigue. The category that contributed most to blade failure was Other. If there were there no blade failures attributed to oxidation/erosion and thermal-mechanical fatigue, the overall blade L(sub 10) life would increase approximately 11 to 17 percent.

Zaretsky, Erwin V.↗

Investigation of Spiral Bevel Gear Condition Indicator Validation Via AC-29-2C Using Damage Progression Tests

This report documents the results of spiral bevel gear rig tests performed under a NASA Space Act Agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to support validation and demonstration of rotorcraft Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS) for maintenance credits via FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 29-2C, Section MG-15, Airworthiness Approval of Rotorcraft (HUMS) (Ref. 1). The overarching goal of this work was to determine a method to validate condition indicators in the lab that better represent their response to faults in the field. Using existing in-service helicopter HUMS flight data from faulted spiral bevel gears as a "Case Study," to better understand the differences between both systems, and the availability of the NASA Glenn Spiral Bevel Gear Fatigue Rig, a plan was put in place to design, fabricate and test comparable gear sets with comparable failure modes within the constraints of the test rig. The research objectives of the rig tests were to evaluate the capability of detecting gear surface pitting fatigue and other generated failure modes on spiral bevel gear teeth using gear condition indicators currently used in fielded HUMS. Nineteen final design gear sets were tested. Tables were generated for each test, summarizing the failure modes observed on the gear teeth for each test during each inspection interval and color coded based on damage mode per inspection photos. Gear condition indicators (CI) Figure of Merit 4 (FM4), Root Mean Square (RMS), +/- 1 Sideband Index (SI1) and +/- 3 Sideband Index (SI3) were plotted along with rig operational parameters. Statistical tables of the means and standard deviations were calculated within inspection intervals for each CI. As testing progressed, it became clear that certain condition indicators were more sensitive to a specific component and failure mode. These tests were clustered together for further analysis. Maintenance actions during testing were also documented. Correlation coefficients were calculated between each CI, component, damage state and torque. Results found test rig and gear design, type of fault and data acquisition can affect CI performance. Results found FM4, SI1 and SI3 can be used to detect macro pitting on two more gear or pinion teeth as long as it is detected prior to progressing to other components or transitioning to another failure mode. The sensitivity of RMS to system and operational conditions limit its reliability for systems that are not maintained at steady state. Failure modes that occurred due to scuffing or fretting were challenging to detect with current gear diagnostic tools, since the damage is distributed across all the gear and pinion teeth, smearing the impacting signatures typically used to differentiate between a healthy and damaged tooth contact. This is one of three final reports published on the results of this project. In the second report, damage modes experienced in the field will be mapped to the failure modes created in the test rig. The helicopter CI data will then be re-processed with the same analysis techniques applied to spiral bevel rig test data. In the third report, results from the rig and helicopter data analysis will be correlated. Observations, findings and lessons learned using sub-scale rig failure progression tests to validate helicopter gear condition indicators will be presented.

gears↗

Failure detection system risk reduction assessment

A process includes determining a probability of a failure mode of a system being analyzed reaching a failure limit as a function of time to failure limit, determining a probability of a mitigation of the failure mode as a function of a time to failure limit, and quantifying a risk reduction based on the probability of the failure mode reaching the failure limit and the probability of the mitigation.

Aguilar, Robert B.↗