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NASA NTRS1979

Fault diagnostic instrumentation design for environmental control and life support systems

As a development phase moves toward flight hardware, the system availability becomes an important design aspect which requires high reliability and maintainability. As part of continous development efforts, a program to evaluate, design, and demonstrate advanced instrumentation fault diagnostics was successfully completed. Fault tolerance designs for reliability and other instrumenation capabilities to increase maintainability were evaluated and studied.

Yang, P. Y.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Avionics System Architecture for the NASA Orion Vehicle

It has been 30 years since the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) last developed a crewed spacecraft capable of launch, on-orbit operations, and landing. During that time, aerospace avionics technologies have greatly advanced in capability, and these technologies have enabled integrated avionics architectures for aerospace applications. The inception of NASA s Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) spacecraft offers the opportunity to leverage the latest integrated avionics technologies into crewed space vehicle architecture. The outstanding question is to what extent to implement these advances in avionics while still meeting the unique crewed spaceflight requirements for safety, reliability and maintainability. Historically, aircraft and spacecraft have very similar avionics requirements. Both aircraft and spacecraft must have high reliability. They also must have as much computing power as possible and provide low latency between user control and effecter response while minimizing weight, volume, and power. However, there are several key differences between aircraft and spacecraft avionics. Typically, the overall spacecraft operational time is much shorter than aircraft operation time, but the typical mission time (and hence, the time between preventive maintenance) is longer for a spacecraft than an aircraft. Also, the radiation environment is typically more severe for spacecraft than aircraft. A "loss of mission" scenario (i.e. - the mission is not a success, but there are no casualties) arguably has a greater impact on a multi-million dollar spaceflight mission than a typical commercial flight. Such differences need to be weighted when determining if an aircraft-like integrated modular avionics (IMA) system is suitable for a crewed spacecraft. This paper will explore the preliminary design process of the Orion vehicle avionics system by first identifying the Orion driving requirements and the difference between Orion requirements and those of other previous crewed spacecraft avionics systems. Common systems engineering methods will be used to evaluate the value propositions, or the factors that weight most heavily in design consideration, of Orion and other aerospace systems. Then, the current Orion avionics architecture will be presented and evaluated.

Baggerman, Clint↗

NASA NTRS2016

Mass and Reliability System (MaRS)

The Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate is responsible for mitigating risk, providing system safety, and lowering risk for space programs from ground to space. The S&MA is divided into 4 divisions: The Space Exploration Division (NC), the International Space Station Division (NE), the Safety & Test Operations Division (NS), and the Quality and Flight Equipment Division (NT). The interns, myself and Arun Aruljothi, will be working with the Risk & Reliability Analysis Branch under the NC Division's. The mission of this division is to identify, characterize, diminish, and communicate risk by implementing an efficient and effective assurance model. The team utilizes Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to ensure decisions concerning risks are informed, vehicles are safe and reliable, and program/project requirements are realistic and realized. This project pertains to the Orion mission, so it is geared toward a long duration Human Space Flight Program(s). For space missions, payload is a critical concept; balancing what hardware can be replaced by components verse by Orbital Replacement Units (ORU) or subassemblies is key. For this effort a database was created that combines mass and reliability data, called Mass and Reliability System or MaRS. The U.S. International Space Station (ISS) components are used as reference parts in the MaRS database. Using ISS components as a platform is beneficial because of the historical context and the environment similarities to a space flight mission. MaRS uses a combination of systems: International Space Station PART for failure data, Vehicle Master Database (VMDB) for ORU & components, Maintenance & Analysis Data Set (MADS) for operation hours and other pertinent data, & Hardware History Retrieval System (HHRS) for unit weights. MaRS is populated using a Visual Basic Application. Once populated, the excel spreadsheet is comprised of information on ISS components including: operation hours, random/nonrandom failures, software/hardware failures, quantity, orbital replaceable units (ORU), date of placement, unit weight, frequency of part, etc. The motivation for creating such a database will be the development of a mass/reliability parametric model to estimate mass required for replacement parts. Once complete, engineers working on future space flight missions will have access a mean time to failures and on parts along with their mass, this will be used to make proper decisions for long duration space flight missions

Barnes, Sarah↗

NASA NTRS1994

Space flight risk data collection and analysis project: Risk and reliability database

The focus of the NASA 'Space Flight Risk Data Collection and Analysis' project was to acquire and evaluate space flight data with the express purpose of establishing a database containing measurements of specific risk assessment - reliability - availability - maintainability - supportability (RRAMS) parameters. The developed comprehensive RRAMS database will support the performance of future NASA and aerospace industry risk and reliability studies. One of the primary goals has been to acquire unprocessed information relating to the reliability and availability of launch vehicles and the subsystems and components thereof from the 45th Space Wing (formerly Eastern Space and Missile Command -ESMC) at Patrick Air Force Base. After evaluating and analyzing this information, it was encoded in terms of parameters pertinent to ascertaining reliability and availability statistics, and then assembled into an appropriate database structure.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2016

[MaRS Project]

The Space Exploration Division of the Safety and Mission Assurances Directorate is responsible for reducing the risk to Human Space Flight Programs by providing system safety, reliability, and risk analysis. The Risk & Reliability Analysis branch plays a part in this by utilizing Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) tools to identify possible types of failure and effective solutions. A continuous effort of this branch is MaRS, or Mass and Reliability System, a tool that was the focus of this internship. Future long duration space missions will have to find a balance between the mass and reliability of their spare parts. They will be unable take spares of everything and will have to determine what is most likely to require maintenance and spares. Currently there is no database that combines mass and reliability data of low level space-grade components. MaRS aims to be the first database to do this. The data in MaRS will be based on the hardware flown on the International Space Stations (ISS). The components on the ISS have a long history and are well documented, making them the perfect source. Currently, MaRS is a functioning excel workbook database; the backend is complete and only requires optimization. MaRS has been populated with all the assemblies and their components that are used on the ISS; the failures of these components are updated regularly. This project was a continuation on the efforts of previous intern groups. Once complete, R&M engineers working on future space flight missions will be able to quickly access failure and mass data on assemblies and components, allowing them to make important decisions and tradeoffs.

Aruljothi, Arunvenkatesh↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗

NASA NTRS1989

Simulation Of Failures And Repairs

Automated Reliability/Availability/Maintainability (ARAM) computer program one of software tools designed to assess candidate architectures of data-management system of the Space Station. Evaluates reliability, availability, and maintainability characteristcs of conceptual system. Uses data representing redundancy and maintainability characteristics of system, and reliability parameters of components of equipment. Design based upon simulation of failures and possible subsequent repairs of each unit of equipment included in system. Analyzes effects of failures and repairs on system and maintains statistics of behavior of system from which results of simulation obtained. Written for IBM PC XT/AT or compatible computer.

Vallone, Antonio↗

NASA NTRS1990

Space Station Freedom electric power system availability study

The results are detailed of follow-on availability analyses performed on the Space Station Freedom electric power system (EPS). The scope includes analyses of several EPS design variations, these are: the 4-photovoltaic (PV) module baseline EPS design, a 6-PV module EPS design, and a 3-solar dynamic module EPS design which included a 10 kW PV module. The analyses performed included: determining the discrete power levels that the EPS will operate at upon various component failures and the availability of each of these operating states; ranking EPS components by the relative contribution each component type gives to the power availability of the EPS; determining the availability impacts of including structural and long-life EPS components in the availability models used in the analyses; determining optimum sparing strategies, for storing space EPS components on-orbit, to maintain high average-power-capability with low lift-mass requirements; and analyses to determine the sensitivity of EPS-availability to uncertainties in the component reliability and maintainability data used.

Turnquist, Scott R.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Wear-Out Sensitivity Analysis Project Abstract

During the course of the Summer 2015 internship session, I worked in the Reliability and Maintainability group of the ISS Safety and Mission Assurance department. My project was a statistical analysis of how sensitive ORU's (Orbital Replacement Units) are to a reliability parameter called the wear-out characteristic. The intended goal of this was to determine a worst case scenario of how many spares would be needed if multiple systems started exhibiting wear-out characteristics simultaneously. The goal was also to determine which parts would be most likely to do so. In order to do this, my duties were to take historical data of operational times and failure times of these ORU's and use them to build predictive models of failure using probability distribution functions, mainly the Weibull distribution. Then, I ran Monte Carlo Simulations to see how an entire population of these components would perform. From here, my final duty was to vary the wear-out characteristic from the intrinsic value, to extremely high wear-out values and determine how much the probability of sufficiency of the population would shift. This was done for around 30 different ORU populations on board the ISS.

Harris, Adam↗

NASA NTRS1987

Reliability modeling of fault-tolerant computer based systems

Digital fault-tolerant computer-based systems have become commonplace in military and commercial avionics. These systems hold the promise of increased availability, reliability, and maintainability over conventional analog-based systems through the application of replicated digital computers arranged in fault-tolerant configurations. Three tightly coupled factors of paramount importance, ultimately determining the viability of these systems, are reliability, safety, and profitability. Reliability, the major driver affects virtually every aspect of design, packaging, and field operations, and eventually produces profit for commercial applications or increased national security. However, the utilization of digital computer systems makes the task of producing credible reliability assessment a formidable one for the reliability engineer. The root of the problem lies in the digital computer's unique adaptability to changing requirements, computational power, and ability to test itself efficiently. Addressed here are the nuances of modeling the reliability of systems with large state sizes, in the Markov sense, which result from systems based on replicated redundant hardware and to discuss the modeling of factors which can reduce reliability without concomitant depletion of hardware. Advanced fault-handling models are described and methods of acquiring and measuring parameters for these models are delineated.

Bavuso, Salvatore J.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Accounting for Proof Test Data in a Reliability Based Design Optimization Framework

This paper investigates the use of proof (or acceptance) test data during the reliability based design optimization of structural components. It is assumed that every component will be proof tested and that the component will only enter into service if it passes the proof test. The goal is to reduce the component weight, while maintaining high reliability, by exploiting the proof test results during the design process. The proposed procedure results in the simultaneous design of the structural component and the proof test itself and provides the designer with direct control over the probability of failing the proof test. The procedure is illustrated using two analytical example problems and the results indicate that significant weight savings are possible when exploiting the proof test results during the design process.

Ventor, Gerharad↗

NASA NTRS2003

Overview of Probabilistic Methods for SAE G-11 Meeting for Reliability and Uncertainty Quantification for DoD TACOM Initiative with SAE G-11 Division

The SAE G-11 RMSL Division and Probabilistic Methods Committee meeting during October 6-8 at the Best Western Sterling Inn, Sterling Heights (Detroit), Michigan is co-sponsored by US Army Tank-automotive & Armaments Command (TACOM). The meeting will provide an industry/government/academia forum to review RMSL technology; reliability and probabilistic technology; reliability-based design methods; software reliability; and maintainability standards. With over 100 members including members with national/international standing, the mission of the G-11's Probabilistic Methods Committee is to "enable/facilitate rapid deployment of probabilistic technology to enhance the competitiveness of our industries by better, faster, greener, smarter, affordable and reliable product development."

Singhal, Surendra N.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Overview of Future of Probabilistic Methods and RMSL Technology and the Probabilistic Methods Education Initiative for the US Army at the SAE G-11 Meeting

The SAE G-11 RMSL Division and Probabilistic Methods Committee meeting sponsored by the Picatinny Arsenal during March 1-3, 2004 at Westin Morristown, will report progress on projects for probabilistic assessment of Army system and launch an initiative for probabilistic education. The meeting features several Army and industry Senior executives and Ivy League Professor to provide an industry/government/academia forum to review RMSL technology; reliability and probabilistic technology; reliability-based design methods; software reliability; and maintainability standards. With over 100 members including members with national/international standing, the mission of the G-11s Probabilistic Methods Committee is to enable/facilitate rapid deployment of probabilistic technology to enhance the competitiveness of our industries by better, faster, greener, smarter, affordable and reliable product development.

Singhal, Surendra N.↗

NASA NTRS1972

Spacecraft reliability/maintainability optimization.

Description of a procedure to develop a methodology to optimize man-serviced systems for reliability and maintainability. The spacecraft systems are analyzed using failure modes and effects analysis and maintenance analysis, component mean-time-between failure, duty cycle, type of redundancy, and cost information to develop parametric data on various time intervals. Included are crew time-to-repair, cost, weight, and volume effects of increasing subsystem reliability above the baseline. Results are presented for space systems using the existing data from a research and applications module. These results show the minimum cost of sustaining mission operations.

Sharmahd, J. N.↗

NASA NTRS1992

Parametric estimation of R&M parameters during the conceptual design of space vehicles

Reliability and maintainability parameters of proposed space vehicles are estimated based on a comparability analysis of similar aircraft subsystems. Using multiple regression techniques, parametric equations are developed for each subsystem to predict mean flying hours between failure as a function of vehicle design and performance specifications. These estimates are then adjusted to account for reliability growth, environmental differences, and new technologies. Overall vehicle mission reliability may then be computed from subsystem reliability estimates.

Ebeling, Charles E.↗

NASA NTRS2019

A Multiple Model Based Approach for Deep Space Power System Fault Diagnosis

Improving protection and health management capabilities onboard the electrical power system (EPS) for spacecraft is essential for ensuring safe and reliable conditions for deep space human exploration. Electrical protection and control technologies on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) current human space platform relies heavily on ground support to monitor and diagnose power systems and failures. As communication bandwidth diminishes for deep space applications, a transformation in system monitoring and control becomes necessary to maintain high reliability of electric power service. This paper presents a novel approach for on-line power system security monitoring for autonomous deep space spacecraft.

Autonomous Power Controller↗

NASA NTRS2009

Johnson Space Center's Risk and Reliability Analysis Group 2008 Annual Report

The Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate s Risk and Reliability Analysis Group provides both mathematical and engineering analysis expertise in the areas of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) analysis, and data collection and analysis. The fundamental goal of this group is to provide National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) decisionmakers with the necessary information to make informed decisions when evaluating personnel, flight hardware, and public safety concerns associated with current operating systems as well as with any future systems. The Analysis Group includes a staff of statistical and reliability experts with valuable backgrounds in the statistical, reliability, and engineering fields. This group includes JSC S&MA Analysis Branch personnel as well as S&MA support services contractors, such as Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and SoHaR. The Analysis Group s experience base includes nuclear power (both commercial and navy), manufacturing, Department of Defense, chemical, and shipping industries, as well as significant aerospace experience specifically in the Shuttle, International Space Station (ISS), and Constellation Programs. The Analysis Group partners with project and program offices, other NASA centers, NASA contractors, and universities to provide additional resources or information to the group when performing various analysis tasks. The JSC S&MA Analysis Group is recognized as a leader in risk and reliability analysis within the NASA community. Therefore, the Analysis Group is in high demand to help the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) continue to fly safely, assist in designing the next generation spacecraft for the Constellation Program (CxP), and promote advanced analytical techniques. The Analysis Section s tasks include teaching classes and instituting personnel qualification processes to enhance the professional abilities of our analysts as well as performing major probabilistic assessments used to support flight rationale and help establish program requirements. During 2008, the Analysis Group performed more than 70 assessments. Although all these assessments were important, some were instrumental in the decisionmaking processes for the Shuttle and Constellation Programs. Two of the more significant tasks were the Space Transportation System (STS)-122 Low Level Cutoff PRA for the SSP and the Orion Pad Abort One (PA-1) PRA for the CxP. These two activities, along with the numerous other tasks the Analysis Group performed in 2008, are summarized in this report. This report also highlights several ongoing and upcoming efforts to provide crucial statistical and probabilistic assessments, such as the Extravehicular Activity (EVA) PRA for the Hubble Space Telescope service mission and the first fully integrated PRAs for the CxP's Lunar Sortie and ISS missions.

Valentine, Mark↗

NASA NTRS1996

Software Reliability Issues Concerning Large and Safety Critical Software Systems

This research was undertaken to provide NASA with a survey of state-of-the-art techniques using in industrial and academia to provide safe, reliable, and maintainable software to drive large systems. Such systems must match the complexity and strict safety requirements of NASA's shuttle system. In particular, the Launch Processing System (LPS) is being considered for replacement. The LPS is responsible for monitoring and commanding the shuttle during test, repair, and launch phases. NASA built this system in the 1970's using mostly hardware techniques to provide for increased reliability, but it did so often using custom-built equipment, which has not been able to keep up with current technologies. This report surveys the major techniques used in industry and academia to ensure reliability in large and critical computer systems.

Kamel, Khaled↗