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NASA NTRS1988

Approach trajectory guidance for maximum concealment

An energy-management concept is examined with a view to provision of a near-optimum maneuver guidance system for military aircraft tactical operations. The data thus obtained indicate that the Quiet Short-Haul Research Aircraft, as modeled in the aircraft-specific energy-rate tables, could fly the flight paths in question. The fuel-conservative guidance system's ability to minimize pop-up flight time and carefully coordinate the aircraft's controls for this performance-oriented requirement is demonstrated.

Warner, David N., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Flight Management System Execution of Idle-Thrust Descents in Operations

To enable arriving aircraft to fly optimized descents computed by the flight management system (FMS) in congested airspace, ground automation must accurately predict descent trajectories. To support development of the trajectory predictor and its error models, commercial flights executed idle-thrust descents, and the recorded data includes the target speed profile and FMS intent trajectories. The FMS computes the intended descent path assuming idle thrust after top of descent (TOD), and any intervention by the controllers that alters the FMS execution of the descent is recorded so that such flights are discarded from the analysis. The horizontal flight path, cruise and meter fix altitudes, and actual TOD location are extracted from the radar data. Using more than 60 descents in Boeing 777 aircraft, the actual speeds are compared to the intended descent speed profile. In addition, three aspects of the accuracy of the FMS intent trajectory are analyzed: the meter fix crossing time, the TOD location, and the altitude at the meter fix. The actual TOD location is within 5 nmi of the intent location for over 95% of the descents. Roughly 90% of the time, the airspeed is within 0.01 of the target Mach number and within 10 KCAS of the target descent CAS, but the meter fix crossing time is only within 50 sec of the time computed by the FMS. Overall, the aircraft seem to be executing the descents as intended by the designers of the onboard automation.

Stell, Laurel L.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

New Horizons for a Practical and Performance-Optimized Solar System Internet

The High-rate Delay Tolerant Networking (HDTN) project at the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) is developing a performance-optimized Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN) implementation using the Bundle Protocol (BP) both for infusion in modern, distributed spacecraft systems and for foundational network research purposes. While one purpose of networking is to enable a returns-to-scale with communicating assets, it is recognized that neither the protocol nor its implementations may impose a bottleneck on data delivery if expected to be implemented. With this in mind, this paper explores the current status of the HDTN software, including its capabilities and also various performance metrics at the bundle layer, the convergence layers (e.g. performance-optimized Licklider Transmission Protocol, or LTP), and bundle storage and retrieval. This includes goals of software implementations that support multi-gigabit per second communications regardless of payload size. A discussion on the current software architecture and internal scheduling and routing is included. Interoperability with such extant DTN implementations as Interplanetary Overlay Network (ION) and DTN Marshall Enterprise Implementation (DTNME) are included. The research goals of the project are also listed, including Software-Defined Networking (SDN) and the theory of DTNs. A table-based filtration system for the Bundle Protocol (BP), called BP Filter, is also explored: this addition enables table-based policies within the context of a DTN for management purposes. Infusion begins with systems testing in the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Software Development and Integration Laboratory (SDIL), which supports International Space Station (ISS) Flight Software development, integration, and verification. Observations made from the results of testing in the SDIL and in flight testing are also discussed, pointing to a path for infusion into high data return low-earth orbit (LEO) missions. The paper concludes with areas for future work.

Delay Tolerant Networking↗

NASA NTRS1979

Configuration management and automatic control of an augmentor wing aircraft with vectored thrust

An advanced structure for automatic flight control logic for powered-lift aircraft operating in terminal areas is under investigation at Ames Research Center. This structure is based on acceleration control; acceleration commands are constructed as the sum of acceleration on the reference trajectory and a corrective feedback acceleration to regulate path tracking errors. The central element of the structure, termed a Trimmap, uses a model of the aircraft aerodynamic and engine forces to calculate the control settings required to generate the acceleration commands. This report describes the design criteria for the Trimmap and derives a Trimmap for Ames experimental augmentor wing jet STOL research aircraft.

Cicolani, L. S.↗

NASA NTRS1995

Mode Transitions in Glass Cockpit Aircraft: Results of a Field Study

One consequence of increased levels of automation in complex control systems is the presence of modes. A mode is a particular configuration of a control system that defines how human command inputs are interpreted. In complex systems, modes also often determine a specific allocation of control authority between the human and automated systems. Even in simple static devices (e.g., electronic watches, word processors), the presence of modes has been found to cause problems in either-the acquisition or production of skilled performance. Many of these problems arise due to the fact that the selection of a mode causes device behavior to be mediated by hidden internal state information. For these simple systems, many of these interaction problems can be solved by the design of appropriate feedback to communicate internal state information to the human operator. In complex dynamic systems, however, the design issues associated with modes seem to trancend the problem of merely communicating internal state information via displayed feedback. In complex supervisory control systems (e.g., aircraft, spacecraft, military command and control), a key function of modes is the selection of a particular configuration of control authority between the human operator and automated control systems. One mode may result in full manual control, another may result in a mix of manual and automatic control, while a third may result in full automatic control over the entire system. The human operator selects an appropriate mode as a function of current goals, operating conditions, and operating procedures. Thus, the operator is put in a position of essentially trying to control two coupled dynamic systems: the target system itself, and also a highly complex suite of automation controlling the target system. From a historical perspective, it should probably not come as a surprise that very little information is available to guide the design of mode-oriented control systems. The topic of function allocation (i.e., the proper division of control authority among human and computer) has a long history in human-machine systems research. Although this research has produced some relevant guidelines, a design approach capable of defining appropriate allocations of control function between the human and automation is not yet available. As a result, the function allocation decision itself has been allocated to the operator, to be performed in real-time, in the operation of mode-oriented control systems. A variety of documented aircraft accidents and incidents suggest that the real-time selection and monitoring of control modes is a weak link in the effective operation of complex supervisory control systems. Research in human-machine systems and human-computer interaction has barely scraped the surface of the problem of understanding how operators manage this task.The purpose of this paper is to present the results of a field study which examined how operators manage mode selection in a complex supervisory control system. Data on mode engagements using the Boeing B757/767 auto-flight system were collected during approach and descent into four major airports in the East Coast of the United States. Protocols documenting mode selection, automatic mode changes, pilot actions, quantitative records of flight-path variables, and verbal reports during and after mode engagements were collected by an observer from the jumpseat. Observations were conducted on two typical trips between three airports. Each trip was be replicated 11 times, which yielded a total of 22 trips and 66 legs on which data were collected. All data collected concerned the same flight numbers, and therefore, the same time of day, same type of aircraft, and identical operational environments (e.g., ATC facilities, weather patterns, traffic flow etc.)

Degani, Asaf↗

NASA NTRS2019

Usability Evaluation of Indicators of Energy-Related Problems in Commercial Airline Flight Decks

A series of pilot-in-the-loop flight simulation studies were conducted at NASA Langley Research Center to evaluate indicators aimed at supporting the flight crew’s awareness of problems related to energy states. Indicators were evaluated utilizing state-of-the-art flight deck systems such as on commercial air transport aircraft. This paper presents results for four technologies: (1) conventional primary flight display speed cues, (2) an enhanced airspeed control indicator, (3) a synthetic vision baseline that provides a flight path vector, speed error, and an acceleration cue, and (4) an aural airspeed alert that triggers when current airspeed deviates beyond a specified threshold from the selected airspeed. Full-mission high-fidelity flight simulation studies were conducted using commercial airline crews. Crews were paired by airline for common crew resource management procedures and protocols. Scenarios spanned a range of complex conditions while emulating several causal factors reported in recent accidents involving loss of energy state awareness by pilots. Data collection included questionnaires administered at the completion of flight scenarios, aircraft state data, audio/video recordings of flight crew, eye tracking, pilot control inputs, and researcher observations. Questionnaire response data included subjective measures of workload, situation awareness, complexity, usability, and acceptability. This paper reports relevant findings derived from subjective measures as well as quantitative measures.

Evans, Emory T.↗

NASA NTRS2010

High-Speed Ring Bus

The high-speed ring bus at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) allows for future growth trends in spacecraft seen with future scientific missions. This innovation constitutes an enhancement of the 1393 bus as documented in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 1393-1999 standard for a spaceborne fiber-optic data bus. It allows for high-bandwidth and time synchronization of all nodes on the ring. The JPL ring bus allows for interconnection of active units with autonomous operation and increased fault handling at high bandwidths. It minimizes the flight software interface with an intelligent physical layer design that has few states to manage as well as simplified testability. The design will soon be documented in the AS-1393 standard (Serial Hi-Rel Ring Network for Aerospace Applications). The framework is designed for "Class A" spacecraft operation and provides redundant data paths. It is based on "fault containment regions" and "redundant functional regions (RFR)" and has a method for allocating cables that completely supports the redundancy in spacecraft design, allowing for a complete RFR to fail. This design reduces the mass of the bus by incorporating both the Control Unit and the Data Unit in the same hardware. The standard uses ATM (asynchronous transfer mode) packets, standardized by ITU-T, ANSI, ETSI, and the ATM Forum. The IEEE-1393 standard uses the UNI form of the packet and provides no protection for the data portion of the cell. The JPL design adds optional formatting to this data portion. This design extends fault protection beyond that of the interconnect. This includes adding protection to the data portion that is contained within the Bus Interface Units (BIUs) and by adding to the signal interface between the Data Host and the JPL 1393 Ring Bus. Data transfer on the ring bus does not involve a master or initiator. Following bus protocol, any BIU may transmit data on the ring whenever it has data received from its host. There is no centralized arbitration or bus granting. The JPL design provides for autonomous synchronization of the nodes on the ring bus. An address-synchronous latency adjust buffer (LAB) has been designed that cannot get out of synchronization and needs no external input. Also, a priority-driven cable selection behavior has been programmed into each unit on the ring bus. This makes the bus able to connect itself up, according to a maximum redundancy priority system, without the need for computer intervention at startup. Switching around a failed or switched-off unit is also autonomous. The JPL bus provides a map of all the active units for the host computer to read and use for fault management. With regard to timing, this enhanced bus recognizes coordinated timing on a spacecraft as critical and addresses this with a single source of absolute and relative time, which is broadcast to all units on the bus with synchronization maintained to the tens of nanoseconds. Each BIU consists of up to five programmable triggers, which may be programmed for synchronization of events within the spacecraft of instrument. All JPL-formatted data transmitted on the ring bus are automatically time-stamped.

Wysocky, Terry↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

SIRIUS: Simulation Infrastructure for Research on Interoperating Unmanned Systems

This paper presents the Simulation Infrastructure for Research on Interoperating Unmanned Systems (SIRIUS), a research framework for simulation and analysis of future conceptual Urban Air Mobility (UAM) operations. SIRIUS is being developed under the auspices of the NASA Air Traffic Management eXploration project, UAM subproject (ATM-X UAM). SIRIUS provides an intuitive, highly configurable graphical user interface to design complex traffic scenarios and airspace configurations representative of conceptual UAM operations. Aircraft simulated with SIRIUS can be equipped with flight-tested capabilities for detect and avoid (DAA), geofencing, distributed merging and spacing, path conformance, and path planning while executing time-constrained, 4D trajectories generated by a UAM ground operations system. Central to the design of the SIRIUS simulation framework is the capability to evaluate the integration and interoperability of ground-based separation services (e.g., strategic separation) with extended DAA functionality (e.g., path monitoring, separation provision, merging and spacing, etc.) The simulation environment also supports modelling of wind, navigation, and sensor uncertainties, as well as communication delays. SIRIUS enables distributed simulation of large-scale scenarios. An interactive graphical analysis capability helps isolate, visualize, and compare relevant vehicle state data and widely used measures of performance metrics across multiple scenarios.

Andrew Peters↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Digital Prototyping Methods to Enable Product Development Analysis Cycle Compression in Aerospace Systems

Historically, the product development life cycle (spanning from origination of a systems concept to initial delivery or fielding) for large-scale aerospace systems is 10-25 years. Examples of recent programs exhibiting this timeline are the Space Shuttle (13 years), , International Space Station (18 years), NASA Hubble telescope (16 years), USAF F-35 Strike Fighter (22 years), Missile Defense Agency THAAD (21 years), USAF V-22 Osprey (26 years), USAF B-2 Spirt (19 years), US Army RAH-66 Comanche (22 years, cancelled prior to fielding), James Webb Space Telescope (25 years), Space Launch System (10 years). This list illustrates the challenges of developing and fielding a modern integrated multi-disciplinary aerospace system. These development timelines are often preceded by significant research and development programs and followed by multiple increments, blocks, or spirals to reach planned operational capability. In the modern era of aerospace system acquisition, there is significant pressure to reduce system development timelines to meet system objectives and enable competitiveness in the current industry and landscape. Across the aerospace industry, a range of rapid acquisition and prototyping programs are seeking to achieve system development within timelines considerably less than 10 years. Notably, in September of 2019, NASA issued a solicitation for the development and demonstration of a Human Landing System (HLS) to deliver humans to the lunar surface by 2024 (5 years) and for the development and demonstration of a more sustainable HLS by 2026 (7 years). Lengthy product development cycle timelines are a product of multiple factors ranging from programmatic, sociological, technical, and systems engineering issues. New approaches in systems engineering provide new ways to enable these compressed development timelines. These approaches employ expanded application of advanced systems engineering methods and cross-cutting digital tools to accelerate system development, utilizing digital prototyping to connect maturing sub-system or component technologies into system or system-of-systems hardware prototypes. Approaches such as the use of system integrating physics relationships to reduce the number of design analysis cycle iterations and state analysis modeling to reduce necessary software testing (and improving coverage of system execution scenarios) represent steps forward in reducing the engineering time needed to field new systems. In addition to cost, schedule and performance benefits, expanded digital exploration and demonstration reduce risk in live system test and demonstration. This incremental demonstration approach, where digital prototyping and demonstration leads and informs full system test and demonstration, could be more important for space applications because of the increased difficulty of test and demonstration of space systems and architectures. The Advanced Concepts Office (ACO) at Marshall Space Flight Center merges traditional multi-disciplinary concept definition methods with modern, cross-cutting systems engineering concepts to enable iterative design and analysis of space architectures and systems through coordinated, strategic management of human capital, technical processes, and technology. This paper provides an overview of that approach, including recent examples and a strategic path forward to enabling continued reduction of aerospace system product development life cycles.

Michael D Watson↗

NASA NTRS1986

Approach trajectory planning system for maximum concealment

A computer-simulation study was undertaken to investigate a maximum concealment guidance technique (pop-up maneuver), which military aircraft may use to capture a glide path from masked, low-altitude flight typical of terrain following/terrain avoidance flight enroute. The guidance system applied to this problem is the Fuel Conservative Guidance System. Previous studies using this system have concentrated on the saving of fuel in basically conventional land and ship-based operations. Because this system is based on energy-management concepts, it also has direct application to the pop-up approach which exploits aircraft performance. Although the algorithm was initially designed to reduce fuel consumption, the commanded deceleration is at its upper limit during the pop-up and, therefore, is a good approximation of a minimum-time solution. Using the model of a powered-lift aircraft, the results of the study demonstrated that guidance commands generated by the system are well within the capability of an automatic flight-control system. Results for several initial approach conditions are presented.

Warner, David N., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2006

NASA flight controllers - Meeting cultural and leadership challenges on the critical path to mission success

As part of its preparation for missions to the Moon and Mars, NASA has identified high priority critical path roadmap (CPR) questions, two of which focus on the performance of mission control personnel. NASA flight controllers have always worked in an incredibly demanding setting, but the International Space Station poses even more challenges than prior missions. We surveyed 14 senior ISS flight controllers and a contrasting sample of 12 more junior controllers about the management and cultural challenges they face and the most effective strategies for addressing them. There was substantial consensus among participants on some issues, such as the importance of building a personal relationship with Russian colleagues. Responses from junior and senior controllers differed in some areas, such as training. We frame the results in terms of two CPR questions. We aim to use our results to improve flight controller training.

Clement, James L., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS1994

The path to an experiment in space (from concept to flight)

The following are discussed in this viewgraph presentation on developing flight experiments for NASA's Microgravity Science and Applications Program: time from flight PI selection to launch; key flight experiment phases and schedule drivers; microgravity experiment definition/development process; definition and engineering development phase; ground-based reduced gravity research facilities; project organization; responsibilities and duties of principle investigator/co-investigators, project scientist, and project manager; the science requirements document; flight development phase; experiment cost and schedule; and keys to experiment success.

Salzman, Jack A.↗

NASA NTRS1974

Pioneer Odyssey: Encounter with a Giant

Ancient peoples, perhaps thousands of years ago, undoubtedly conceived the idea of "reaching out" to Jupiter, the largest and most brilliant of the "wandering stars." But for mankind to stretch across the half billion miles to the giant planet of the Solar System many advances in technical and organizational fields of human endeavor had to be made. Outreach to Jupiter did not become a serious possibility until the Pioneer F and G Project was formed by NASA early in 1968. And then man began to design an extension of his senses that would probe the environs of the giant of the Solar System, a truly pioneer odyssey into the virtually unknown regions beyond the orbit of Mars. In the ensuing year. a dedicated and cooperative effort of several thousand people in Government, university, and private industrial organizations converted the idea into a reality. Less than twelve generations after Galileo first saw the banded disc of Jupiter and the flickering dots of its large satellites in the newly invented telescope, mankind sent a machine to make observations within that Jovian system. The two Pioneer spacecraft for the mission to Jupiter each weighed only about 570 pounds, yet carried eleven highly sophisticated instruments capable of operating unattended for many year in space. The spacecraft consumes less electrical power than a standard 100 watt lamp yet is able to accept instructions from Earth to control numerous operating modes of its scientific payload, process observations from these scientific instruments and format the observations into information usable on Earth. Even more remarkable. the spacecraft transmits a radio signal of only 8 watts power - equal to a nightlight - yet the information carried by the radio signal is received back on Earth from a distance of several billion miles. The Pioneer mission could not have been a success without the special engineering, scientific and management organization created for its accomplishment. This organization was rather unique in that it first had to meet a launch date target relatively quickly and then had to function for an extremely long mission operational time, far longer than any previous mission to planets. The first task was thus to organize so that the mission could be planned and the spacecraft designed and fabricated to be ready for launch within a few weeks of a 30-month target for completion. The program also produced an organization that planned mission operations to such detail that more than 16,000 commands were transmitted flawlessly to the distant spacecraft during Jupiter encounter. And each command reached the spacecraft within one second of the planned time despite the more than 90 minutes required for the radio message to travel from Earth to the spacecraft and for the spacecraft to return a confirmation to controllers back on Earth. The organization for Pioneer also determined the required flight path from Earth to Jupiter with such precision, and controlled the launch vehicle with such accuracy, that 21 months after launch the spacecraft was able to fly behind Jupiter's satellite lo, thereby providing the first measurement that indicated the possibility of a tenuous atmosphere about this large satellite. Finally, the Pioneer organization processed and analyzed each year sufficient information from the spacecraft to fill a book having about 3 million pages and reduced this avalanche of data from space into summaries of manageable size. And all this organization depended on people, consisted of people: the people who really made this whole mission possible. Pioneer has always depended on the dedication of many individuals from many organizations throughout the world to achieve its scientific objectives, and, as evidenced by the success of the Pioneer series, this dependence is completely justified. Relatively few individuals have an opportunity during their lives to participate in such a challenging, historic, pioneering effort; and still fewer are able to enjoy the rewards of such an activity. We who have worked on Pioneer 10 and its sister spacecraft, Pioneer 11, consider ourselves fortunate to be in both classes. For the opportunity we thank the people of the United States of America, who have supported our country's space effort and its spreading of human awareness of a vast and intriguing universe in which our own unique planet Earth is only one of myriads of worlds. This volume describing the mission to Jupiter and its results is one of the many rewards for our effort which we share with you, the reader.

Fimmel, Richard O.↗

NASA NTRS1974

Performance monitor system functional simulator, environmental data, orbiter 101(HFT)

Information concerning the environment component of the space shuttle performance monitor system simulator (PMSS) and those subsystems operational on the shuttle orbiter 101 used for horizontal flight test (HFT) is provided, along with detailed data for the shuttle performance monitor system (PMS) whose software requirements evolve from three basic PMS functions: (1) fault detection and annunciation; (2) subsystem measurement management; and (3) subsystem configuration management. Information relative to the design and operation of Orbiter systems for HFT is also presented, and the functional paths are identified to the lowest level at which the crew can control the system functions. Measurement requirements are given which are necessary to adequately monitor the health status of the system. PMS process requirements, relative to the measurements which are necessary for fault detection and annunciation of a failed functional path, consist of measurement characteristics, tolerance limits, precondition tests, and correlation measurements.

Parker, F. W.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Applying Required Navigation Performance Concept for Traffic Management of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems

In anticipation of a rapid increase in the number of civil Unmanned Aircraft System(UAS) operations, NASA is researching prototype technologies for a UAS Traffic Management (UTM) system that will investigate airspace integration requirements for enabling safe, efficient low-altitude operations. One aspect a UTM system must consider is the correlation between UAS operations (such as vehicles, operation areas and durations), UAS performance requirements, and the risk to people and property in the operational area. This paper investigates the potential application of the International Civil Aviation Organizations (ICAO) Required Navigation Performance (RNP) concept to relate operational risk with trajectory conformance requirements. The approach is to first define a method to quantify operational risk and then define the RNP level requirement as a function of the operational risk. Greater operational risk corresponds to more accurate RNP level, or smaller tolerable Total System Error (TSE). Data from 19 small UAS flights are used to develop and validate a formula that defines this relationship. An approach to assessing UAS-RNP conformance capability using vehicle modeling and wind field simulation is developed to investigate how this formula may be applied in a future UTM system. The results indicate the modeled vehicles flight path is robust to the simulated wind variation, and it can meet RNP level requirements calculated by the formula. The results also indicate how vehicle-modeling fidelity may be improved to adequately verify assessed RNP level.

required navigation performance↗

NASA NTRS2005

The Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS), Higher Volume Operations (HVO) Concept and Research

The ability to conduct concurrent, multiple aircraft operations in poor weather at virtually any airport offers an important opportunity for a significant increase in the rate of flight operations, a major improvement in passenger convenience, and the potential to foster growth of operations at small airports. The Small Aircraft Transportation System, (SATS) Higher Volume Operations (HVO) concept is designed to increase capacity at the 3400 non-radar, non-towered airports in the United States where operations are currently restricted to one-in/one-out procedural separation during low visibility or ceilings. The concept s key feature is that pilots maintain their own separation from other aircraft using air-to-air datalink and on-board software within the Self-Controlled Area (SCA), an area of flight operations established during poor visibility and low ceilings around an airport without Air Traffic Control (ATC) services. While pilots self-separate within the SCA, an Airport Management Module (AMM) located at the airport assigns arriving pilots their sequence based on aircraft performance, position, winds, missed approach requirements, and ATC intent. The HVO design uses distributed decision-making, safe procedures, attempts to minimize pilot and controller workload, and integrates with today's ATC environment. The HVO procedures have pilots make their own flight path decisions when flying in Instrument Metrological Conditions (IMC) while meeting these requirements. This paper summarizes the HVO concept and procedures, presents a summary of the research conducted and results, and outlines areas where future HVO research is required. More information about SATS HVO can be found at http://ntrs.nasa.gov.

Baxley, B.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Incorporating Data Link Features into a Multi-Function Display to Support Self-Separation and Spacing Tasks for General Aviation Pilots

One objective of the Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS) Higher Volume Operations (HVO) project is to increase the capacity and utilization of small non-towered, non-radar equipped airports by transferring traffic management activities to an automated Airport Management Module (AMM) and separation responsibilities to general aviation (GA) pilots. Implementation of this concept required the development of a research Multi-Function Display (MFD) to support the interactive communications between pilots and the AMM. The interface also had to accommodate traffic awareness, self-separation, and spacing tasks through dynamic messaging and symbology for flight path conformance and conflict detection and alerting (CDA). The display served as the mechanism to support the examination of the viability of executing instrument operations designed for SATS designated airports. Results of simulation and flight experiments conducted at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Langley Research Center indicate that the concept, as facilitated by the research MFD, did not increase pilots subjective workload levels or reduce their situation awareness (SA). Post-test usability assessments revealed that pilots preferred using the enhanced MFD to execute flight procedures, reporting improved SA over conventional instrument flight rules (IFR) procedures.

Adams, Catherine A.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗