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NASA NTRS2005

Orbiter LH2 Feedline Flowliner Cracking Problem

In May of 2002, three cracks were found in the downstream flowliner at the gimbal joint in the LH2 feedline at the interface with the Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump (LPFP) of Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) #1 of Orbiter OV-104. Subsequent inspections of the feedline flowliners in the other orbiters revealed the existence of 8 additional cracks. No cracks were found in the LO2 feedline flowliners. A solution to the cracking problem was developed and implemented on all orbiters. The solution included weld repair of all detectable cracks and the polishing of all slot edges to remove manufacturing discrepancies that could initiate new cracks. Using the results of a fracture mechanics analysis with a scatter factor of 4 on the predicted fatigue life, the orbiters were cleared for return to flight with a one-flight rationale requiring inspections after each flight. OV-104 flew mission STS-112 and OV-105 flew mission STS-113. The post-flight inspections did not find any cracks in the repaired flowliners. At the request of the Orbiter Program, the NESC conducted an assessment of the Orbiter LH2 Feedline Flowliner cracking problem with a team of subject matter experts from throughout NASA.

Harris, Charles E.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Artificial Neural Network Test Support Development for the Space Shuttle PRCS Thrusters

A significant anomaly, Fuel Valve Pilot Seal Extrusion, is affecting the Shuttle Primary Reaction Control System (PRCS) Thrusters, and has caused 79 to fail. To help address this problem, a Shuttle PRCS Thruster Process Evaluation Team (TPET) was formed. The White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) and Boeing members of the TPET have identified many discrete valve current trace characteristics that are predictive of the problem. However, these are difficult and time consuming to identify and trend by manual analysis. Based on this exhaustive analysis over months, 22 thrusters previously delivered by the Depot were identified as high risk for flight failures. Although these had only recently been installed, they had to be removed from Shuttles OV103 and OV104 for reprocessing, by directive of the Shuttle Project Office. The resulting impact of the thruster removal, replacement, and valve replacement was significant (months of work and hundreds of thousands of dollars). Much of this could have been saved had the proposed Neural Network (NN) tool described in this paper been in place. In addition to the significant benefits to the Shuttle indicated above, the development and implementation of this type of testing will be the genesis for potential Quality improvements across many areas of WSTF test data analysis and will be shared with other NASA centers. Future tests can be designed to incorporate engineering experience via Artificial Neural Nets (ANN) into depot level acceptance of hardware. Additionally, results were shared with a NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Super Problem Response Team (SPRT). There was extensive interest voiced among many different personnel from several centers. There are potential spin-offs of this effort that can be directly applied to other data acquisition systems as well as vehicle health management for current and future flight vehicles.

Lehr, Mark E.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Computational Fluid Dynamics Analysis for the Orbiter LH2 Feedline Flowliner

In phase II, additional inducer rotations are simulated in order to understand the root cause of the flowliner crack problem. CFD results confirmed that there is a strong unsteady interaction between the backflow regions caused by the LPFTP inducer and secondary flow regions in the bellows cavity through the flowliner slots. It is observed that the swirl on the duct side of the downstream flowliner is stronger than on the duct side of the upstream flowliner. Due to this swirl, there are more significant unsteady flow interactions through the downstream slots than those observed in the upstream slots. Averaged values of the local velocity at the slots were provided to the NESC-ITA flow physics acoustics team to guide them in designing the acoustics experiment. A parametric study was performed to compare the flow field in the flowliner area when one upstream slot and one corresponding downstream slot were enlarged. No significant differences were observed between the flow field obtained from the enlarged slot configuration when compared with the original configuration. More cases must be analyzed with various enlarged slot configurations to generalize this observation. The flow through the A1 test stand and the flow through the orbiter fuel feedline manifold were simulated without the LPFTP. It was observed that incoming flow to the flowliner and inducer was more uniform in the A1 test stand then in the orbiter manifold. Additionally, each engine LPFTP in the orbiter receives significantly different velocity distributions. Because of the differences observed in the computed results, it is not possible for the A1 test stand to represent the three different engine feedlines simultaneously.

Kiris, Cetin C.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Material Issues in Space Shuttle Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV) store gases used in four subsystems for NASA's Space Shuttle Fleet. While there are 24 COPV on each Orbiter ranging in size from 19-40", stress rupture failure of a pressurized Orbiter COPV on the ground or in flight is a catastrophic hazard and would likely lead to significant damage/loss of vehicle and/or life and is categorized as a Crit 1 failure. These vessels were manufactured during the late 1970's and into the early 1980's using Titanium liners, Kevlar 49 fiber, epoxy matrix resin, and polyurethane coating. The COPVs are pressurized periodically to 3-5ksi and therefore experience significant strain in the composite overwrap. Similar composite vessels were developed in a variety of DOE Programs (primarily at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories or LLNL), as well as for NASA Space Shuttle Fleet Leader COPV program. The NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) formed an Independent Technical Assessment (ITA) team whose primary focus was to investigate whether or not enough composite life remained in the Shuttle COPV in order to provide a strategic rationale for continued COPV use aboard the Space Shuttle Fleet with the existing 25-year-old vessels. Several material science issues were examined and will be discussed in this presentation including morphological changes to Kevlar 49 fiber under stress, manufacturing changes in Kevlar 49 and their effect on morphology and tensile strength, epoxy resin strain, composite creep, degradation of polyurethane coatings, and Titanium yield characteristics.

Sutter, James K.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Strain Measurement Using FBG on COPV in Stress Rupture Test

White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) was requested to perform ambient temperature hydrostatic pressurization testing of a Space Transportation System (STS) 40-in. Kevlar Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel (COPV). The 40-in. vessel was of the same design and approximate age as the STS Main Propulsion System (MPS) and Orbiter Maneuvering System (OMS) vessels. The NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) assembled a team of experts and conducted an assessment that involved a review of national Kevlar COPY data. During the review, the STS COPVs were found to be beyond their original certification of ten years. The team observed that the likelihood of STS COPV Stress rupture, a catastrophic burst before leak failure mode, was greater than previously believed. Consequently, a detailed assessment of remaining stress rupture life became necessary. Prior to STS-114, a certification deviation was written for two flights of OV-103 (Discovery) and OV-104 (Atlantis) per rationale that was based on an extensive review of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, COPV data, and revisions to the STS COPV stress levels. In order to obtain flight rationale to extend the certification deviation through the end of the Program, the Orbiter Project Office has directed an interagency COPV team to conduct further testing and analysis to investigate conservatism in the stress rupture model and evaluate material age degradation. Additional analysis of stress rupture life requires understanding the fiber stresses including stress that occurs due to thru-wall composite compression in COPV components. Data must be obtained at both zero gauge pressure (pre-stress) and at the component operating pressure so that this phenomenon can be properly evaluated. The zero gauge pressure stresses are predominantly a result of the autofrettage process used during vessel manufacture. Determining these pre-stresses and the constitutive behavior of the overwrap at pressure will provide necessary information to better predict the remaining life of the STS COPVs. The primary test objective is obtaining data to verify the hypothesis of a radially oriented thru-thickness stress-riser in the COPV composite whose magnitude is a function of the applied pressure and the load history. The anticipated load dependent response follows from the constitutive behavior of the composite overwrap so data to quantify its nonlinear and time dependent response will be sought. The objective of the Fiber Braggs Gratings (FBGs) were to advance the state-of-the-art by developing techniques using FBG sensors that are capable of assessing stress-rupture degradation in Kevlar COPVs in a health monitoring mode (1). Moreover, they sought to answer questions of how embedded sensors affect overall integrity of the structure. And lastly, they sought to provide an important link in the overall stress rupture study that will help close the loop on the COPV fabrication process. NDE inspection methods will be used from start to finish and FBG will be an integral link within the overall chain.

Banks, Curtis↗

NASA NTRS2007

Composite Overwrap Pressure Vessels: Mechanics and Stress Rupture Lifing Philosophy

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) has been conducting an independent technical assessment to address safety concerns related to the known stress rupture failure mode of filament wound pressure vessels in use on Shuttle and the International Space Station. The Shuttle's Kevlar-49 fiber overwrapped tanks are of particular concern due to their long usage and the poorly understood stress rupture process in Kevlar-49 filaments. Existing long term data show that the rupture process is a function of stress, temperature and time. However due to the presence of load sharing liners and the complex manufacturing procedures, the state of actual fiber stress in flight hardware and test articles is not clearly known. Indeed non-conservative life predictions have been made where stress rupture data and lifing procedures have ignored the contribution of the liner in favor of applied pressure as the controlling load parameter. With the aid of analytical and finite element results, this paper examines the fundamental mechanical response of composite overwrapped pressure vessels including the influence of elastic-plastic liners and degraded/creeping overwrap properties. Graphical methods are presented describing the non-linear relationship of applied pressure to Kevlar-49 fiber stress/strain during manufacturing, operations and burst loadings. These are applied to experimental measurements made on a variety of vessel systems to demonstrate the correct calibration of fiber stress as a function of pressure. Applying this analysis to the actual qualification burst data for Shuttle flight hardware revealed that the nominal fiber stress at burst was in some cases 23% lower than what had previously been used to predict stress rupture life. These results motivate a detailed discussion of the appropriate stress rupture lifing philosophy for COPVs including the correct transference of stress rupture life data between dissimilar vessels and test articles.

Thesken, John C.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Astronaut Risk Levels During Crew Module (CM) Land Landing

The NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) is investigating the merits of water and land landings for the crew exploration vehicle (CEV). The merits of these two options are being studied in terms of cost and risk to the astronauts, vehicle, support personnel, and general public. The objective of the present work is to determine the astronaut dynamic response index (DRI), which measures injury risks. Risks are determined for a range of vertical and horizontal landing velocities. A structural model of the crew module (CM) is developed and computational simulations are performed using a transient dynamic simulation analysis code (LS-DYNA) to determine acceleration profiles. Landing acceleration profiles are input in a human factors model that determines astronaut risk levels. Details of the modeling approach, the resulting accelerations, and astronaut risk levels are provided.

Lawrence, Charles↗

NASA NTRS2007

A Comparison of Various Stress Rupture Life Models for Orbiter Composite Pressure Vessels and Confidence Intervals

In conjunction with a recent NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) investigation of flight worthiness of Kevlar Overwrapped Composite Pressure Vessels (COPVs) on board the Orbiter, two stress rupture life prediction models were proposed independently by Phoenix and by Glaser. In this paper, the use of these models to determine the system reliability of 24 COPVs currently in service on board the Orbiter is discussed. The models are briefly described, compared to each other, and model parameters and parameter uncertainties are also reviewed to understand confidence in reliability estimation as well as the sensitivities of these parameters in influencing overall predicted reliability levels. Differences and similarities in the various models will be compared via stress rupture reliability curves (stress ratio vs. lifetime plots). Also outlined will be the differences in the underlying model premises, and predictive outcomes. Sources of error and sensitivities in the models will be examined and discussed based on sensitivity analysis and confidence interval determination. Confidence interval results and their implications will be discussed for the models by Phoenix and Glaser.

Grimes-Ledesma, Lorie↗

NASA NTRS2007

Independent Review Support for Phoenix Mars Mission Robotic Arm Brush Motor Failure

The Phoenix Project requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) perform an independent peer review of the Robotic Arm (RA) Direct Current (DC) motor brush anomalies that originated during the Mars Exploration Rover (MER) Project and recurred during the Phoenix Project. The request was to evaluate the Phoenix Project investigation efforts and provide an independent risk assessment. This includes a recommendation for additional work and assessment of the flight worthiness of the RA DC motors. Based on the investigation and findings contained within this report, the IRT concurs with the risk assessment Failure Cause / Corrective Action (FC/CA) by the project, "Failure Effect Rating "3"; Major Degradation or Total Loss of Function, Failure Cause/Corrective Action Rating Currently "4"; Unknown Cause, Uncertainty in Corrective Action."

McManamen, John P.↗

NASA NTRS2007

DAWN Mission Bus and Waveguide Venting Analysis Review

A concern was raised regarding the time after launch when the DAWN Mission Communications Subsystem, which contains a 100 Watt X-Band Traveling Wave Tube Amplifier (TWTA) with a high voltage ((approximately 7 Kilo Volt (KV)) Electronic Power Converter (EPC), will be powered on for the first post-launch downlink. This activation is planned to be approximately one hour after launch. Orbital Sciences (the DAWN Mission spacecraft contractor) typically requires a 24-hour wait period prior to high voltage initiation for Earth-orbiting Science and GEO spacecraft. The concern relates to the issue of corona and/or radio frequency (RF) breakdown of the TWTA ((high voltage direct current (DC) and RF)), and of the microwave components (high voltage RF) in the presence of partial atmospheric pressures or outgassing constituents. In particular, generally the diplexer and circulator are susceptible to RF breakdown in the corona region due to the presence of small physical gaps ((~ 2.5 millimeter (mm)) between conductors that carry an RF voltage. The NESC concurred the DAWN Mission communication system is safe for activation.

Cragg, Clinton H.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT and E) Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems

A team directed by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) collected methodologies for how best to develop safe and reliable human rated systems and how to identify the drivers that provide the basis for assessing safety and reliability. The team also identified techniques, methodologies, and best practices to assure that NASA can develop safe and reliable human rated systems. The results are drawn from a wide variety of resources, from experts involved with the space program since its inception to the best-practices espoused in contemporary engineering doctrine. This report focuses on safety and reliability considerations and does not duplicate or update any existing references. Neither does it intend to replace existing standards and policy.

Miller, James↗

NASA NTRS2008

Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT and E) Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems

Miller, James↗

NASA NTRS2008

Ares I-X Upper Stage Simulator Residual Stress Analysis

The structural analyses described in the present report were performed in support of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Critical Initial Flaw Size (CIFS) assessment for the Ares I-X Upper Stage Simulator (USS) common shell segment. An independent assessment was conducted to determine the critical initial flaw size (CIFS) for the flange-to-skin weld in the Ares I-X Upper Stage Simulator (USS). The Ares system of space launch vehicles is the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration s plan for replacement of the aging space shuttle. The new Ares space launch system is somewhat of a combination of the space shuttle system and the Saturn launch vehicles used prior to the shuttle. Here, a series of weld analyses are performed to determine the residual stresses in a critical region of the USS. Weld residual stresses both increase constraint and mean stress thereby having an important effect on fatigue and fracture life. The results of this effort served as one of the critical load inputs required to perform a CIFS assessment of the same segment.

Raju, Ivatury S.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Binding Procurement

This viewgraph presentation reviews the use of the binding procurement process in purchasing Aerospace Flight Battery Systems. NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) requested NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group to develop a set of guideline requirements document for Binding Procurement Contracts.

Rao, Gopalakrishna M.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Guidelines for Reliable DC/DC Converters for Space Use

NESC saw the need to study the persistent failure of DC/DC Converters during ground testing and in flight, motivated investigation of causes and mitigation options. Research indicated misapplication and device quality to be root causes. The study took 20 months. Team included multiple NASA Centers : JPL, JSC, MSFC, GSFC Project Background

Plante, Jeannette↗

NASA NTRS2008

Assessment of the LC-2 Prelaunch Fatigue Spectra of the CM-to-SM Flange Weld

The pad stay and rollout components of the Ares I-X life cycle can generate cyclic stress oscillations to the vehicle that could initiate and grow fatigue cracks from weld defects. The Ares I-X Project requested that a study be performed to determine if stabilization of the vehicle is required to reduce the stresses that could initiate and grow fatigue cracks at the flange-to-skin weld of the Command Module (CM) and Service Module (SM) interface. A fatigue crack growth analysis was conducted that used loads (LC-2) and stress analyses developed by the Ares I-X Project and utilized material data and analysis methods developed by a critical initial flaw size (CIFS) analysis conducted by NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) for the Upper Stage Simulator (USS) of the Ares I-X vehicle. A full CIFS analysis for the CM-to-SM flange-to-skin weld was not performed because the full flight spectrum was not provided and was not necessary to answer the question posed by the Ares I-X Project. Instead, an approach was developed to determine if the crack growth due to the pad stay and rollout components of the flight spectrum would adversely influence the CIFS. The approach taken used a number of conservative assumptions that eliminated the need for high-fidelity analyses and additional material testing, but still provided a bounding solution for the uncertainties of the problem. The results from this analysis indicate that the LC-2 pad stay and rollout spectrum components would not produce significant fatigue crack growth on the CM-to-SM flange-to-skin weld. Thus, from a fatigue crack growth standpoint, no stabilization is required to reduce the LC-2 pad stay and rollout cyclic stresses on the CM-to-SM flange-to-skin weld.

Dawicke, David S.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Failure Analysis Study and Long-Term Reliability of Optical Assemblies with End-Face Damage

In June 2005, the NESC received a multi-faceted request to determine the long term reliability of fiber optic termini on the ISS that exhibited flaws not manufactured to best workmanship practices. There was a lack of data related to fiber optic workmanship as it affects the long term reliability of optical fiber assemblies in a harsh environment. A fiber optic defect analysis was requested which would find and/or create various types of chips, spalls, scratches, etc., that were identified by the ISS personnel. Once the defects and causes were identified the next step would be to perform long term reliability testing of similar assemblies with similar defects. The goal of the defect analysis would be for the defects to be observed and documented for deterioration of fiber optic performance. Though this report mostly discusses what has been determined as evidence of poor manufacturing processes, it also concludes the majority of the damage could have been avoided with a rigorous process in place.

Kichak, Robert A.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Pad B Catenary Capability Analysis and Technical Exchange Meeting (TEM) Support

The existing lightning protection system at Pad 39B for the Space Shuttle is an outgrowth of a system that was put in place for the Apollo Program. Dr. Frank Fisher of Lightning Technologies was a key participant in the design and implementation of that system. He conveyed to the NESC team that the catenary wire provision was put in place quickly (as assurance against possible vehicle damage causing critical launch delays) rather than being implemented as a comprehensive system designed to provide a high degree of guaranteed protection. Also, the technology of lightning protection has evolved over time with considerable work being conducted by groups such as the electric utilities companies, aircraft manufacturers, universities, and others. Several accepted present-day methods for analysis of lightning protection were used by Drs. Medelius and Mata to study the expected lightning environment for the Pad 39B facility and to analyze the degree of protection against direct lightning attachment to the Space Shuttle. The specific physical configuration directly affects the vulnerability, so cases that were considered included the RSS next to and rolled back from the Space Shuttle, and the GOx Vent Arm both extended and withdrawn from the ET. Elements of the lightning protection system at Pad 39B are shown in Figure 6.0-1 and consist of an 80 foot insulating mast on top of the Fixed Support Structure (FSS), a catenary wire system that runs from the mast in a North/South direction to grounds 1000 feet away on each side of the mast, the RSS which can either be next to or away from the Space Shuttle, and a GOx vent that can either be extended or retracted from the top of the ET.

Wilson, Timmy R.↗