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At least 181 records · Page 10

Evaluation of dispersion strengthened nickel-base alloy heat shields for space shuttle application

The work reported constitutes the first phase of a two-phase program. Vehicle environments having critical effects on the thermal protection system are defined; TD Ni-20Cr material characteristics are reviewed and compared with TD Ni-20Cr produced in previous development efforts; cyclic load, temperature, and pressure effects on TD Ni-20Cr sheet material are investigated; the effects of braze reinforcement in improving the efficiency of spotwelded, diffusion-bonded, or seam-welded joints are evaluated through tests of simple lap-shear joint samples; parametric studies of metallic radiative thermal protection systems are reported; and the design, instrumentation, and testing of full-scale subsize heat shield panels are described. Tests of full-scale subsize panels included simulated meteoroid impact tests; simulated entry flight aerodynamic heating in an arc-heated plasma stream; programmed differential pressure loads and temperatures simulating mission conditions; and acoustic tests simulating sound levels experienced by heat shields during about boost flight. Test results are described, and the performances of two heat shield designs are compared and evaluated.

Johnson, R., Jr.↗

Assessing the Effects of Various Surface Textures and Features on Turbulent Heat Transfer in Hypersonic Flight

Experiments were conducted in the NASA Ames Hypervelocity Free Flight Aerodynamic Facility (ballistic range) to quantify the effects on turbulent convective heat transfer of distributed surface roughness, and of isolated features, representative of thermal protection systems on atmospheric entry vehicles. The surface textures and features were applied on the conic frusta of 45o sphere-cone models having a nose-to-base radius ratio of 0.5, similar to the forebody geometry of the Galileo and Pioneer-Venus entry probes. Test conditions were selected to provide turbulent roughness Reynolds numbers, k+, in the ranges expected for outer planet entry missions. Turbulent flow on the conic frustum was achieved by tripping the flow on the sphere-segment nose cap with distributed surface roughness, created by sand-blasting the nose cap. Surface textures included distributed, acreage, roughness, as well as cavity and groove discrete features. The majority of the data to be presented are results for distributed roughness, which includes both random, sand-grain-like roughness, and regular pattern roughness. The pattern roughness was designed to represent the roughness on woven thermal protection system materials, such as NASA’s 3-D Medium Density Carbon Phenolic (3MDCP), also known as HEEET, developed by the Heatshield for Extreme Entry Environments Technology project. The pattern roughness tested is a 3-D wavy surface, and includes three different roughness element height-to-spacing ratios representative of two configurations of 3MDCP, and spanning ratios measured both before, and after, ablation in an arc jet test facility. The patterns tested in the ballistic range were laser-etched on metal models, and represented an idealized version of the real-world materials in which each roughness element was nearly identical. Additional tests were performed wherein the laser-etched patterns were degraded by sand-blasting with various sized grit media, to produce regular patterns with superimposed irregular roughness, more representative of flight materials. Results of each will be compared. The discrete features tested included cylindrical cavities and rectangular grooves of various width-to-depth ratios. Cavities represent either heatshield damage, such as from micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage, or from designed penetrations, such as on the Genesis sample return capsule. The grooves were scaled representations of seams between segments of HEEET material in a notional tiled thermal protection system. The tests examined the effects on turbulent heating downstream of the isolated features. The tests were conducted at speeds between 3 km/s and 4 km/s in air between 0.15 atm and 0.25 atm (Mach numbers between 9 and 12). Roughness Reynolds numbers, k+, ranged from 12 to 70 for the sand roughness, and as high as 200 for the pattern roughness. Boundary-layer parameters required for calculating k+ were evaluated using computational fluid dynamics simulations using the DPLR (Data Parallel Line Relaxation) code. Each model included both rough- and smooth-wall segments, and heat transfer augmentation factors were determined as the ratio of the rough-wall to smooth-wall heat flux measured on each test.

hypersonic↗

Code Assesses Risks Posed by Meteoroids and Orbital Debris

BUMPER II version 1.92e is a computer code for assessing the risk of damage from impacts of micrometeoroids and orbital debris on the International Space Station (ISS), including those parts of the ISS covered by shielding that affords partial protection against such impacts. (Other versions of BUMPER II have been written for other spacecraft.) Bumper II quantifies the probability of penetration of shielding and the damage to spacecraft equipment as functions of the size, shape, and orientation of the spacecraft; the parameters of its orbit; failure criteria that quantify impact damage at the threshold of failure for each spacecraft surface; and the impact-damage resistance of each spacecraft surface as defined by "ballistic limit equations" that return the size of a failure-causing particle as a function of target parameters (including materials, configurations, thicknesses, and gap distances) and impact conditions (impact velocity and the density and shape of the impactor). BUMPER II version 1.92e contains several dozen ballistic limit equations that are based on results from thousands of hypervelocity impact tests conducted by NASA on ISS shielding and other hardware, and on results from numerical simulations of impacts.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

Evaluation of dispersion strengthened nickel-base alloy heat shields for space shuttle application

The results obtained in a program to evaluate dispersion-strengthened nickel-base alloys for use in a metallic radiative thermal protection system operating at surface temperatures to 1477 K for the space shuttle were presented. Vehicle environments having critical effects on the thermal protection system are defined; TD Ni-20Cr characteristics of material used in the current study are compared with previous results; cyclic load, temperature, and pressure effects on sheet material residual strength are investigated; the effects of braze reinforcement in improving the efficiency of spotwelded joints are evaluated; parametric studies of metallic radiative thermal protection systems are reported; and the design, instrumentation, and testing of full scale subsize heat shield panels in two configurations are described. Initial tests of full scale subsize panels included simulated meteoroid impact tests, simulated entry flight aerodynamic heating, programmed differential pressure loads and temperatures simulating mission conditions, and acoustic tests simulating sound levels experienced during boost flight.

Johnson, R., Jr.↗

Engineering design constraints of the lunar surface environment

Living and working on the lunar surface will be difficult. Design of habitats, machines, tools, and operational scenarios in order to allow maximum flexibility in human activity will require paying attention to certain constraints imposed by conditions at the surface and the characteristics of lunar material. Primary design drivers for habitat, crew health and safety, and crew equipment are: ionizing radiation, the meteoroid flux, and the thermal environment. Secondary constraints for engineering derive from: the physical and chemical properties of lunar surface materials, rock distributions and regolith thicknesses, topography, electromagnetic properties, and seismicity. Protection from ionizing radiation is essential for crew health and safety. The total dose acquired by a crew member will be the sum of the dose acquired during EVA time (when shielding will be least) plus the dose acquired during time spent in the habitat (when shielding will be maximum). Minimizing the dose acquired in the habitat extends the time allowable for EVA's before a dose limit is reached. Habitat shielding is enabling, and higher precision in predicting secondary fluxes produced in shielding material would be desirable. Means for minimizing dose during a solar flare event while on extended EVA will be essential. Early warning of the onset of flare activity (at least a half-hour is feasible) will dictate the time available to take mitigating steps. Warning capability affects design of rovers (or rover tools) and site layout. Uncertainty in solar flare timing is a design constraint that points to the need for quickly accessible or constructible safe havens.

Morrison, D. A.↗

LDEF materials: An overview of the interim findings

The flight and retrieval of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF) provided an opportunity for the study of the low-Earth orbit (LEO) environment and long-duration space environmental effect (SEE) on materials that are unparalleled in the history of the U.S. space program. The 5.8-year flight of LDEF greatly enhanced the potential value of materials data from LDEF to the international SEE community, compared to that of the original 1-year flight plan. The remarkable flight attitude stability of LDEF enables specific analyses of various individual and combined effects of LEO environmental parameters on identical materials of the same space vehicle. NASA recognized the potential by forming the LDEF Space Environmental Effects on Materials Special Investigation Group (MSIG) to address the greatly expanded materials and LEO space environment parameter analysis opportunities available in the LDEF structure, experiment trays, and corollary measurements, so that the combined value of all LDEF materials data to current and future space missions will be assessed and documented. This paper provides an overview of the interim LDEF materials findings of the Principal Investigators and the Materials Special Investigation Group. These revelations are based on observations of LEO environmental effects on materials made in-space during LDEF retrieval and during LDEF tray deintegration at the Kennedy Space Center, and on findings of approximately 1.5 years of laboratory analyses of LDEF materials by the LDEF materials scientists. These findings were extensively reviewed and discussed at the MSIG-sponsored LDEF Materials Workshop '91. The results are presented in a format which categorizes the revelations as 'clear findings' or 'confusing/unexplained findings' and resultant needs for new space materials developments and ground simulation testing/analytical modeling in seven categories: environmental parameters and data bases; LDEF contamination; thermal control coatings and protective treatments; polymers and films; polymer-matrix composites; metals, ceramics, and optical materials; and systems-related materials. General outlines of findings of the other LDEF Special Investigation Groups (Ionizing Radiation, Meteoroid and Debris, and Systems) are also included. The utilization of LDEF materials data for future low-earth orbit missions is also discussed, concentrating on Space Station Freedom. Some directions for continuing studies of LDEF materials are outlined. In general, the LDEF data is remarkable consistent; LDEF will provide a 'benchmark' for materials design data bases for satellites in low-Earth orbit. Some materials were identified to be encouragingly resistant to LEO SEE for 5.8-years; other 'space qualified' materials displayed significant environmental degradation. Molecular contamination was widespread; LDEF offers an unprecedented opportunity to provide a unified perspective of unmanned LEO spacecraft contamination mechanisms. New material development requirements for long-term LEO missions have been identified and current ground simulation testing methods/data for new, durable materials concepts can be validated with LDEF results. LDEF findings are already being integrated into the design of Space Station Freedom.

Stein, Bland A.↗

Alternative MMOD Shielding Concepts

A core objective of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group is to improve spacecraft meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shielding by evaluating new materials and shielding concepts by test and analysis. This paper describes hypervelocity impact tests that were performed over several years to evaluate alternative MMOD shielding concepts. Specific objectives of the work were to incorporate improved MMOD and radiation protection within Stuffed Whipple shields, and to evaluate various self-sealing MMOD shielding concepts. The tests were performed under similar impact conditions and with fixed shield standoff and comparable overall shield mass. Damage to the rear wall was quantified and compared to determine the best performing shield concepts. Generally, the best shielding for both MMOD and radiation protection included polymer materials rich in hydrogen introduced into the intermediate and final layers of the shielding. In the self-sealing material evaluations, the test objective was to gauge the ability of different materials and techniques to stop leaks in a rear wall with a delta-pressure across the wall typical of spacecraft crew cabins (i.e., up to 1 atmosphere pressure). Shielding containing ionomer films and elastomer materials satisfied this objective for pressure shell holes up to 6mm diameter. This paper provides results of the investigations.

Orbital Debris↗

Whipple shield sizing equations

Wipple shield sizing equations are given for use in current Space Station Freedom (SSF) Work Package 2 (WP-2) trade study activities. These equations are modifications of the 1969 Cour-Palais predictor equations which were used by McDonnell Douglas to size WP-2 meteoroid and debris shielding for the SSF preliminary design review. Recent hypervelocity impact (HVI) test results have shown that the original 1969 Cour-Palais predictor improperly scales to the particle sizes that the WP-2 shields must be designed to protect against. The original equations have been redesigned to correct this scaling deficiency. Substantial increases to WP-2 shielding weight estimates are indicated by the modified equations. Several possibilities exist, however, to reduce the weight of WP-2 shielding. These equations will be updated in the future as warranted by the results of ultra-high speed (greater than 19 km/sec) HVI tests and further analysis.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

Augmentation of orbital debris shielding for Space Station Freedom

Augmentation concepts for the Space Station Freedom (SSF) are described in detail and advantages and disadvantages of various proposals are evaluated. It is pointed out that early augmentation of SSF debris shielding, which would take place 6-9 years after the First Element Launch, could provide the greatest advantages to the program in terms of weight, cost, and safety benefits. Potential augmentation concepts include an attached, rigid aluminum second bumper; the multi-shock shield concept; a mesh double bumper concept; a debris shield augmentation element; a multi-shock airbag protection concept for 2-10 cm debris; and a debris sweeper. Requirements for and operation and deployment of these concepts are described in detail and an example of the augmentation effect on cumulative SSF probability of no-failure from debris and meteoroid impacts is given. An estimate of predicted encounter rates between debris and a 100 m radius sphere around SSF is presented.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

Orion Artemis I As Flown MMOD Analysis

Introduction The Lockheed Martin Orion spacecraft conducted the Artemis I flight around the Moon from November 16 through December 11, 2022. After the flight, an engineer from the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group performed a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris MMOD analysis using the Bumper 3 risk assessment tool to predict the number of small impacts that would likely have occurred during the mission. Separately, a team from the same group inspected the Orion capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. The results of the inspection were compared to those of the analysis to aid in improving the analysis, including the environment models. Scope of Work The spacecraft geometry model was created by Lockheed Martin during construction of the Artemis I Orion vehicle based on Computer Aided Design (CAD) models of the vehicle. New hypervelocity impact testing was performed to verify Ballistic Limit Equations (BLEs) used in the analysis to link impactor size and damage to the Thermal Protection System (TPS). The exact trajectory flown was recorded during the flight, including vehicle attitude. This data was used in conjunction with the ORDEM 3.2 and MEM 3 environment modeling tools to create models of particle flux impacting the spacecraft throughout the mission. Meteoroid shower forecast information was also included to account for additional particle flux associated with meteoroid showers. Inspection of the Orion capsule included the Backshell thermal tiles and the tape covering it, windows, fabric thermal materials, and small areas of other materials. Potential MMOD damage found was characterized using various techniques, including optical microscopy, computed tomography scanning, and X-ray spectroscopy. Findings The number of craters found in the Backshell tile, and their size distribution, matches well with the Bumper analysis prediction. Tape, window, and other material impacts recorded similarly align to Bumper analysis predictions. Conclusions and Recommendations This comparison of analysis with inspection of the hardware provides valuable insight into the MMOD environment and how accurately analysis tools assess the impact risk to spacecraft. As this was the first large, non-ablative returned surface from a lunar mission, this analysis extends the MMOD community’s insight beyond low Earth orbit into cis-lunar space.

MMOD↗

Orion Artemis I As Flown MMOD Analysis

Introduction The Lockheed Martin Orion spacecraft conducted the Artemis I flight around the Moon from November 16 through December 11, 2022. After the flight, an engineer from the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group performed a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris MMOD analysis using the Bumper 3 risk assessment tool to predict the number of small impacts that would likely have occurred during the mission. Separately, a team from the same group inspected the Orion capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. The results of the inspection were compared to those of the analysis to aid in improving the analysis, including the environment models. Scope of Work The spacecraft geometry model was created by Lockheed Martin during construction of the Artemis I Orion vehicle based on Computer Aided Design (CAD) models of the vehicle. New hypervelocity impact testing was performed to verify Ballistic Limit Equations (BLEs) used in the analysis to link impactor size and damage to the Thermal Protection System (TPS). The exact trajectory flown was recorded during the flight, including vehicle attitude. This data was used in conjunction with the ORDEM 3.2 and MEM 3 environment modeling tools to create models of particle flux impacting the spacecraft throughout the mission. Meteoroid shower forecast information was also included to account for additional particle flux associated with meteoroid showers. Inspection of the Orion capsule included the Backshell thermal tiles and the tape covering it, windows, fabric thermal materials, and small areas of other materials. Potential MMOD damage found was characterized using various techniques, including optical microscopy, computed tomography scanning, and X-ray spectroscopy. Findings The number of craters found in the Backshell tile, and their size distribution, matches well with the Bumper analysis prediction. Tape, window, and other material impacts recorded similarly align to Bumper analysis predictions. Conclusions and Recommendations This comparison of analysis with inspection of the hardware provides valuable insight into the MMOD environment and how accurately analysis tools assess the impact risk to spacecraft. As this was the first large, non-ablative returned surface from a lunar mission, this analysis extends the MMOD community’s insight beyond low Earth orbit into cis-lunar space.

MMOD↗

Bumper 3 Update for IADC Protection Manual

The Bumper code has been the standard in use by NASA and contractors to perform meteoroid/debris risk assessments since 1990. It has undergone extensive revisions and updates [NASA JSC HITF website; Christiansen et al., 1992, 1997]. NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied BUMPER to risk assessments for Space Station, Shuttle, Mir, Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMU) space suits, and other spacecraft (e.g., LDEF, Iridium, TDRS, and Hubble Space Telescope). Bumper continues to be updated with changes in the ballistic limit equations describing failure threshold of various spacecraft components, as well as changes in the meteoroid and debris environment models. Significant efforts are expended to validate Bumper and benchmark it to other meteoroid/debris risk assessment codes. Bumper 3 is a refactored version of Bumper II. The structure of the code was extensively modified to improve maintenance, performance and flexibility. The architecture was changed to separate the frequently updated ballistic limit equations from the relatively stable common core functions of the program. These updates allow NASA to produce specific editions of the Bumper 3 that are tailored for specific customer requirements. The core consists of common code necessary to process the Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) environment models, assess shadowing and calculate MMOD risk. The library of target response subroutines includes a board range of different types of MMOD shield ballistic limit equations as well as equations describing damage to various spacecraft subsystems or hardware (thermal protection materials, windows, radiators, solar arrays, cables, etc.). The core and library of ballistic response subroutines are maintained under configuration control. A change in the core will affect all editions of the code, whereas a change in one or more of the response subroutines will affect all editions of the code that contain the particular response subroutines which are modified. Note that the Bumper II program is no longer maintained or distributed by NASA.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

Projectile shape and material effects in hypervelocity impact response of dual-wall structures

All large spacecraft are susceptible to impacts by meteoroids and pieces of orbiting space debris. These impacts occur at extremely high speeds and can damage flight-critical systems, which can in turn lead to catastrophic failure of the spacecraft. A long-duration spacecraft developed for a mission into this environment must include adequate protection against perforation of pressurized components by such impacts. This paper presents the results of an investigation into the effects of projectile shape and material on the perforation of aluminum dual-wall structural systems. Impact damage is characterized according to the extent of perforation, crater, and spall damage in the structural systems as a result of hypervelocity projectile impact loadings. Analysis of the damage data shows that there are distinct differences in impact damage from cylindrical and spherical projectiles. Projectile density is also found to affect the type and extent of damage sustained by dual-wall structural systems.

Schonberg, William P.↗

Optimization of armored spherical tanks for storage on the lunar surface

A redundancy strategy for reducing micrometeroid armoring mass is investigated, with application to cryogenic reactant storage for a regenerative fuel cell (RFC) on the lunar surface. In that micrometeoroid environment, the cryogenic fuel must be protected from loss due to tank puncture. The tankage must have a sufficiently high probability of survival over the length of the mission so that the probability of system failure due to tank puncture is low compared to the other mission risk factors. Assuming that a single meteoroid penetration can cause a storage tank to lose its contents, two means are available to raise the probability of surviving micrometeoroid attack to the desired level. One can armor the tanks to a thickness sufficient to reduce probability of penetration of any tank to the desired level or add extra capacity in the form of space tanks that results in survival of a given number out of the ensemble at the desired level. A combination of these strategies (armor and redundancy) is investigated.

Bents, D. J.↗

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs.) An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. The xEMU shares similarities with the legacy Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit that is currently used for ISS EVAs, however differences in the layup (e.g., materials, thicknesses, and layers) of the fabric environmental protection garment (EPG), portable life support system (xPLSS) and helmet required an extensive test program to determine ballistic performance. Over 100 hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for MMOD impacts. Additionally, over 50 low speed tests (< 1km/s) were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate BLEs for lunar ejecta impacts. Post testing, ballistic limit equations (BLEs) used to define the performance of the various regions on the xEMU spacesuit were developed from a generic set of BLEs. The HVI and low speed testing was performed to establish a physical basis for the equations with the coefficients and exponents of the generic BLEs adjusted to fit the test data. The xEMU BLEs were added to the NASA/JSC software application used for spacecraft MMOD risk assessments (BUMPER-3). A finite element model (FEM) of the xEMU spacesuit, which defines the size and shape of the spacesuit as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations, was created based on a solid model provided by the xEMU program office. Using the FEM file and added xEMU BLEs, BUMPER-3 assessments of the xEMU spacesuit for probability of no penetration (PNP) were performed. For the LEO assessment of a typical ISS EVA, the orbital debris and meteoroids environments were defined using the latest engineering models, ORDEM 3.2 and MEM-3 respectively. The lunar surface assessment again used the MEM-3 engineering model to define the meteoroid environment along with the current released lunar surface ejecta model, NASA SP-8013 (developed during the Apollo Program). The Space Team in the Natural Environments Branch at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will soon release the new Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), at which time the xEMU lunar surface EVA will be reassessed. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds. Similar to the legacy EMU spacesuit, the majority of the MMOD risk (96% of the LEO EVA risk and 99% of the lunar surface EVA risk) is concentrated in regions of xEMU that are comprised primarily of softgoods (arms, legs, and gloves) rather than the hardgoods (xPLSS, hard upper torso and helmet).

Micrometeoroid↗

Critical issues in connection with human missions to Mars: protection of and from the Martian environment

Human missions to Mars are planned to happen within this century. Activities associated therewith will interact with the environment of Mars in two reciprocal ways: (i) the mission needs to be protected from the natural environmental elements that can be harmful to human health, the equipment or to their operations; (ii) the specific natural environment of Mars should be protected so that it retains its value for scientific and other purposes. The following environmental elements need to be considered in order to protect humans and the equipment on the planetary surface: (i) cosmic ionizing radiation, (ii) solar particle events; (iii) solar ultraviolet radiation; (iv) reduced gravity; (v) thin atmosphere; (vi) extremes in temperatures and their fluctuations; and (vii) surface dust. In order to protect the planetary environment, the requirements for planetary protection as adopted by COSPAR for lander missions need to be revised in view of human presence on the planet. Landers carrying equipment for exobiological investigations require special consideration to reduce contamination by terrestrial microorganisms and organic matter to the greatest feasible extent. Records of human activities on the planet's surface should be maintained in sufficient detail that future scientific experimenters can determine whether environmental modifications have resulted from explorations. c2002 COSPAR. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Extraterrestrial Environment↗

Effects of High-Density Impacts on Shielding Capability

Spacecraft are shielded from micrometeoroids and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts to meet requirements for crew safety and/or mission success. In the past, orbital debris particles have been considered to be composed entirely of aluminum (medium-density material) for the purposes of MMOD shielding design and verification. Meteoroids have been considered to be low-density porous materials, with an average density of 1 g/cu cm. Recently, NASA released a new orbital debris environment model, referred to as ORDEM 3.0, that indicates orbital debris contains a substantial fraction of high-density material for which steel is used in MMOD risk assessments [Ref.1]. Similarly, an update to the meteoroid environment model is also under consideration to include a high-density component of that environment. This paper provides results of hypervelocity impact tests and hydrocode simulations on typical spacecraft MMOD shields using steel projectiles. It was found that previous ballistic limit equations (BLEs) that define the protection capability of the MMOD shields did not predict the results from the steel impact tests and hydrocode simulations (typically, the predictions from these equations were too optimistic). The ballistic limit equations required updates to more accurately represent shield protection capability from the range of densities in the orbital debris environment. Ballistic limit equations were derived from the results of the work and are provided in the paper.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

Space Station pressure wall repair techniques

Space Station components are susceptible to hypervelocity impact damage from orbital debris and meteoroids. An especially vulnerable and critical space station component is the module pressure wall. Even with shielding, sufficiently large impacting particles can create penetrations ranging from pinholes to large jagged holes. This paper describes pressure wall damage repair patches along with procedures and tools for performing the repair. One patch incorporates an aluminum foil protected from the jagged hole edge with a Kevlar or foam pad. An adhesive holds the patch in place. Another patch uses a stiff plate held away from the damaged area by a low durrometer rubber ring which also seals the plate edge. An adhesive will also secure this patch in place. Procedures were developed to prepare the punctured wall surface and apply the patch under weightless and unpressurized conditions. The procedures were tested in a laboratory and in the MSFC Neutral Buoyancy Simulator with models of the patches and tools.

Gibbins, Martin N.↗