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Role of reinforcement learning for risk-based robust control of cyber-physical energy systems

Critical infrastructures such as cyber-physical energy systems (CPS-E) integrate information flow and physical operations that are vulnerable to natural and targeted failures. Safe, secure, and reliable operation and control of CPS-E is critical to ensure societal well-being and economic prosperity. Automated control is key for real-time operations and may be mathematically cast as a sequential decision-making problem under uncertainty. Emergence of data-driven techniques for decision making under uncertainty, such as reinforcement learning (RL), have led to promising advances for addressing sequential decision-making problems for risk-based robust CPS-E control. However, existing research challenges include understanding the applicability of RL methods across diverse CPS-E applications, addressing the effect of risk preferences across multiple RL methods, and development of open-source domain-aware simulation environments for RL experimentation within a CPS-E context. This article systematically analyzes the applicability of four types of RL methods (model-free, model-based, hybrid model-free and model-based, and hierarchical) for risk-based robust CPS-E control. Problem features and solution stability for the RL methods are also discussed. We demonstrate and compare the performance of multiple RL methods under different risk specifications (risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-seeking) through the development and application of an open-source simulation environment. Motivating numerical simulation examples include representative single-zone and multizone building control use cases. Finally, six key insights for future research and broader adoption of RL methods are identified, with specific emphasis on problem features, algorithmic explainability, and solution stability.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

A Graph-Net with Node Embeddings to Detect False Data Injection Attacks in Photovoltaic Systems

Distributed energy resources (DER) contribute to the operational stability of the larger power grid both at utility-scale as well as commercial and residential scales in aggregated forms. These DER in-turn are susceptible to increasing cyber threats. An adversary can plug into the same local network that a field photovoltaic (PV) system uses to interconnect its data loggers and inverters and manipulate certain measurements collected from the network or trick existing irradiance and inverter readings through false data injection attacks (FDIA). Control routines that rely on these measurements can propagate the false data, impacting critical decisions that result in a suboptimal operation or even cause intentional harm leading to inverter-tripping or unscheduled loads that need to be shed. To detect FDIA in PV systems, the paper introduces an attention-based graph neural network with node embeddings and applied it to a simple prototypical DC-coupled microgrid with PV, energy storage, and load. The algorithm shows a detection accuracy of up to 98.95%. The proposed FDIA detection technique will provide micro-grid operators with an effective method to safeguard their systems, guaranteeing the secure and reliable operation.

Parvez, Imtiaz [Utah Valley University]↗

SURVEILLANCE DETECTION FOR TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TO PREVENT HIJACKING, THEFT, SABOTAGE, AND MALICIOUS SECURITY EVENTS DURING TRANSPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL

The secure transportation of high-consequence materials, including nuclear and radiological assets, is a critical global priority in the face of escalating terrorism, security threats, and violent protests targeting these operations. Effective surveillance detection—the ability to identify, assess, and respond to potential threats across a continuum of scenarios—is paramount in addressing these challenges. This paper outlines a phased, multi-tiered training program designed to strengthen the surveillance detection capabilities of organizations responsible for nuclear material transport. The proposed training program adopts a progressive approach, gradually increasing in technical complexity to provide participants with comprehensive knowledge and tools for implementing robust security strategies. It targets a wide spectrum of stakeholders, including competent authorities, regulators, inspectors, shippers, carriers, law enforcement, and emergency response personnel, equipping them to plan, evaluate, and safeguard nuclear material transportation effectively. Each phase of the program emphasizes distinct elements of the surveillance detection continuum and transport security, focusing on critical topics such as threat identification, adversary task timelines, protective methodologies, and attack mitigation strategies. The training framework is anchored in technical exchanges and scenario-driven courses that reflect real-world complexities and challenges. By addressing the surveillance detection continuum comprehensively—from early threat assessment to active countermeasures—the program reinforces global efforts to secure nuclear assets. It aligns with international security objectives and fosters a strong security culture within participating organizations, ensuring personnel are prepared to counter potential threats and maintain the safe, secure movement of these materials. Ultimately, this initiative aims to enhance preparedness, security, and response capabilities, supporting the global mission to safeguard high-consequence materials against evolving threats.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

Cybersecurity Risk Profiles for Distributed Energy Resource Management Systems

Managing the digitalization of increasingly diversity energy resources is a complex challenge for energy systems planners and managers. As the penetration of solar photovoltaics (PV) and other distributed renewable energy resources (DERs) expands, distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) will play an increasingly important role in managing, monitoring, and controlling DERs as electric systems before more distributed, interconnected, and networked. However, the cybersecurity implications of DERMS deployments are not well understood today. A lack of understanding around the cybersecurity implications of DERMS deployments and variability in the security posture of DERMS vendors, owners, and operators could introduce new security risks to evolving electric power systems. This paper describes cybersecurity attack scenarios on DERMS, identifies related cybersecurity standards and guidelines, reviews the security features of state-of-the-art DERMS solutions, and offers cybersecurity guidance for DERMS vendors, owners, and operators to protect DERMS' unique capabilities. Standardizing cybersecurity requirements for DERMS could help improve the security of DERMS integrations and improve innovations that are more secure by design. The cybersecurity guidance found in this paper is intended to offer a unified approach and lay the foundation for future standardization of DERMS cybersecurity to reduce risk to the solar industry and other renewable energy stakeholders when integrating these technologies with electric power systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Proposed Classifications of Remote Operations for Nuclear Reactors Based on Physical and Cybersecurity Considerations

The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Multilayered Network Models for Security: Enhancing System Security Engineering with Orchestration

Security engineering approaches can often focus on a particular domain—physical security, cyber security, or personnel security, for example. Yet, security systems engineering consistently faces challenges requiring socio-technical solutions to address evolving and dynamic complexity. While some drivers of this complexity stem from complex risk environments, innovative adversaries, and disruptive technologies, other drivers are endogenous and emerge from the interactions across security engineering approaches. In response, INCOSE's Systems Security Working Group identified the need to better coordinate “disparate security solutions [that] operate independently” as one of eleven key concepts in their IS21 FuSE Security Roadmap. From this perspective, this need for “security orchestration” aligns with the perspective that security is a property that emerges from interactions within complex systems. Current efforts at Sandia National Laboratories are developing a systems security engineering approach that describes high consequence facility (HCF) security as a multidomain set of interacting layers. The result is a multilayered network (MLN)-based approach that captures the interactions between infrastructure, physical components, digital components, and humans in nuclear security systems. This article will summarize the MLN-based approach to HCF security and describe two preliminary results demonstrating potential benefits from incorporating interactions across disparate security solutions. Here, leveraging the logical structure of networks, this MLN model-based approach provides an example of how security orchestration provides enhanced systems security engineering solutions.

42 ENGINEERING↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions (CY 2019)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this source dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2020

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. Radionuclides in air from NNSS activities have been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this sources dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of manmade radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), specifically the National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (40 CFR 61, Subpart H, 2020) limits the release of radioactivity from a DOE facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent (EDE) to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS. This alternative was proposed and formerly submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are closer to radionuclide releases than where the public resides so they act as protective substitutes for public receptor locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in Table 2 of 40 CFR 61, Appendix E. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. The EPAapproved air transport model, called the Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) is also used to calculate the effective dose equivalent to the maximally exposed individual from NNSS air emissions. CAP88-PC was also used to calculate the population dose, or the collective EDE (expressed as person-rem [roentgen equivalent man] per year [person-rem/y]) for all individuals combined who reside within 80 kilometers (km) of NNSS emission sources. In 2020, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by both the air sampling data collected at critical receptor air monitoring stations and CAP88-PC modeling. The average concentrations of radioactivity at air critical receptor stations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 4.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. CAP88-PC modeling of all 2020 NNSS radionuclide emissions showed the maximally exposed individual to be in Amargosa Valley and this individual received a potential dose of 0.063 mrem/y. The collective dose was calculated to be 0.29 person-rem/year for the 521,300 people who lived within 80 km of NNSS emission sources.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

An Evaluation of The Dynamic Physical Security Risk Assessment Methodology for Fleet-Wide Applications

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This integrated process for physical security analysis is named Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). This document provides an update on the progress in applying the MASS-DEF process to an operating commercial nuclear power plant as well as additional industry feedback regarding use of the tool for other physical security risk-informed topics. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, and integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5 or MAAP. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report is an update the progress of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report also provides an update to the procedural guidance for the MASS-DEF process and an overview of the generic models available for use by utilities. This report does not contain any plant’s sensitive information and/or safeguards information. This study’s purpose was to verify that the results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Plant-specific Model and Data Analysis using Dynamic Security Modeling and Simulation

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large on-site physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an update on the progress in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available force-on-force simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework or MASS-DEF. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report does not contain any plant's sensitive information and/or Safeguards Information. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Evaluation of Physical Security Risk for Potential Implementation of FLEX using Dynamic Simulation Methods

The requirements for United States nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their large operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Physical Security Pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. This pathway will analyze and minimize the conservatisms built into current security postures in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within this pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force (FOF) modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrated them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an overview of lessons learned in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available FOF simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific FOF models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System or Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations, and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance of the use of the framework. Such an assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants. NOTE: The work performed in this report is based on a generic EMRALD model with actual plant data used for the analysis. However, only the generic model and general results of the analysis are in the report. No plant’s sensitive information is discussed in this report. The discussion shows examples of insights that can be obtained from the MASS-DEF methodology.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Equipment Self-Assessment Guide Checklist

This Equipment Self-Assessment Checklist is designed for asset owners and operators (AOOs) responsible for the deployment, operation, maintenance, or cybersecurity oversight of grid systems and digital energy technologies. It provides a structured inspection checklist for evaluating the security, integrity, and operational trustworthiness of equipment across substations, generation sites, distributed energy resources (DERs), and control environments.

32 - ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZA↗

What Role Do Aggregators Play in Power System Security and Resilience?

Barriers to the participation of distributed energy resources (DERs) in wholesale electricity markets have limited the use of DERs for power system security and resilience. In September 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved an order to reduce these barriers. FERC Order No. 2222 enables the participation of DER aggregators in wholesale electricity markets. DERs include renewable generation and technologies that support the integration of renewable generation by increasing grid flexibility and resilience. Requiring wholesale energy markets to allow DER aggregator participation provides a path for DERs to become competitive in these markets. As the contribution from aggregated DERs continues to increase, the aggregator's role in supporting grid security and resilience will become more critical. This paper reviews work that demonstrates how DER aggregators can provide resilience support through technical capabilities, operational strategies, and secure communication architectures. Socioeconomic influences and impacts of aggregators, including implications for social resilience, are presented. In surveying the current state-of-the-art across different but interconnected topics, we illustrate how aggregators can be power system participants that enhance grid security. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to enhancing resilience in a power grid that includes a growing cohort of DER aggregators, but there are many options for aggregators to contribute to a more resilient and secure power grid.

aggregator↗

What Role Do Aggregators Play in Power System Security and Resilience? Preprint

Barriers to the participation of distributed energy resources (DERs) in wholesale electricity markets have limited the use of DERs for power system security and resilience. In September 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved an order to reduce these barriers. FERC Order No. 2222 enables the participation of DER aggregators in wholesale electricity markets. DERs include renewable generation and technologies that support the integration of renewable generation by increasing grid flexibility and resilience. Requiring wholesale energy markets to allow DER aggregator participation provides a path for DERs to become competitive in these markets. As the contribution from aggregated DERs continues to increase, the aggregator's role in supporting grid security and resilience will become more critical. This paper reviews work that demonstrates how DER aggregators can provide resilience support through technical capabilities, operational strategies, and secure communication architectures. Socioeconomic influences and impacts of aggregators, including implications for social resilience, are presented. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to enhancing resilience in a power grid that includes a growing cohort of DER aggregators, but there are many options for aggregators to contribute to a more resilient and secure power grid.

aggregator↗

Modelling and control coordination scheme of a wind‐to‐hydrogen set for future renewable‐based power systems

New challenges regarding system stability and efficiency arise when power systems operate with a high penetration level of inverter‐based renewable sources (IBRSs) and few synchronous generators. Since IBRSs have been on the rise, to secure the stable operation of future power systems, IBRSs will be required to support systems without having to rely on remaining synchronous generators. Also, to efficiently manage the uncertainty of renewable production, power‐to‐gas technology can provide the required flexibility. This study proposes modelling and a control coordination scheme (CCS) of a wind‐to‐hydrogen (W2H) set to optimise electricity production from a variable‐speed wind turbine generator (WTG) while helping balance between supply and demand in a system. To achieve this, a grid‐forming (GFM) inverter‐based WTG is modelled and a set of electrolyser and fuel cell is integrated at the DC circuit of a GFM‐WTG to be coordinated. Furthermore, the CCS offers an opportunity to reduce the investment cost for deploying a W2H set by utilising the control capabilities of a WTG and reducing the need for an additional device. The performance of the proposed W2H set with the CCS was verified considering the variations in system load and wind speed by using Power System Computer Aided Design (PSCAD)/ElectroMagnetic Transients including Direct Current (EMTDC).

Kim, Jinho↗

US Department of Energy, Office of Science High Performance Computing Facility Operational Assessment 2019 Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility

Oak Ridge National Laboratory's (ORNL's) Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF) continues to surpass its operational target goals: supporting users; delivering fast, reliable computational ecosystems; creating innovative solutions for high performance computing (HPC) needs; and managing risks, safety, and security associated with operating some of the most powerful computers in the world. The results can be seen in the cutting-edge science conducted by users and the praise from the research community. Calendar year (CY) 2019 was a big year as OLCF staff ran five world-class resources (the leadershipclass computers Titan and Summit, the large analysis cluster called Eos, and the massive parallel filesystems called Atlas and Alpine)) and also began power and cooling upgrades for a 2021 exascale system called Frontier. While continuing exceptional operation of Titan, Eos, and Rhea, the OLCF released the Summit supercomputer for production on January 1, 2019. Summit debuted as the most capable and efficient system in its class and has been recognized as the most powerful system in the world for its performance on both the high performance linpack (HPL) and conjugate gradient (HPCG) benchmark applications since June 2018 according to TOP500. Summit represents the culmination of a multiyear effort between the OLCF, IBM, NVIDIA, and Mellanox to deliver a system that is unmatched for modeling, simulation, data analysis, and learning. To hit the ground running with science-ready applications on day one, application teams worked closely with the OLCF through the Center for Accelerated Application Readiness (CAAR) program for years in advance of the Summit deployment. CY 2019 was filled with outstanding results and accomplishments: a very high rating from users on overall satisfaction for the sixth year in a row; a tremendous amount of core-hours delivered to researchers from two leadership-class systems; and success in delivering on the allocation split of roughly 60%, 30%, and 10% of core-hours offered for the Innovative and Novel Computational Impact on Theory and Experiment (INCITE), Advanced Scientific Computing Research Leadership Computing Challenge (ALCC), and Director's Discretionary (DD) programs, respectively (see Operational Performance section). These accomplishments, coupled with the high utilization rates (overall and capability usage), represent the fulfillment of the promise of both leadership-class machines: efficient facilitation of leadership-class computational applications. Table ES.1 presents a summary of the 2019 OLCF metric targets and the associated results. More information can be found in the Operational Performance section for each OLCF resource. The scientific accomplishments of OLCF users are a strong indication of long-term operational success, with publications this year in such notable journals and publications as Nature, Nature Physics, Nature Plants, Physical Review X, Journal of the American Physical Society, Cell, Nano Letters, and Trends in Biotechnology. Crucial domain-specific discoveries facilitated by resources at the OLCF are described in the High Performance Computing Facility Operational Assessment 2019 Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility (OAR) Strategic Results section. For example, researchers used Summit to pinpoint and understand the production of proteins from genetic information, including mutations and the functional expression of disease (Section 8.2).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Power System Resilience Considering Hurricane Storms and Generator Step-up Transformers

Power system resilience describes the system’s ability to withstand and recover quickly from unexpected power outages due to extreme events. As society’s electrification continues at a rapid rate, it is imperative electric infrastructure is designed and operated with extra security. This work studies the impact of severe hurricane storms on the power system located along the United States’ Eastern Seaboard. Specific focus is designated to steady state system operation and loss of large generation step up power transformers. A series of phasor domain power system simulations are conducted to determine the critical point at which the system loses steady state operability. Additionally, active power load shedding and generator dispatching are studied as mitigation and recovery strategies. Results indicate generator dispatching as an effective proactive mitigation strategy and load shedding as an effective recovery strategy.

Liu, Yilu↗

US Department of Energy, Office of Science High Performance Computing Facility Operational Assessment 2021: Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility

Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s (ORNL’s) Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF) continues to surpass its operational target goals of supporting users; delivering fast, reliable computational ecosystems; creating innovative solutions for high-performance computing (HPC) needs; contributing to the community to build the next generation HPC workforce, and managing risks, safety, and security associated with operating some of the most powerful computers in the world. The results can be seen in the cutting-edge science conducted by users and the praise from the research community. Calendar year (CY) 2021 saw continued excellence in research supported by the OLCF’s leadership-class computing resources, including Summit (the nation’s most powerful supercomputer), the global scratch file system Alpine, the Scalable Protected Infrastructure (SPI), the Exploratory Visualization Environment for Research in Science and Technology (EVEREST), and the archival mass-storage resource High-Performance Storage System (HPSS). While maintaining access and exceptional user support for Summit, the OLCF continued to make progress on the installation and deployment of Frontier, which will be the nation’s first exascale system when it comes online at the start of CY 2023. Users have already begun running and optimizing scientific codes on Crusher, the OLCF test and development system equipped with Frontier’s architecture. Throughout the year, the OLCF maintained a strong culture of operational excellence, including risk management, workplace safety, and cybersecurity. The OLCF’s rigorous risk management strategy anticipated and mitigated risks, and at this time there are no high-priority operational risks. Similarly, ORNL and the OLCF were committed to operating under the US Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) safety regulations that ensure a safe workplace. Technical staff tracked and monitored existing threats and vulnerabilities within the OLCF while continually developing tools and practices to enhance operations without increasing the facility’s risk. CY 2021 was filled with outstanding results and accomplishments, including a very high rating from users on overall satisfaction for the eighth consecutive year; a tremendous number of node hours delivered to 1,671 researchers on Summit; and the successful delivery of the allocation split of roughly 60%, 20%, and 20% of core-hours offered for the Innovative and Novel Computational Impact on Theory and Experiment (INCITE), Advanced Scientific Computing Research Leadership Computing Challenge (ALCC), and Director’s Discretionary (DD) programs, respectively (Section 2). COVID-19 research remained a focus in 2021, and the ALCC and DD programs allocated over 1 million Summit hours to the COVID-19 High Performance Computing Consortium. These accomplishments, coupled with the high utilization rates (i.e., overall and capability usage), represent the fulfillment of the promise of leadership class machines: efficient facilitation of leadership-class computational applications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗